Gary F and Jon AS,
GF
Peirce’s classification of sciences is itself ambiguous...
Hence the significance of Peirce claiming that logicians will have
to study “the physiology of signs” simply because nobody else is
going to do it (R 499 as quoted by Bellucci). This complicates the
traditional classification of logic as one of the three Normative
sciences.
Anything can be classified in an open-ended variety of ways for an
open-ended variety of reasons. Librarians have long ago realized
that there is no unique classification of anything. They require
cross-references, which are more complex than a simple tree.
GF
John has a point in that Logic as Semeiotic shares with phenomenology
an emphasis on observation and analysis — which must indeed precede
any judgments of good or bad in the practice of science.
Thanks. That's the reason for adding the node labeled Formal Semeiotic
to the cspsci.png diagram. Some people may say that node is part of
of phenomenology/phaneroscopy. Others may say that it represents
a separate field by itself. But that is just a "turf battle".
JAS
Peirce's manuscripts that included Seme/Pheme/Delome--an undated
one-page fragment (R 795), which Bellucci considers a "polished
and compact version" of that same scheme; and a Logic Notebook
entry dated "1906 Aug 31" (R 339:424[285r]), where they replace
the crossed-out Rheme/Dicisign/Argument. Interestingly, only
a day earlier he had written Term/Sentence/Movement of Thought
(R 339:423[284r]; 1906 Aug 30), so this was apparently when he
definitively decided that he needed the new words.
My claim is that a Seme is either a predicate or a quasi-predicate.
The above paragraph is consistent with that claim. Therefore, it
is irrelevant to the debate.
In evaluating these and other bits of evidence, it's essential to use
Peirce's methodeutic to evaluate their contributions toward the goal
of determining the truth or at least a reliable approximation.
To illustrate methodeutic, let's consider our current debate.
Following are the two claims. Yours is #1, mine is #2. If you
wish to restate #1 and the arguments for it, please do so.
In an MS around 1903, Peirce used his favorite prefix to talk about
quasi-predicates. But he didn't use it later. Why?
Claim #1: He later rejected that term because he changed his mind.
He decided that 'Seme' should be defined as "subject or predicate"
or even just the single word 'subject'.
Claim #2: He decided that the 14-letter word was inconvenient.
A 4-letter word from Greek roots was too tempting for him to ignore.
That led him to the euphonious triad Seme, Pheme, Delome, with 'Seme'
as a synonym for the phrase "predicate or quasi-predicate".
Which claim is a more accurate explanation of Peirce's usage?
The case for #1: He changed his mind. In CP 4.538, he said that
the triad Term, Proposition, Argument should be widened to Seme,
Pheme, Delome. Therefore, a Seme is a widening of the word Term,
and a Term may be used as a subject or predicate.
The case for #2: Whenever Peirce changed his mind on any point, he
would usually discuss specific reasons for the change. But he never
said that the word 'quasi-predicate' was inappropriate. In every
occurrence of the word 'Seme', it's possible to replace 'Seme' with
the phrase "predicate or quasi-predicate" without any change in meaning.
Observation: Claim #1 introduces a triad that Peirce never mentioned
or implied in any MS: Subject, Proposition, Argument. Claim #2 uses
Peirce's own words in combinations that he himself wrote.
The case against #1: Peirce's triads are central to his semeiotic,
and introducing the new triad requiresclear, unequivocal evidence.
But every point cited is indirect or ambiguous. The word 'Term' from
Aristotle to the present has referred to a word or phrase that maps
to and from a predicate in existential graphs and other versions of
logic. But a subject always maps to a predicate plus a line of identity
in EGs (or an equivalent variable in algebraic notations). That is a
sharp distinction. No simple widening of the word 'predicate' could
cause it to become a subject.
As I always do, I'll refute the other arguments in your recent note.
any "discrete" predicate can be analyzed further into
a subject and a continuous predicate.
More precisely, a predicate that has content may be converted to
a continuous predicate, a line of identity, and another predicate
that has a content that is derived from the content of the first one.
Both of the content predicates may be called Semes. There is no
reason to claim that the line of identity is part of either Seme.
The proposition "something is white" means "something possesses the
character of whiteness"; the proposition "Cicero is Tully" means
"Cicero is identical to Tully"; and the proposition "something is a car"
means "something belongs to the class of car."
Consider the first example: the adjective 'white' and the noun
'whiteness' both map to monadic predicates in EGs. Both predicates,
which may be called Semes, map to the same "object" in the physical
world. But they do so by different syntactic and logical patterns.
There is no reason for including the line of identity in the Seme.
The same observation may be made about each of the other examples: the
Seme (predicate) in the result is derived from the Seme (predicate) in
the result. Neither Seme is a subject.
The so-called evidence is irrelevant.
what did he mean by "widening" a definition? Increasing its logical
breadth, such that the newly defined word refers to more Objects
Yes. As a synonym for "predicate or quasi-predicate", the word
'Seme' refers to more objects than the word 'predicate' by itself.
He needed a word encompassing not only "term," "predicate," and "quasi-
predicate," but also "indexical," "selective," "subject," "quasi-
subject," and any other Sign that is not a Proposition or an Argument.
There is such a word. It's 'sign'. If you want to classify the
many kinds of signs, see Peirce's 10 classes of signs.
I have never claimed "superiority" [to H & W], only disagreement.
You have every right to disagree. And I have every right to say
that you have not shown the slightest reason for disagreeing.
Peirce himself used "Seme" in every taxonomy of Signs that he
attempted after he introduced it in 1906. He never used "predicate"
or "quasi-predicate"
He most definitely never used the word 'subject' in the first
position of any triad. But a term has always been a predicate.
A rheme is either a synonym for or a widening of a predicate.
And a Seme is a widening of a term or a rheme.
Peirce had a good reason preferring the shorter word 'Seme' as a
synonym for "predicate or quasi-predicate". Defining a new word as a
combination of two older words does not make the old words obsolete.
So what exactly are you characterizing here as "unsubstantiated
conjecture"? What specific "evidence against it" are you claiming
is "overwhelming"?
My claim is that case #1 is false, and #2 is the best available
interpretation of the word 'Seme'.
In every note in this thread, I have refuted every proposed claim
for #1 and every proposed argument against #2. That is overwhelming
evidence against #1 and for #2
Therefore, the ethical response is to reject #1. If you wish to revise
case #1, please do so. But ethics would require strong evidence for
the revised version.
John
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