Francesco, List:
FB: As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general"
in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
term).
Where did Peirce state that (only) Symbols have a general Object and (only)
Indices have an individual Object? Again, my current understanding is
instead that *every *Sign is a Type, has a General Object, and only exists
in Replicas, each of which has an individual Dynamic Object.
FB: Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that
possesses the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the
immediate object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that
corresponds to the definition of man? Of course, every really existing man,
as well as those existed and those that will exist. If this is the
immediate object of the rheme "--is a man", what's its dynamic object?
I can see now that this is indeed unclear. How should we explain the
difference between the Essential, Informed, and Substantial Breadth of a
Sign? Peirce's definitions for them similarly require careful
differentiation.
CSP: By the *informed breadth* of a term, I shall mean all the real things
of which it is predicable, with logical truth on the whole in a supposed
state of information ... we define the *essential breadth* of a term as
those real things of which, according to its very meaning, a term is
predicable ... *Substantial breadth* is the aggregate of real substances of
which alone a
term is predicable with absolute truth. (CP 2.407,412,414; 1867)
I suggest that any Sign's Immediate, Dynamic, and General *Objects *correspond
to its Essential, Informed, and Substantial *Breadth*, respectively. As
such, the Immediate Object is what a Sign-Replica *could *denote to someone
with mere Sign System Acquaintance; the Dynamic Object is what a
Sign-Replica *does *denote to someone with Collateral Experience; and the
General Object is what a Sign-Replica *would *denote to someone with
omniscience. Likewise ...
CSP: By the informed depth of a term, I mean all the real characters (in
contradistinction to mere names) which can be predicated of it* (with
logical truth, on the whole) in a supposed state of information ... By
the *essential
depth* of a term, then, I mean the really conceivable qualities predicated
of it in its definition ... Substantial depth is the real concrete form
which belongs to everything of which a term is predicable with absolute
truth.
*That is, of whatever things it is applicable to. (CP 2.408,410,414; 1867)
I suggest that any Sign's Immediate, Dynamic, and Final *Interpretants
*correspond
to its Essential, Informed, and Substantial *Depth*, respectively. As
such, the Immediate Interpretant is what a Sign-Replica *could *signify to
someone with *minimal *Interpretative Habits, the Dynamic Interpretant is
what a Sign-Replica *does *signify to someone with *fallible *Interpretative
Habits, and the Final Interpretant is what a Sign-Replica *would *signify
to someone with *infallible *Interpretative Habits.
Although these passages are from Peirce's *early *writings, my warrant for
applying them in this way comes from a *late *manuscript that cited the
very article in which they originally appeared.
CSP: ... Breadth and Depth, which the logic-books restrict to one class of
signs, namely to terms, are equally applicable, by a legitimate and easy
generalization of their meanings, not only to propositions and to
arguments, but also to *icons*, *indices*, and all kinds of signs ...
Breadth refers to the Object, which occasions the use of the sign, while
Depth refers to the Interpretant, or proper determinate of the sign ... (R
200:E87; 1908)
Gary Fuhrman deserves some credit for helping me sort out this
correspondence of Breadth and Depth with Object and Interpretant, since the
1867 article instead aligned Depth with Ground and Information with
Interpretant.
FB: Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its
"object" (he says so in very many places).
Please provide at least a couple of citations. My understanding is that
each of a sentence's subjects *indicates *one of its Objects, rather
than *being
*one of its Objects; i.e., it is a Rheme whose own Object is one of the
Objects of the corresponding proposition. The General Object of "_____ is
Napoleon" is the Real historical person, its Dynamic Object is that person
as* actually *denoted by a Replica when employed in an Instance of the
Sign, and its Immediate Object is whatever its Replica *could *denote to
someone who knows only the definitions of English words.
FB: You get the rheme "--- is lethargic". This rheme has no hint by which
its object is indicated, i.e. has no immediate object.
On the contrary, we can "throw into the subject" *both *Rhemes that are
included in the proposition. The General Object of "_____ is lethargic" is
the aggregate of Real substances that possess the character of *lethargy*,
its Dynamic Object is whatever one of its Replicas *actually *denotes when
employed in an Instance of the Sign, and its Immediate Object is whatever
its Replica *could *denote to someone who knows only the definitions of
English words.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 1:57 AM, Francesco Bellucci <bellucci.francesco@
googlemail.com> wrote:
> Jon, Gary, List
>
> thanks for your replies.
>
> As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in
> at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which have
> an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as types
> that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are also
> said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
> term).
>
> *GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
> quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had
> occasion to read) [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general
> object appears to you as "very unPeircean"?*
>
>
> At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the object
> of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever
> possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are
> real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object" is
> used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the
> universal quantifier: "any man ....". That's why the notion of a general
> object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the
> immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol,
> it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a
> universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general;
> if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I
> don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
> interpretation of Peirce.
>
>
> *JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here. As I already
> quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is not equivalent to
> "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed
> to singular ("This man is mortal"). Moreover, any common noun, such as
> "man," is a general Rheme ("_____ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904)
> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate Object,
> which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds to its
> definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant. Quantification only comes
> into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition.*
>
>
> The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as CP
> 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is opposed
> to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g. R 9,
> pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and
> singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which
> "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate
> object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284,
> p. 67
>
>
>
>
>
> *According to the Immediate Object (how represented)Indefinite
> SignSingular SignDistributively General Sign (*R 339, p. 253)
>
> *General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically
> formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality.* (R
> 284, p. 67)
>
> Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the rheme
> "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol, i.e. a sign
> whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses the set of
> characters that corresponds to its definition. But the general object of a
> symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of characters that
> corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the dynamic, not the immediate
> object. For icon/index/symbol is a division according to the dynamic, not
> the immediate object.
>
> Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that possesses
> the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the immediate
> object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that corresponds to
> the definition of man? Of course, every really existing man, as well as
> those existed and those that will exist. If this is the immediate object of
> the rheme "--is a man", what's its dynamic object?
>
> Another example. Take the sign "Napoleon is lethargic". It contains a
> proper name, "Napoleon", which refers to the real Napoleon, the historical
> figure. Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its
> "object" (he says so in very many places). What object? Should we say that
> the proper name "Napoleon" is the dynamic object of the sign? But then what
> is the historical figure? the immediate object, perhaps? Or should we say
> that the historical figure is the dynamic object? But then, Peirce's claim
> that the subject of a sentence is its "object" could only mean that it is
> its immediate object. You see, as soon as one wonders what the difference
> between the real object outside the sign and the "subject" of the sign is,
> one is obliged to distinguish two kinds of objects, one dynamic the other
> immediate:
>
> * “The Mediate Object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call it the
> Dynamoid Object. The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or
> its substance, is the Immediate Object” (SS 83).*
>
> The historical figure of Napoleon is outside the sign "Napoleon is
> lethargic". Its being and its characters do not depend on what the sign
> says of it. But the sign, besides saying something about it (that it is
> lethargic), indicates it, by means of a proper name. And this hint, this
> proper name, is the immediate object.
>
> Now take that the sign "Napoleon is lethargic" and remove from it its
> subject. You get the rheme "--- is lethargic". This rheme has no hint by
> which its object is indicated, i.e. has no immediate object. We could, of
> course, restore the indication, e.g. indicating an object of this sign
> indefinitely, i.e. either vagually or generally: "someone is lethargic" or
> "everything is lethargic".
>
> Best
> Francesco
>
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