Auke, List: AvB: What we need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the term argument?
I agree with this general approach, and have sought to offer some suggestions that I hope are gesturing more or less in the right direction; in particular, my proposed diagram of Semes/Subjects as continuous lines, Phemes/Propositions as continuous planes, Delomes/Arguments as continuous spaces, and Instances as discrete points that we mark where these all coincide. I believe that this last aspect conveniently reflects the fundamental *unity *of connected Signs; perhaps it is a corollary of Peirce's "theorem of the science of semeiotics" that if any *Instances *are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one *Instance*. Returning to my original post on "Continuity of Semiosis"--just as the motion of any individual body is truly continuous, and we only *mark *discrete positions for specific purposes, the thought of any individual Quasi-mind (i.e., semiosis) is truly continuous, and we only *isolate *discrete Instances for specific purposes. That includes when we decompose a Delome/Argument into Phemes/Propositions connected by a Logical Leading Principle, and a Pheme/Proposition into Semes/Subjects connected by a Continuous Predicate. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues. > 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at > large > 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common > language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves. > > I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe > Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping > with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, > that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That > terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the > speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, > hence argument becomes delome. > > If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program > (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade. > > I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John > Sowa points in this direction: > > JAS: > > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to > > accept our disagreement and move on. > > John: > That is certainly true. The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as > a predicate or quasi-predicate. Continuity cannot have any effect on that > definition. There is nothing more to say. > > (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue) > > Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering > his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence > at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program > and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we > need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we > explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is > captured in logic by the term argument? > > In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may > find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes > as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different > terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both > possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the > experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an > example of differences in perspective: > > On the terminological level Peirce experimented > > He suggested: > A (1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign, as an alternative > trichotomy for > B (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign, but he also > introduced > C (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. > > In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a > different angle > With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an > interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective, > With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our > world, it opens up the sign structure perspective > With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a > sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the > phaneroscopic endeavour. > > A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The > exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking > recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right > in his interpretation of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic > considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion > which allows different tokens to be taken as the same. For instance when we > deal with the spoken and written forms. Familiarity may overcome > differences in form by an established law; because two different forms > raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign. > > Best, > > Auke van Breemen >
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