List:

I have been musing recently on the well-known remark by Peirce that "just
as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we
ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us" (CP
5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868).  He also asserted in the same series of articles
that "all thought is in signs" (CP 5.253, EP 1:24; 1868), so by
substitution we ought to say that our individual (Quasi-)minds are in
semiosis, and not that signs are in our individual (Quasi-)minds.

As Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit of Einstein's
insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by understanding *continuous
*motion through space-time as a more fundamental reality than
*discrete *positions
in space and/or moments in time.  We arbitrarily *mark *the latter to
facilitate measurement and calculation for particular purposes, but space
is not *composed *of points and time is not *composed *of instants.

Likewise, I suggest that semiosis is *continuous*, and we arbitrarily
isolate *discrete *signs--or rather, Instances of Signs--to facilitate
analysis for particular purposes.  We can say that a Dynamic Object
determines a Token of a Type to determine a Dynamic Interpretant in an
individual (Quasi-)mind, treating this as an actual event "occurring just
when and where it does" (CP 4.537; 1906).  Nevertheless, the Type is
not *composed
*of its Tokens.

Moreover, every Instance contributes to the Sign's *Informed* Breadth by
adding that Token's *Dynamic *Object; as Peirce put it, "Breadth refers to
the Object, which occasions the use of the sign" (R 200:E87; 1908).
Nevertheless, this collection could never amount to the Sign's *Substantial
*Breadth, which (I have argued) corresponds to its *General *Object.  In
other words, the Sign (as a Type) and its General Object are both
*continuous*, while each Instance (as a Token) and its Dynamic Object (even
if it includes multiple items) are both *discrete*.

In fact, it seems to me that a necessary condition for a Token to be an
Instance of a Type is that the Token's Dynamic Object must likewise be an
instantiation of the Type's General Object.  When I pick something up and
say out loud, "This is a vase," the word "vase" that I pronounce is an
*actual* constituent of the *real *continuum of all *potential *Tokens of
the corresponding Type, which could be in any spoken or written language or
other Sign System; and I am asserting that what I now hold in my hands is
an *actual *constituent of the *real *continuum of all *potential *vases.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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