Peirce is relevant for having suggested all thought is in signs. Pierce
fuels folk who are looking past he could see but where he knew of. This was
known when this list began. It is lost now in the back and forth which
continues despite its impossibility which you point out. The result of his
root premise is the inevitable suggestion that the universe is information
and that this is the stuff of the universe.
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information
amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 8:05 AM Auke van Breemen <[email protected]> wrote:

> List,
>
> Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
> 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at
> large
> 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common
> language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.
>
> I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe
> Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping
> with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology,
> that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That
> terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the
> speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce,
> hence argument becomes delome.
>
> If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program
> (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.
>
> I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John
> Sowa points in this direction:
>
> JAS:
> > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to
> > accept our disagreement and move on.
>
> John:
> That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as
> a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that
> definition.  There is nothing more to say.
>
> (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
>
> Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering
> his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence
> at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program
> and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we
> need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we
> explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is
> captured in logic by the term argument?
>
> In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may
> find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes
> as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different
> terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both
> possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the
> experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an
> example of differences in perspective:
>
> On the terminological level Peirce experimented
>
> He suggested:
> A        (1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative
> trichotomy for
> B       (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,    but he also
> introduced
> C       (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type.
>
> In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a
> different angle
> With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an
> interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
> With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our
> world, it opens up the sign structure perspective
> With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a
> sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the
> phaneroscopic endeavour.
>
> A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The
> exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking
> recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right
> in his interpretation of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic
> considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion
> which allows different tokens to be taken as the same. For instance when we
> deal with the spoken and written forms. Familiarity may overcome
> differences in form by an established law; because two different forms
> raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
>
>
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