Jon, list, Jon wrote: How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything else for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as Semeiotic?
Peirce would have us develop two very different sciences--phenomenology and semeiotic--in cenocopic science within his classification of sciences. As I see it, one could just as well have written: "How can one develop a normative semeiotic as Peirce conceived it without employing trichotomic principles found and developed in phenomenology? In fact, Peirce's late classification of sciences (what Beverly Kent termed the 'perennial classification) is mostly developed on tricategorial principles. For example, take cenoscopic philosophy's three branches which Peirce explicitly linked with his Universal Categories: phenomenology (1ns), the normative sciences (2ns), and metaphysics (3ns). Or, taking a broader view of the sciences, mathematics (1ns, "first science"), cenoscopic (2ns: good/bad; true/false; right/wrong), metaphysics (the science that takes up the principles discovered in semeiotic and applies them to the *real world*). I have even conjectured that from an even broader view of Science that discovery science (including all those mentioned above) could be associated with 1ns, practical arts and sciences (applied sciences) with 2ns, and review sciences (philosophy of science, classifications, such as those of signs and sciences, etc.) with 3ns. But the principal point for now, and as I earlier mentioned, we can, and really must, at least at this early stage of its development, discuss Peircean phenomenology employing, in large part, our *logica utens*. Again, upon the 'principle of data', what is discovered and 'refined' in logic as semeiotic (for example, the way in which so much of it is developed in consideration of the categories, and trichotomies of these, most especially in its first two branches, grammar and critic) can certainly offer data, examples, etc. which may be useful in further developing phenomenology. There are those who suggest, as you have, Jon, that phenomenological research is done only by an individual subject. But that is only true, and only partially so, of the first branch, phaneroscopy. After those subjective observations have been made and, perhaps, individually recorded, phenomenologists can, for example, compare notes (they don't need, say, EGs to do that, nor the complexification you've brought to our attention in consideration of the relations which Peirce uses in considering two objects and three interpretants, which consideration requires a multitude of novel terms and concepts), again, they do not need these to see if their shared observations reveal 1ns or 2ns or 3ns (and altogether, perhaps one-after-the-other in contemplation). In what de Tienne terms 'Idioscopy' (the branch of phenomenology which he suggests follows 'Phaneroscopy') they can connect individual phenomena with each of the categories, for example, the color 'blue' with 1ns, a pool stick hitting a ball with 2ns, a thought, or a syllogism, or a book, or the Italian language with 3ns. I have thought it desirable and useful to find trichotomies of 1ns + 2ns + 3ns which "hold together" (even involving degenerate relations), and that some of these might have vectorial direction, that some may combine with other trichotomies, etc. Joseph Ransdell suggested that I term that branch of phenomenology 'category theory', and I have used that expression ever since. So, in a word, one can make some considerable headway in phenomenology *qua* phenomenology just by observation and the use of a, shall we say, shared logica utens. No doubt as one discovers (and develops such discoveries) in the normative logical science of semeiotic--that there are, for example, two objects and three interpretants--phenomenology may become ever more nuanced, make finer and finer distinctions because of that development in a science further down in the classification. But that would be phenomenology's work, again, on the principle of data--not semeiotics. Does one need the normative science of logic to develop theory in phenomenology? Does it need it in pure mathematics? That mathematicians and phenomenologists speak with each other is patent. Whether they do so fully informed by findings in the logic of semeiotic is doubtful and a little silly. I suppose there will always be those who pooh-pooh phenomenology, conflate it with semeiotics, or even suggest that there is *only* semeiotics (which, as I see it, is not true even if everything--or most everything--is a sign). And no doubt there are some researchers less suited to phenomenological research than to logical inquiry. It may even be the case that those who are most suited to the latter are least suited to phenomenological research. In any event, that is how I would begin a reply to your question: How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything else for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as Semeiotic? Phenomenology has its own work to do and supplies principles to the sciences lower in the classification of sciences including normative logic. The science of logic as semeiotic (a *logica docens*) has its own work to do. Ideally it both hones our *logica utens* and supplies sciences higher in the classification with data and examples. Finally, it is, in my opinion, dangerous to conflate phenomenology and semeiotics. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> Virus-free. www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> <#m_5415504751108220040_m_5869438442477658702_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 9:43 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., Edwina, List: > > GR: For example, it seems to me that the tendency recently of some, > perhaps most involved in the discussion here, to bypass phenomenology as > first cenoscopic science and to leap to its relation to logic as semeiotic > (notably, critical logic, esp. as expressed in EGs) is unfortunate and, I'd > say, counter-productive. Will we ever discuss phenomenology *as such*? > > > How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything else > for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as Semeiotic? It > seems to me, as it did to Peirce, that all we can do is *examine *what is > present to our *individual *minds; "My appeal is to > observation,--observation that each of you must make for himself" (CP > 5.52, EP 2:154; 1903). Even then, we are immediately *compelled *to > adopt Perceptual Judgments *about *those Percepts--i.e., we formulate, as > Retroductive conclusions, Propositions that are either true or false. > And no matter how carefully we attend only to the *appearances *themselves, > we cannot subsequently *describe *them to someone else *without *using > such Propositions, as illustrated by thought experiments like "The First > Thing I See." > > GR: Will we ever get back to discussing pragmaticism *as such*? > > ET: As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic > framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis - and > terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal. > > > What exactly is "pragmaticism *as such*"? What is the nature of "a > pragmatic analysis"? According to Peirce, it is "merely a method of > ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP > 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907). As I have said repeatedly in defense of our > terminological discussions here, the goal is always to make our (and > Peirce's) ideas *clear*; but that is not an end *in itself*--it is simply > an indispensable step toward developing *applications *of those ideas in > the sciences that are *below *normative Logic as Semeiotic in Peirce's > classification, beginning with Metaphysics and then encompassing all of the > Special Sciences. After all, if our theory of Logic as Semeiotic is > incorrect or incomplete, then our use of it in other fields will suffer > from those defects. > > Here is a hypothesis for consideration that touches on Phaneroscopy, Logic > as Semeiotic, and Metaphysics. We *perceive *relations with different > *valencies*, which correspond to the three *Categories*; we *experience > *Objects > with different *Modalities of Being*, which correspond to the three > *Universes*. What do you think? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 7:58 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R - thanks for your post, but I think that my concern about the >> tendency on this list: >> >> ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an >> isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based >> around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict >> terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic >> point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze and explain >> the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of the real world >> >> IS NOT a definition of anthroposemiosis! >> >> I don't see that a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict >> terminological definitions is 'about anthroposemiosis'. To me, the term of >> 'anthroposemiosis' means an analytic infrastructure capable and active in >> explaining human cognition and human societal organization. Terminology >> can't do that. What is required is an analytic frame that examines the >> dynamic, yes, dynamic, nature of human cognition and human societal >> organization. And these endless discussions of 'who is right' about 'what >> X term means' can't provide us with such an analysis. >> >> As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic >> framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis - and >> terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal. >> >> My focus is not simply on biosemiotics but on human cognition and human >> societal organization - and I consider Peircean semiosis to be an excellent >> analytic agent for such an examination - but find that this list is either >> silent on such topics or, the few who do post, confine themselves to >> back-and-forth arguments over who is right about terminology. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Mon 18/02/19 3:20 AM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: >> >> Jon, Edwina, list, >> >> Jon wrote: >> >> I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word; and if researchers >> today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of Signs to be useful for >> their purposes, then far be it from me to block the way of inquiry. >> >> >> No need to apologize. As I've repeatedly said, your inquiry into Peirce's >> late taxonomy of signs has been helpful to me and, I believe, of >> potentially considerable value to those doing research especially into the >> grammatical branch of logic as semeiotic. Granted, "abandoned" may >> perhaps have been "too strong a word" to describe Peirce's position apropos >> the late classification of signs in considering the 1903 classification. >> Yet when one is working, as you have been, within that late taxonomy based >> on Peirce's developed notion of their being two objects and three >> interpretants, it is understandable that an emphasis on the later one would >> take precedence over that earlier classification. >> >> Continuing, Edwina quoted me: >> >> GR: I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom Short for >> example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he finds >> himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly state that >> along with his corrected view[. . .] Peirce is constantly experimenting; >> but, in my opinion, one needn't take an experiment late in his life as >> necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken earlier and the principles >> derived from them. >> >> >> Then commented: >> >> ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an >> isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based >> around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict >> terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic >> point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze and explain >> the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of the real >> world. >> >> >> I would not characterize the great effort by Peirce and others (including >> John S, Jon S, Gary F, and Jeff D and others on this list, and myriad >> others involved in Peirce studies for the past 6 or 7 decades) made in logic >> as semeiotic as an attempt "to develop an isolate framework" for >> semeiotic. Indeed, Peirce did the vast majority of his work in what we >> sometimes refer to as 'anthroposemiotic', that is, that logica docens which >> strictly is logic as semeiotic (his pragmaticism is included here). >> >> While logicians and others may argue as to what semeiotic definitions are >> important, ought to be emphasized, their proper relations to other >> definitions, etc., it seems to me that logicians tend to find what you call >> "strict terminological definitions" not only important, but quite essential >> for certain types of inquiry. >> >> It is understandable that as a biosemiotician that you would be >> especially concerned with semeiotics in "its capacity to analyze and >> explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of the >> real world." And, in truth, it is my opinion that the discoveries of the >> normative science of logic as semiotics ought more and more (according to >> "the principle of principles") be applied to pragmaticism, metaphysics, and >> most all the special sciences, including biosemiotics. I would only >> suggest--really a kind of truism--that there are many kinds of semiotic >> inquiry, and that, for example, the logic of semeiotic (semiotic grammar, >> critic, and methodeutic/rhetoric) as the principal discovery science (pure >> research science) ought to be allowed free reign in its inquiries, and even >> if these naturally and necessarily principally deal with anthroposemiotics. >> In sum: there are in fact many possible inquiries and applications of >> Peircean semeiotics, but the first of these is properly in theoretical >> science. >> >> Perhaps, Edwina, you are frustrated by the tendency on this list to >> concentrate from time to time on anthroposemiotics which, truly, can at >> times seem all too abstract even to me! But this has not always been the >> case. Consider, for example, the slow read here (and concurrently on the >> Biosemiotics list) of Frederik Stjernfelt's, Natural Propositions. The >> Actuality of Peirce’s Doctrine of Dicisigns, a year or so long ago. >> Earlier slow reads also concerned topics other than logica docens. >> >> I have repeatedly urged folk here to take up on the list threads on other >> topics than the first two branches of the normative science of logic as >> semeiotic (semeiotic grammar and critical logic). But this hasn't much >> happened. For example, it seems to me that the tendency recently of some, >> perhaps most involved in the discussion here, to bypass phenomenology as >> first cenoscopic science and to leap to its relation to logic as semeiotic >> (notably, critical logic, esp. as expressed in EGs) is unfortunate and, I'd >> say, counter-productive. Will we ever discuss phenomenology as such? >> Will we ever get back to discussing pragmaticism as such? >> >> Nonetheless, one does not want to block the way of inquiry of those who >> are especially interested in anthroposemiosis through inquiries into >> philosophical (semeiotic) grammar and critical logic (logic as logic, which >> includes discussions of EGs). One is always free to introduce a thread here >> on any topic, but of late this has rarely happened. Perhaps we need a new >> 'slow read'? Any suggestions? >> >> Best, >> >> Gary (writing, in part, as list moderator) >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> >> > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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