Gary F., List: I changed the thread topic so as not to derail what is supposed to be a discussion of Phaneroscopy into Semeiotic.
The notion of an "indecomposable element" is obviously quite prominent in the quoted excerpt. CP 1.288-299 includes similar passages from three other manuscripts, which the CP editors dated c. 1908, c. 1894, and c. 1905--the last of which is from a *different *draft for "The Basis of Pragmaticism." I was curious to see what came next in that text, but was omitted from CP. While browsing through the Peirce Digital Archive images, I came across the following, which caught my eye instead. CSP: Among the preliminary questions the first (which is only rendered necessary on account of our study of medads, monads, dyads, etc.) will be, Can an indecomposable element of the phaneron be a medad? The answer must be, *no*. For a medad is a proposition, and a proposition essentially contains two elements, its subject and predicate. This is true even of the simple proposition 'It rains,' that is the environment is rainy. (R 284:42[39]; 1905) A Proposition is *not *an indecomposable element, because it can *always *be analyzed into a subject and predicate. Moreover, a "discrete" predicate is also *not* an indecomposable element, because it can *always *be analyzed into *another *subject and a *continuous *predicate. However, "a continuous predicate obviously cannot be a compound except of continuous predicates, and thus when we have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908). Likewise, an Argument is *not *a indecomposable element, because it can *always *be analyzed into Propositions--premisses and conclusion--and a leading principle; but the latter, like a continuous predicate, *is *indecomposable. As I have acknowledged before, Francesco Bellucci called attention to this parallel in his 2018 book, *Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*, crediting List founder Joseph Ransdell with being "The first to perceive the similarity between" them (p. 351 n. 30). FB: Just like a continuous predicate, a logical leading principle is proved valid through itself, and adding it as a further premise does not modify its primitive logical structure ... Leading principles and continuous predicates behave precisely the same with respect to logical analysis: they are "elementary" or "unanalyzable" logical forms that are found to enter intact into the parts into which we try to analyze them. (p. 333) What about the Signs that serve as the *subjects *in such an analysis--namely, Semes? Some are decomposable into *more basic* Semes, such as Peirce's example of "The mortality of man"; but I suggest that logical analysis can *never *decompose a Seme into any *other *kinds of parts. This is what I take to be the upshot of your observation below that a Seme is only a "first" *relative to* a Proposition or an Argument; i.e., it is the *simplest *class of Signs according to the relation to the Final Interpretant. When we have carried logical analysis of *any *Sign to its ultimate elements *in that respect*, we will find that we have only *Semes*, *continuous predicates* that marry those Semes in Propositions, and *leading principles* that marry those Propositions in Arguments. Now, consider each of these elements from the standpoint of *valency*. A Seme can be a monad, but a continuous predicate is *at least* a dyad joining two Semes as subjects in a Proposition, and a leading principle is *at least* a triad joining three Propositions as premisses and conclusion in an Argument. Consistent with Peirce's classification of the sciences, logical analysis (*logica utens*) thus confirms that this aspect of Speculative Grammar--the first branch of the Normative Science of logic (*logica docens*)--fully conforms to the principles provided by Phaneroscopy. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 9:55 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > First I’d like to thank Jon A.S. and Francesco Bellucci for their posts in > another thread which help to clear up a basic misconception about Peirce’s > application of his categories to his semiotic analysis. To further my aim > of getting “back to basics” in this thread, I’ll try to state one key point > in more general terms: > > Each of the ten trichotomies in Peirce’s late classification of signs can > be (and usually is) arranged in order of increasing complexity. Within each > trichotomy, the simplest sign type is “first” *in relation to the other > two*. Thus *Seme* is first in the trichotomy Seme/Pheme/Delome. But that > is the *only* sense in which “A Seme is a First” (as John S. put it). > Only one trichotomy of signs — Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign (as Peirce called > them in 1903) — is made according to the “mode of being” or ontological > nature of the sign itself as possible/actual/necessary. All the other > trichotomies > classify signs according to their various relations to the other correlates > within the basic triadic relation Sign-Object-Interpretant. Within the > Seme/Pheme/Delome trichotomy, which (as Jon said) is made according to the > sign’s relation to its interpretant, the Seme is certainly *not* First in > an ontological sense as claimed by John S. > > This feature of Peirce’s trichotomic analyses should be borne in mind as > we look further into his development of the “valency” analogy. The next > Peirce text I’m selecting from here was “probably written in December 1905” > according to EP2, where it is Selection 26, “The Basis of Pragmaticism in > Phaneroscopy.” I have highlighted certain key terms by using *bold* type; > the *italics* are Peirce’s (i.e. they mark words he underlined in the > manuscript). > > [[ I propose to use the word *Phaneron* as a proper name to denote the > total content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any > other), the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of > its cognitive value. This is pretty vague: I intentionally leave it so. I > will only point out that I do *not* limit the reference to an > instantaneous state of consciousness; for the clause “in any way whatever” > takes in memory and all habitual cognition. The reader will probably wonder > why I did not content myself with some expression already in use. The > reason is that the absence of any contiguous associations with the new word > will render it sharper and clearer than any well-worn coin could be. > > I invite the reader to join me in a little survey of the Phaneron (which > will be sufficiently identical for him and for me) in order to discover > what different *forms of indecomposable elements* it contains. On account > of the general interest of this inquiry, I propose to push it further than > the question of pragmaticism requires; but I shall be forced to compress my > matter excessively. It will be a work of observation. But in order that a > work of observation should bring in any considerable harvest, there must > always be a *preparation of thought*, a consideration, as definite as may > be, of what it is possible that observation should disclose. That is a > principle familiar to every observer. Even if one is destined to be quite > surprised, the preparation will be of mighty aid. > > As such preparation for our survey, then, let us consider what forms of > indecomposable elements it is possible that we should find. The expression > “indecomposable element” sounds pleonastic; but it is not so, since I mean > by it something which *not only is elementary, since it seems so*, and > seeming is the only being a constituent of the Phaneron has, as such, but > is moreover *incapable of being separated by logical analysis into parts*, > whether they be substantial, essential, relative, or any other kind of > parts. Thus, a cow inattentively regarded may perhaps be an element of the > Phaneron; but whether it can be so or not, it is certain that it can be > analyzed logically into many parts of different kinds that are not in it as > a constituent of the Phaneron, since they were not in mind in the same way > as the cow was, nor in any way in which the cow, as an appearance in the > Phaneron, could be said to be formed of these parts. We are to consider > what *forms* are possible, rather than what *kinds* are possible, because > it is universally admitted, in all sorts of inquiries, that the most > important divisions are divisions according to form, and not according to > qualities of *matter*, in case division according to form is possible at > all. Indeed, this necessarily results from the very idea of the distinction > between *form* and *matter*. If we content ourselves with the usual > statement of this idea, the consequence is quite obvious. A doubt may, > however, arise whether any distinction of form is possible among > indecomposable elements. But since a possibility is proved as soon as a > single actual instance is found, it will suffice to remark that *although > the chemical atoms were until quite recently conceived to be, each of them, > quite indecomposable and homogeneous, yet they have for half a century been > known to differ from one another, not indeed in internal form, but in > external form.* Carbon, for example, is a tetrad, combining only in the > form [CH4] (marsh gas), that is, with four bonds with monads (such as is > H) or their equivalent; boron is a triad, forming by the action of > magnesium on boracic anhydride, [H3B], and never combining with any other > valency; glucinum [the old name for beryllium] is a dyad, forming [GCl2], > as the vapor-density of this salt, corroborated by many other tests, > conclusively shows, and it, too, always has the same valency; lithium forms > LiH and LiI and Li3N, and is invariably a monad: and finally helion, > neon, argon, krypton, and xenon are medads, not entering into atomic > combination at all. We conclude, then, that there is a fair antecedent > reason to suspect that the Phaneron's indecomposable elements may likewise > have analogous differences of external form. Should we find this > possibility to be actualized, it will, beyond all dispute, furnish us with > by far the most important of all divisions of such elements. ]] > > A *tetrad* (valency 4) is called so because it forms four bonds with > *monads*, i.e. with atoms that form only single bonds with anything else. > A *triad* (valency 3) forms three bonds with monads, and a *dyad* > (valency 2) forms two bonds with monads. Peirce is proposing that this > division of the chemical elements according to their *external form* > (i.e. their mode of combination with other atoms) can serve as a > hypothetical model for a division of indecomposable elements of the > phaneron. This is the preparation which (we hope) “will be of mighty aid” > for the *observation of the phaneron* which is the inductive stage of the > science of phaneroscopy. > > In practice, the key to such observation of the phaneron is the *control > of attention*. “Thus, a cow inattentively regarded may perhaps be an > element of the Phaneron,” but since it can be analyzed in many ways, it is > certainly not an *indecomposable* element. This shows that Peirce’s > phaneroscopic observation leads us directly into logical analysis — so > directly that, in my view, logical analysis is in practice *part* of > phaneroscopy. (There are other versions of *phenomenology* in which such > analysis is not so directly involved — which is why I have described > Peirce’s brand of phenomenology as more analytical than others.) If we ask > how logic, or logic as semeiotic, can *depend* on phaneroscopy as Peirce > says it does, the only way we can avoid circularity is to say that *logica > docens* does depend on phaneroscopy, but the latter makes use of a *logica > utens* as part of its process. (Or, as has been suggested, we can give > other names to parts of the process; but personally I’d rather not > introduce even more terminology into an already jargon-filled discourse.) > > There are probably other questions raised by the excerpt above, or by my > commentary, so I’ll stop here for today to see if anyone wants to raise > them before we continue. > > Gary f. >
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