Gary F., John, List: I will refrain from further debate about Peirce's classification of the sciences, since I find it incontrovertible that in CP 1.191 he explicitly equated the Normative Science of Logic with Semeiotic, including *all three* of its branches--Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic. The absence of the word "Semeiotic" in that text is not a valid basis on which to deny this, since there can be no reasonable doubt that it is exactly what he meant by "the science of the general laws of signs"; and whether Speculative Grammar (or "formal Semeiotic") in itself is properly "normative" is irrelevant. The bottom line for me is that I am still not aware of *any text* where Peirce situated *any aspect* of Semeiotic *anywhere else* in his classification, including Phenomenology.
JFS: But if no context is stated, implied, or expected, the indexical is just as indefinite as an unattached peg of a predicate. Then we agree after all; an unattached Peg of a Spot is indefinite, and so is the corresponding selective in modern predicate logic. In the proposition "something is a car," "something" is indefinite; and if we translate it to "there exists an x, such that x is a car," "x" is indefinite. A Line of Identity attached to the Peg, but not attached at its other end, is likewise indefinite. In the proposition, "something is identical to something that is a car," both Instances of "something" are indefinite; and if we translate it to "there exists an x and there exists a y, such that x is identical to y and y is a car," both "x" and "y" are indefinite. Note that as I pointed out before, there is a continuous predicate *embedded within* every Spot--the copula in these translations can have three different meanings, depending on the nature of the Dynamic Object. That is why *any *"discrete" predicate can be analyzed further into a subject and a *continuous *predicate. The proposition "something is white" means "something possesses the character of whiteness"; the proposition "Cicero is Tully" means "Cicero is identical to Tully"; and the proposition "something is a car" means "something belongs to the class of car." JFS: The only definition he ever stated for 'Seme' is a widening of the word 'Term', which means 'predicate'. Peirce did not approve of anyone tampering with his terminology. Indeed, and what did he mean by "widening" a definition? Increasing its logical *breadth*, such that the newly defined word *refers to more Objects* than its predecessor. He needed a word encompassing not only "term," "predicate," and "quasi-predicate," but also "indexical," "selective," "subject," "quasi-subject," and *any other *Sign that is *not *a Proposition or an Argument. One more time--if Peirce considered "Rheme," "predicate," "quasi-predicate," and/or "term" to be appropriate for the concept that he had in mind, why did he blatantly violate his own ethics of terminology by introducing "Seme"? JFS: But if you claim that your interpretation is superior to H & W's footnotes *and* to the word 'quasi-predicate', which Peirce himself used, you have an obligation to present very solid evidence. So far, it's an unsubstantiated conjecture, and the evidence against it is overwhelming. I have never claimed "superiority," only disagreement. Peirce himself used "Seme" in *every *taxonomy of Signs that he attempted after he introduced it in 1906. He *never *used "predicate" or "quasi-predicate" as a counterpart to "proposition" and "argument"; in fact, he never used "quasi-predicate" *at all* after its sole appearance in 1903. So what exactly are you characterizing here as "unsubstantiated conjecture"? What specific "evidence against it" are you claiming is "overwhelming"? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 7:54 AM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F and Jon AS. > > GF > > As for [the disputes], rather than taking sides on the issue, I > > prefer to attribute the dispute itself to the ambiguity of the > > words “phenomenology” and “semeiotic.” > > I agree. I'm writing a longer note that gets into some important > issues that André De Tienne raises his article: "Is Phaneroscopy > as a Pre-Semiotic Science Possible?" > > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf > > GF > > This is the same ambiguity which caused Joe Ransdell, a very > > responsible scholar, to say that almost all of Peirce’s > > phenomenology really came under the heading of semeiotic. > > Yes. Ransdell's point is consistent with the way H & W organized > Book III on Phenomenology in CP Vol. 1. That comes before Book IV > on The Normative Sciences. But see De Tienne's article. > > GF > > I think one’s attempt to regularize terminology that is naturally > > multivalent is likely to deepen whatever ruts one already tends > > to get stuck in. > > I agree. But I would advise caution in using or extending Peirce's > terminology in ways that he did not explicitly use. He tried to be > very precise, and it's better to quote his words explicitly than > to paraphrase them or to make any changes to them. > > JAS > > Phenomenology has no branches; so "Formal Semeiotic," however we > > define it, obviously cannot be a branch of Phenomenology. > > That's why I drew exactly one line, not a branch. Formal Semeiotic > is mathematics applied to analyzing the phaneron. Whether you > call it part of phenomenology or a separate science is debatable. > See the article by De Tienne. > > JAS > > Logic is the third branch of Normative Science. > > Yes. But formal logic is the first branch of mathematics. Peirce > explicitly said that logic as a normative science is much broader. > > > CSP: in the present state of knowledge logic should be regarded > > as coextensive with General Semeiotic. (R 634:15; 1909) > > Yes. General Semeiotic would be the union of (1) formal logic, which > is the first branch of mathematics; (2) formal semeiotic, which is > the result of analyzing the phaneron; and (3) the largest part, which > is normative logic as semeiotic. > > JAS > > Nothing in the rest of CP 1.180-202 states or implies that any aspect > > of Semeiotic belongs anywhere else in Peirce's classification. > > The word 'semeiotic' in any spelling does not occur in CP 1.180 - 202. > That is why I added the node labeled Formal Semeiotic to cspsci.png. > That addition is justified by what Peirce explicitly wrote in CP 1.180: > "The classification has been carried into great detail; but only its > broader divisions are here given." > > JAS > > No part of Phenomenology, including the derivation of the Categories, > > is Semeiotic. > > The classification of signs is a major part of Semeiotic. Whether the > process of deriving the classification is part of Phaneroscopy or part > of Semeiotic is debatable. (See De Tienne's article.) The critical > point is that the categories that result from the analysis are a > prerequisite for the normative sciences. > > JAS > > Phenomenology uses mathematics and formal logic--not Semeiotic, > > That's true. Formal semeiotic is the result of using math/logic to > analyze the phaneron. That's why I placed it under phenomenology. > > > JFS: Peirce's phrase "the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of > > signs." By replacing "doctrine of signs" with 'semeiotic, we get > > the term 'formal semeiotic'. > > > > JAS: Why make that substitution in CP 2.227 (c. 1897), but not > > in CP 1.191 (1903)? > > Because the word 'semeiotic' does not occur anywhere in CP 1.180-202. > > > JFS: But he did not say that the word 'something' is indefinite: > > > > JAS: That is exactly what he said in the passage that I quoted. > > Every indexical depends on the *intended* context or common knowledge > that is shared by the speaker and listener. When the context is > stated or implied, the referent of the indexical is definite. Note > CP 2.289, where Peirce explains how words like 'something' inform > "the hearer how he is to pick out one of the objects intended." > > For another example, > > CP 3.460: An indexical word, such as a proper noun or demonstrative > > or selective pronoun, has force to draw the attention of the listener > > to some hecceity *common to the experience of speaker and listener* . > > But if no context is stated, implied, or expected, the indexical is > just as indefinite as an unattached peg of a predicate. > > > CSP: a heavy dot to denote quite indefinitely, each of its subjects. > > Thus, “•dies” will naturally mean “Something dies”, this something being > > denoted by the dot; and •kills• will naturally mean “Something kills > > something”, the left-hand dot denoting the killer, and the right-hand > > one the killed ... These heavy dots attached to spots and indefinitely > > denoting their different subjects are called the “pegs” of the spots. > > (R 670:8-9; 1911 June 9) > > In R 670, Peirce is used the word 'something' outside of any specific > context. Without a context, it means "any possibility whatsoever". > And that is exactly what Peirce was trying to say. > > > We need a word that encompasses not only predicates, but also > > Indices and selectives. Peirce proposed "Seme." > > No. He never made that claim. The only definition he ever stated > for 'Seme' is a widening of the word 'Term', which means 'predicate'. > Peirce did not approve of anyone tampering with his terminology. > > If you want more information about how the word 'something' should be > classified, please note where it fits in Peirce's ten classes of signs: > > > CP 2.259. Sixth: A Rhematic Indexical Legisign [e.g., a demonstrative > > pronoun] is any general type or law, however established, which requires > > each instance of it to be really affected by its Object in such a manner > > as merely to draw attention to that Object. Each Replica of it will be > > a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind. The Interpretant of a > > Rhematic Indexical Legisign represents it as an Iconic Legisign; and > > so it is, in a measure--but in a very small measure. > > I must admit that your repeated questions have forced me to dig into > more nooks and crannies in the writings by Peirce and other authors. > I have found that exercise useful. > > But if you claim that your interpretation is superior to H & W's > footnotes *and* to the word 'quasi-predicate', which Peirce himself > used, you have an obligation to present very solid evidence. So far, > it's an unsubstantiated conjecture, and the evidence against it is > overwhelming. > > John >
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