List, Jeff: > On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal to > Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the existential > graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more minute analysis > of examples. What is more, I think that the application of such formal tools > would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools of phenomenological > analysis when looking at particular cases of inference--such as when we are > looking at the role of the immediate object in Peirce's discussion with > Juliette about the weather. What can we learn from the existential graphs and > phenomenology about the dialogue that is taking place between the two--and > the role of the immediate object in explaining what it is being conveyed as > the conversation progresses from Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the > decisions she makes about how to prepare for her day? > > Yours, > > Jeff >
Your suggestion is an important one. I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of identity in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign and the meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the same sign. As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a form of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies widely. In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can trigger recall of similar signs. Such feelings may exist in one observer but not the other. (Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically different sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared experience.) Cheers Jerry
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