Jon, list, Jon quoted me quoting a comment of his and my reply to that comment, then further remarked:
JAS: How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything else for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as Semeiotic? GR: As I see it, one could just as well have written: "How can one develop a normative semeiotic as Peirce conceived it without employing trichotomic principles found and developed in phenomenology?" JAS: In accordance with Peirce's classification of the sciences, the *only *[science] that *does not* employ principles found and developed in Phaneroscopy is Pure Mathematics. On the other hand, as soon as we employ principles found and developed in normative Logic as Semeiotic, we are *no longer* engaging in Phaneroscopy. Specifically, as soon as we formulate a proposition (e.g., "the color blue is an example of 1ns") and begin to consider (let alone *discuss*) whether it is true or false--rather than merely consistent or inconsistent with some ideal hypothesis--we are *no longer* engaging in Phaneroscopy. I completely agree: 1) all sciences below Phenomenology in Peirce's Classification of Sciences (can) employ principles of Phenomenology; but 2) when one is engaged in Logic as Semeiotic one is certainly *not* doing Phenomenology (obviously, since they are two very different sciences with different methodologies, goals, etc.) Jon continued: JAS: In fact, as I already pointed out, Phaneroscopists cannot even "compare notes" without first translating their "subjective observations" into such descriptive propositions. After all, how could different people ever share each other's Percepts? Are we not constrained to sharing our resulting Perceptual Judgments instead? If so, what are the consequences for Phaneroscopy's prospects as a *collaborative *science? This also relates to my earlier suggestion of an important distinction between mere appearances and brute Experience. Here I have to at least partially disagree. I have previously briefly discussed this: 1) Phenomenologists *can* compare notes because they have at their disposal a *logica utens*. They can, for example, point to the same perceptual phenomenon they are (more or less) sharing (although their percepts are, of course, their own) and agree that, say, 1ns is predominant in some admixture of categories in a given phenomenon, that it has a certain character which they could agree on a description of (if this is the sharing of perceptual judgments, so be it); they can agree (or not), in a classic example, that chance sporting, 1ns, new habit-taking, 3ns, an achieved structural modification form a categorial trichotomy which follows the vector of process, a trichotomy and path which Peirce offered as the process of biological evolution. This, of course, implies that Phenomenology is more than isolate Phaneroscopy, and as I earlier noted, Andre de Tienne has suggested a second possible branch of Phenomenology, by his own admission badly named Iconoscopy https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rssi/2013-v33-n1-2-3-rssi02379/1035282ar/ and I a third branch, Category Theory, which arranges various trichotomies, groups of trichotomies, vectorial paths they might follow, etc. and discusses the implications of those arrangements and paths. Little work has been done in either of these hypothetical branches of Phenomenology following Phaneroscopy. Ransdell might well be wrong when he contends that there is not much more to do in phaneroscopy and Peirce might be right when he writes that phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg (de Tienne, "Is Phaneroscopy as a Pre-Semiotic Science Possible?"--highly recommended) But, as Peirce suggested and as both de Tienne and I have argued, both these branches would seem to require iconic diagrams if Phenomenology is to develop as a science. It is my opinion that best diagram type for this science has not yet been developed, but that it should be as "optimally iconic" as Existential Graphs. In any event, observational Phaneroscopy cannot be but the first stage of Peircean phenomenological practice. As soon as the phaneron is iconically represented in a diagram, its ingredients having been separated and classified according to their categorial distribution, the observer can begin to scrutinize with “minute accuracy” (CP 1.287, 1905) the interplay and agency of the categories within the diagram, displaying the part(s) played by each, the effects created through their commingling, and the types of experience that each of their guises actualize (de Tienne, op. cit.) 2) Phenomenologists do not work in a vacuum and so a) by the *principle of data* can use data and, especially examples from any number of sciences further down the Classification of Sciences and apply categories, trichotomies, vectors, etc. to anything that comes before the mind, b) and, again, being at least somewhat aware of the findings of the normative science of logic as semeiotic, they are free to fine tune their own logic within their own discipline in creating diagrams and describing phenomena categorially, etc. This is hardly different from our certain knowledge that mathematicians too often discuss their on-going and previous work employing the best logic they have at hand as well as diagrams, charts, models, etc. Jon concluded: JAS: Of course, normative Logic as Semeiotic likewise must rely initially on our *logica utens *for necessary reasoning about ideal hypotheses. That brings up again a question that I have raised previously about* Peirce's "theorem of the science of semeiotics," which states "**that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" *(R 1476:36; c. 1904). *What are the **"postulates" of that science, from which such a "theorem" can presumably be derived deductively? * As someone not especially adept at Phaneroscopy myself, I wonder if a careful and diligent practice of it could provide an answer, or at least some hints in the right direction (emphasis added). At the moment I cannot think of how phenomenology might address that question which seems to me at the moment to be a strictly semeiotic one. But it is a most interesting question which I hope we can pursue further in discussion here and whether or not phenomenology can contribute anything to its answer. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> Virus-free. www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 6:47 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > JAS: How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything > else for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as Semeiotic? > GR: As I see it, one could just as well have written: "How can one > develop a normative semeiotic as Peirce conceived it without employing > trichotomic principles found and developed in phenomenology?" > > > But these two questions are not at all parallel. In accordance with > Peirce's classification of the sciences, the *only *one that *does not* > employ principles found and developed in Phaneroscopy is Pure Mathematics. > On the other hand, as soon as we employ principles found and developed in > normative Logic as Semeiotic, we are *no longer* engaging in > Phaneroscopy. Specifically, as soon as we formulate a proposition (e.g., > "the color blue is an example of 1ns") and begin to consider (let alone > *discuss*) whether it is true or false--rather than merely consistent or > inconsistent with some ideal hypothesis--we are *no longer* engaging in > Phaneroscopy. > > In fact, as I already pointed out, Phaneroscopists cannot even "compare > notes" without first translating their "subjective observations" into such > descriptive propositions. After all, how could different people ever share > each other's Percepts? Are we not constrained to sharing our resulting > Perceptual Judgments instead? If so, what are the consequences for > Phaneroscopy's prospects as a *collaborative *science? This also relates > to my earlier suggestion of an important distinction between mere > appearances and brute Experience. > > Of course, normative Logic as Semeiotic likewise must rely initially on > our *logica utens* for necessary reasoning about ideal hypotheses. That > brings up again a question that I have raised previously about Peirce's > "theorem of the science of semeiotics," which states "that if any signs > are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" (R > 1476:36; c. 1904). What are the "postulates" of that science, from which > such a "theorem" can presumably be derived deductively? As someone not > especially adept at Phaneroscopy myself, I wonder if a careful and diligent > practice of it could provide an answer, or at least some hints in the right > direction. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 4:17 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, list, >> >> Jon wrote: How can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or >> anything else for that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as >> Semeiotic? >> >> Peirce would have us develop two very different sciences--phenomenology >> and semeiotic--in cenocopic science within his classification of sciences. >> As I see it, one could just as well have written: "How can one develop a >> normative semeiotic as Peirce conceived it without employing trichotomic >> principles found and developed in phenomenology? >> >> In fact, Peirce's late classification of sciences (what Beverly Kent >> termed the 'perennial classification) is mostly developed on tricategorial >> principles. For example, take cenoscopic philosophy's three branches which >> Peirce explicitly linked with his Universal Categories: phenomenology >> (1ns), the normative sciences (2ns), and metaphysics (3ns). Or, taking a >> broader view of the sciences, mathematics (1ns, "first science"), >> cenoscopic (2ns: good/bad; true/false; right/wrong), metaphysics (the >> science that takes up the principles discovered in semeiotic and applies >> them to the *real world*). >> >> I have even conjectured that from an even broader view of Science that >> discovery science (including all those mentioned above) could be associated >> with 1ns, practical arts and sciences (applied sciences) with 2ns, and >> review sciences (philosophy of science, classifications, such as those of >> signs and sciences, etc.) with 3ns. >> >> But the principal point for now, and as I earlier mentioned, we can, and >> really must, at least at this early stage of its development, discuss >> Peircean phenomenology employing, in large part, our *logica utens*. >> Again, upon the 'principle of data', what is discovered and 'refined' in >> logic as semeiotic (for example, the way in which so much of it is >> developed in consideration of the categories, and trichotomies of these, >> most especially in its first two branches, grammar and critic) can >> certainly offer data, examples, etc. which may be useful in further >> developing phenomenology. >> >> There are those who suggest, as you have, Jon, that phenomenological >> research is done only by an individual subject. But that is only true, and >> only partially so, of the first branch, phaneroscopy. After those >> subjective observations have been made and, perhaps, individually recorded, >> phenomenologists can, for example, compare notes (they don't need, say, EGs >> to do that, nor the complexification you've brought to our attention in >> consideration of the relations which Peirce uses in considering two objects >> and three interpretants, which consideration requires a multitude of novel >> terms and concepts), again, they do not need these to see if their shared >> observations reveal 1ns or 2ns or 3ns (and altogether, perhaps >> one-after-the-other in contemplation). In what de Tienne terms 'Idioscopy' >> (the branch of phenomenology which he suggests follows 'Phaneroscopy') they >> can connect individual phenomena with each of the categories, for example, >> the color 'blue' with 1ns, a pool stick hitting a ball with 2ns, a thought, >> or a syllogism, or a book, or the Italian language with 3ns. I have thought >> it desirable and useful to find trichotomies of 1ns + 2ns + 3ns which "hold >> together" (even involving degenerate relations), and that some of these >> might have vectorial direction, that some may combine with other >> trichotomies, etc. Joseph Ransdell suggested that I term that branch of >> phenomenology 'category theory', and I have used that expression ever >> since. >> >> So, in a word, one can make some considerable headway in phenomenology >> *qua* phenomenology just by observation and the use of a, shall we say, >> shared logica utens. No doubt as one discovers (and develops such >> discoveries) in the normative logical science of semeiotic--that there are, >> for example, two objects and three interpretants--phenomenology may become >> ever more nuanced, make finer and finer distinctions because of that >> development in a science further down in the classification. But that would >> be phenomenology's work, again, on the principle of data--not semeiotics. >> Does one need the normative science of logic to develop theory in >> phenomenology? Does it need it in pure mathematics? That mathematicians and >> phenomenologists speak with each other is patent. Whether they do so fully >> informed by findings in the logic of semeiotic is doubtful and a little >> silly. >> >> I suppose there will always be those who pooh-pooh phenomenology, >> conflate it with semeiotics, or even suggest that there is *only* >> semeiotics (which, as I see it, is not true even if everything--or most >> everything--is a sign). And no doubt there are some researchers less suited >> to phenomenological research than to logical inquiry. It may even be the >> case that those who are most suited to the latter are least suited to >> phenomenological research. >> >> In any event, that is how I would begin a reply to your question: How >> can we fruitfully *discuss *phenomenology as such, or anything else for >> that matter, *without *employing normative Logic as Semeiotic? >> >> Phenomenology has its own work to do and supplies principles to the >> sciences lower in the classification of sciences including normative logic. >> The science of logic as semeiotic (a *logica docens*) has its own work >> to do. Ideally it both hones our *logica utens* and supplies sciences >> higher in the classification with data and examples. Finally, it is, in my >> opinion, dangerous to conflate phenomenology and semeiotics. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690* >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> Virus-free. www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>
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