Francesco, Jon, List, May I too, as Moderator of Peirce-L, but especially as a frequent active participant, join other list members who have welcomed you to the forum. Several active participants in our forum--including Jon, Gary Fuhrman (who a couple of years ago organized a slow read of Frederik Stjernfelt's, *Natural Propositions*, with Frederik joining in the discussion), and Dr. Jeff Downard--have read your book in its entirety and with great interest, finding it valuable in many ways. Gary F, in particular, has encouraged folk here, including me, to read it. So far I have had time to read only portions of it, but already can say that I greatly admire your scholarship, insights, and writing style. I hope to finish reading it in the next few weeks.
May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had occasion to read) including: CSP: And do not overlook the fact that the pragmaticist maxim says nothing of single experiments or of single experimental phenomena (for what is conditionally true *in futuro* can hardly be singular), but only speaks of *general kinds* of experimental phenomena. Its adherent does not shrink from speaking of *general objects* as real, since whatever is true represents a real. Now the laws of nature are true. (CP 5.426, EP 2:340; 1905, bold added) CSP: … thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of us virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of "real," the state of things which will be believed in that ultimate opinion is real. But, for the most part, such opinions will be general. Consequently, *some* *general objects* are real. (CP 5.430, EP 2:342-343; 1905, bold added) CSP: What is the nature of all these relations [between different points in space] as well as those of time? They all result from complications of only two elements. One of these is the relation of a distributively *general object*, "any" something, to the single individual collection which embraces "any" such, and nothing else. The other is the relation of geometrical *betweenness* … (EP 2:368; 1906, bold added) Why do write that the notion of a *general object* appears to you as "very unPeircean"? FB: Talk of "general objects" besides the dynamic and the immediate sounds to me very unPeircean. After all, Peirce clearly has the notion in mind in 1905-6. One would hope that it might at least be considered as "possibly Peircean" even if he is seen to be in error in positing such an object (a notion which, I must admit, I am still struggling with). I am sure I am not alone in looking forward to further lively discussions of your work (and possibly other Peircean themes) on Peirce-L should you find the time and have the inclination. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 4:46 PM Francesco Bellucci < [email protected]> wrote: > Dear Jon, List > > Thanks for your response. Here some further thoughts. > > You will agree that the notion of immediate object as a technical notion > of semiotics emerges in 1904, that it emerges in the classification of > signs, and that its purpose in the classification of signs up to 1906 is to > divide signs into vague, singular, and general. You will also agree that in > that context, as well as in other writings of the same year (Kaina > Stoicheia, MSS 4-11), singular means existentially quantified and general > means universally quantified (distributively general). I see that you also > agree that "all men" is not a rheme. Let's proceed from here. > > If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's taxonomies > of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with immediate > objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all men" is not a > rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects. > > I must say I do not understand the discussion of "general object". As far > as I know, symbols have a general object (indices an individual object), > legisigns are general in themselves (as types) and universally quantified > sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" > his preferred term). Talk of "general objects" besides the dynamic and the > immediate sounds to me very unPeircean. > > Best > Francesco > > >> >> My position regarding the Immediate Object (IO) has evolved since I >> offered the specific comment that you quoted, but I still maintain that >> *every >> *Sign has one. Peirce said so explicitly in at least two places, and >> certainly implied it in various others; so I think that any definition of >> the IO that *excludes *any class of Signs *cannot *be correct. >> Specifically, I find it unwarranted to infer from his *temporary *use of >> vague/singular/general as the division of the IO that *only *a >> proposition has one. Instead, we can say that quantification is always *part >> *of the IO of any *proposition*; but this by no means entails that a >> less complete Sign--i.e., a Rheme--does not have an IO *at all*. >> >> Indeed, "all men" (or "any man") is *not *a Rheme, but "man" certainly >> is; Peirce would have represented it as "_____ is a man" accordingly. >> "Mortal" is also a Rheme; Peirce would have likewise represented it as >> "_____ is mortal" accordingly. Quantification only becomes necessary when >> we *combine *two general Rhemes to form a proposition; e.g., "Any man is >> mortal." As Peirce realized by 1908, all Symbols are Copulatives according >> to the IO; in this case, the continuous predicate is "_____ possesses the >> character of _____," where the first blank is for a Designative and the >> second blank is for a Descriptive ("mortality"). The quantifier is what >> enables a *general *term ("man") to serve as a Designative ("any man," >> "this man," or "some man"). >> >> This ties in with my recent proposal that a Sign (Type) is in a *genuine >> *triadic relation with a General Object and the Final Interpretant, >> while an individual Sign-Replica (Token) is in a *degenerate *triadic >> relation with a Dynamic Object and a Dynamic Interpretant. Quantification, >> as part of the (internal) IO, is how a Replica of a proposition *delineates >> *its Dynamic Object from the General Object of the Sign that serves as >> its subject. This is evident in passages where Peirce referred to a >> "general subject." >> >> CSP: We know very well that universal propositions have general subjects >> … Thus the subject of a proposition if not an index is a precept >> prescribing the conditions under which an index is to be had. (EP 2:168; >> 1903) >> >> >> CSP: But a general subject is either an indesignate individual or a >> quodlibetical individual [any individual you please] of the universe to >> which no descriptive character is attached … It involves merely directions >> as to what one is to do to find an individual such as is intended, without >> at all describing that individual. (EP 2:224; 1903) >> >> >> >> CSP: A subject of a proposition is either *singular*, *general*, or >> *abstract >> *(*Summulae*). It is singular if it indicates an otherwise known >> individual. It is general if it describes how an individual is to be >> selected. A general subject is (as commonly recognized) either *universal >> *or *particular *(and indefinite). (CP 2.324, EP 2:284; 1903) >> >> >> Without a quantifier, a common noun like "man" has only a General Object, >> not a Dynamic Object. Being a Symbol, it is a Copulative as the Rheme, >> "_____ is a man"; but it is also a Descriptive in the sense that its IO is >> whatever possesses the necessary and sufficient set of *characters *that >> constitutes *what it means* to be a "man" as that term is *defined *in >> standard written English. It is no different from an adjective like >> "mortal" in that regard. >> >> CSP: Now a common noun [such] as "man," standing alone, is certainly an >> index, but not of the object it denotes. It is an index of the mental >> object which it calls up. It is the index of an icon; for it denotes >> whatever there may be which is like that image. (EP 2:17-18; 1895) >> >> CSP: For what is a "term," or "class-name," supposed to be? It is >> something which signifies, or, to use J. S. Mills' objectionable >> terminology, "connotes" certain characters, and thereby denotes whatever >> possesses those characters. That is, it draws the attention to an idea, or >> mental construction, or diagram, of something possessing those characters, >> and the possession of those characters is kept in the foreground of >> consciousness. What does that mean unless that the listener says to >> himself, "that which is *here* (before the attention) possesses such and >> such characters"? (CP 2.341; c. 1895) >> >> CSP: A general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the >> characters which it signifies … (CP 2.434; 1901-1902). >> >> >> This notion of the IO as a "mental object" or "mental construction" is >> what I take Peirce to have intended when he called it "the idea which the >> sign is built upon" (EP 2:407; 1907). The IO is thus the Essential Breadth >> of the Sign-Replica, the collection of Objects that corresponds to its >> Essential Depth--i.e., the Immediate Interpretant (II). Hence the IO and >> II are in a *doubly degenerate* triadic relation with the Sign-Qualities >> (Tones) of the Sign-Replica that make it *recognizable *as an Instance >> (Token) of the Sign (Type) *within *a particular Sign System--in this >> case, the sequence of shapes that spell out "m-a-n" or "m-o-r-t-a-l." >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 1:46 AM, Francesco Bellucci < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Dear All, >>> >>> I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is >>> Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in >>> Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic. >>> >>> Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (*Peirce's >>> Speculative Grammar*, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads >>> here on Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some >>> further thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the >>> discussion. >>> >>> One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have >>> immediate objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all >>> signs have immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention >>> – that in the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's >>> postpone discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to >>> their immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the >>> vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina >>> Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the >>> history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity: >>> Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called >>> particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which >>> traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the >>> vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest >>> that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object >>> into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has >>> been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we >>> should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least >>> that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the >>> "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions. >>> >>> Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division, >>> then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their >>> immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable >>> to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a >>> "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to >>> a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding >>> to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the >>> idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all >>> men" is a rheme. >>> >>> But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines >>> a rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable >>> by a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that >>> when the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if >>> "all men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been >>> extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us >>> imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are >>> mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a >>> proper name, like "Hamlet", this does *not *yield again a proposition: >>> "all men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And >>> since the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is >>> that this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction >>> to *all* signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified. >>> >>> Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon: >>> >>> "a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that >>> Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute >>> its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the >>> unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)" >>> >>> If the Object's characters taken together constitute the Immediate >>> Object of the Sign, what does it mean that such Immediate Object can be >>> vague, singular, or general? Let's suppose the Sign mentioned here is the >>> proposition "Halmet is mad". According to Jon, the Sign denotes the Dynamic >>> Object (arguably, Hamlet), and signifies one of the Object's characters >>> (arguably, his madness). Is this character vague, general, or singular? Can >>> you provide examples of three propositions (which, arguably, are Signs) in >>> one of which the character/Immediate Object is vague, in another is >>> general, and in the third is singular? And can you provide an example of a >>> proposition in which the characters signified are, taken together, singular? >>> >>> Best, >>> Francesco >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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