Nice to see this product of musing. More muses please. :) amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 11:01 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > List: > > I have been musing recently on the well-known remark by Peirce that "just > as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we > ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us" (CP > 5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868). He also asserted in the same series of articles > that "all thought is in signs" (CP 5.253, EP 1:24; 1868), so by > substitution we ought to say that our individual (Quasi-)minds are in > semiosis, and not that signs are in our individual (Quasi-)minds. > > As Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit of Einstein's > insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by understanding *continuous > *motion through space-time as a more fundamental reality than *discrete > *positions > in space and/or moments in time. We arbitrarily *mark *the latter to > facilitate measurement and calculation for particular purposes, but space > is not *composed *of points and time is not *composed *of instants. > > Likewise, I suggest that semiosis is *continuous*, and we arbitrarily > isolate *discrete *signs--or rather, Instances of Signs--to facilitate > analysis for particular purposes. We can say that a Dynamic Object > determines a Token of a Type to determine a Dynamic Interpretant in an > individual (Quasi-)mind, treating this as an actual event "occurring just > when and where it does" (CP 4.537; 1906). Nevertheless, the Type is not > *composed > *of its Tokens. > > Moreover, every Instance contributes to the Sign's *Informed* Breadth by > adding that Token's *Dynamic *Object; as Peirce put it, "Breadth refers > to the Object, which occasions the use of the sign" (R 200:E87; 1908). > Nevertheless, this collection could never amount to the Sign's *Substantial > *Breadth, which (I have argued) corresponds to its *General *Object. In > other words, the Sign (as a Type) and its General Object are both > *continuous*, while each Instance (as a Token) and its Dynamic Object > (even if it includes multiple items) are both *discrete*. > > In fact, it seems to me that a necessary condition for a Token to be an > Instance of a Type is that the Token's Dynamic Object must likewise be an > instantiation of the Type's General Object. When I pick something up and > say out loud, "This is a vase," the word "vase" that I pronounce is an > *actual* constituent of the *real *continuum of all *potential *Tokens of > the corresponding Type, which could be in any spoken or written language or > other Sign System; and I am asserting that what I now hold in my hands is > an *actual *constituent of the *real *continuum of all *potential *vases. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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