Jon, the question of whether speculative grammar is properly normative may be irrelevant to your “bottom line”, but it is quite relevant to any practitioner of the science, because it determines whether his practice is prescriptive or descriptive.
On the “Seme” issue I agree with you, but I have a question about your statement that “Peirce himself used "Seme" in every taxonomy of Signs that he attempted after he introduced it in 1906.” He did use it in the taxonomy of the Dec. 1908 Welby letters, but what other taxonomies did he attempt after 1906? Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: 11-Mar-19 10:36 Gary F., John, List: I will refrain from further debate about Peirce's classification of the sciences, since I find it incontrovertible that in CP 1.191 he explicitly equated the Normative Science of Logic with Semeiotic, including all three of its branches--Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic. The absence of the word "Semeiotic" in that text is not a valid basis on which to deny this, since there can be no reasonable doubt that it is exactly what he meant by "the science of the general laws of signs"; and whether Speculative Grammar (or "formal Semeiotic") in itself is properly "normative" is irrelevant. The bottom line for me is that I am still not aware of any text where Peirce situated any aspect of Semeiotic anywhere else in his classification, including Phenomenology. JFS: But if no context is stated, implied, or expected, the indexical is just as indefinite as an unattached peg of a predicate. Then we agree after all; an unattached Peg of a Spot is indefinite, and so is the corresponding selective in modern predicate logic. In the proposition "something is a car," "something" is indefinite; and if we translate it to "there exists an x, such that x is a car," "x" is indefinite. A Line of Identity attached to the Peg, but not attached at its other end, is likewise indefinite. In the proposition, "something is identical to something that is a car," both Instances of "something" are indefinite; and if we translate it to "there exists an x and there exists a y, such that x is identical to y and y is a car," both "x" and "y" are indefinite. Note that as I pointed out before, there is a continuous predicate embedded within every Spot--the copula in these translations can have three different meanings, depending on the nature of the Dynamic Object. That is why any "discrete" predicate can be analyzed further into a subject and a continuous predicate. The proposition "something is white" means "something possesses the character of whiteness"; the proposition "Cicero is Tully" means "Cicero is identical to Tully"; and the proposition "something is a car" means "something belongs to the class of car." JFS: The only definition he ever stated for 'Seme' is a widening of the word 'Term', which means 'predicate'. Peirce did not approve of anyone tampering with his terminology. Indeed, and what did he mean by "widening" a definition? Increasing its logical breadth, such that the newly defined word refers to more Objects than its predecessor. He needed a word encompassing not only "term," "predicate," and "quasi-predicate," but also "indexical," "selective," "subject," "quasi-subject," and any other Sign that is not a Proposition or an Argument. One more time--if Peirce considered "Rheme," "predicate," "quasi-predicate," and/or "term" to be appropriate for the concept that he had in mind, why did he blatantly violate his own ethics of terminology by introducing "Seme"? JFS: But if you claim that your interpretation is superior to H & W's footnotes *and* to the word 'quasi-predicate', which Peirce himself used, you have an obligation to present very solid evidence. So far, it's an unsubstantiated conjecture, and the evidence against it is overwhelming. I have never claimed "superiority," only disagreement. Peirce himself used "Seme" in every taxonomy of Signs that he attempted after he introduced it in 1906. He never used "predicate" or "quasi-predicate" as a counterpart to "proposition" and "argument"; in fact, he never used "quasi-predicate" at all after its sole appearance in 1903. So what exactly are you characterizing here as "unsubstantiated conjecture"? What specific "evidence against it" are you claiming is "overwhelming"? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
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