I think there are no semiotic principles since signs exist prior to any thinking of them and are only ours second hand as it were. They are the objective/subjective (i.e. triadic) receptions of consciousness. They become tangible to us according to the process we engage in to understand them. There could be and more than likely are millions of signs related to the same general subject that occur to millions of souls. It seems to me that the heart of semiotics is conscious awareness of signs and that anything we understand as semiotics is what we choose and intend regarding our encounter with them. Consciousness I see as fundamentally triadic because it cannot function otherwise. The processes of being conscious involve the vaporization of binary notions to enable the mind to function is the proper way.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 9:20 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, List: > > I suppose that my answer to your question is both #1 and #2. As I have > said before, and as should be evident from my previous post, my ultimate > interest is in Metaphysics as "the results of the absolute acceptance of > logical [i.e., semeiotic] principles not merely as regulatively valid, but > as truths of being" (CP 1.487; c. 1896). That obviously requires getting > those semeiotic principles right, which requires getting the relevant > phenomenological principles right, which requires getting the relevant > mathematical principles right. If you believe that I am getting something > *wrong > *at any of these levels, please tell me where and why. > > My focus over the last couple of months has mainly been on the analysis of > Propositions; in particular, Peirce's late 1908 approach in which > everything that requires previous Collateral Experience or current > Collateral Observation in order to be understood by an interpreter is > treated as a *subject *that *denotes an Object* of the Proposition. What > remains is all that the Proposition *itself *can convey--a *continuous > predicate* that *signifies the Interpretant*. That is why I start with > Semes, rather than Rhemes--the latter are *incomplete *Propositions, not > *constituents > *of Propositions. It is also why I start with Beta EGs, rather than > Alpha--the latter treat Propositions as if they were *indecomposable*, > rather than separately representing their parts. > > The result has been various experiments with reinterpreting and modifying > EGs in accordance with such an analysis. At this point, I now find myself > leaning toward proposing only three adjustments; see attached for updated > examples. > > 1. Recognize every *existential *predicate as consisting of a subject > (Seme) and a *continuous *(logical) predicate, represented > respectively by a Spot and its Peg(s). > 2. For Spots with more than one Peg, arrange them to attach the > subject nominative on the left, the direct object on the right, and any > others below such that their clockwise order conforms as closely as > possible to "the flow of causation" (cf. R 664:11-13; 1910 Nov 27). > 3. Use color and font effect for each Spot in accordance with the > nature of its Dynamic Object, which also corresponds to the continuous > predicate(s) signified by its Peg(s): > - Red and bold for an Abstractive, denoting something in the > Universe of Capacities/Possibles; "possessing the character of," > "belonging > to the class/collection of," or "standing in the relation of." > - Green and italic for a Concretive, denoting something in the > Universe of Actualities/Existents; "identical to." > - Blue and underline for a Subjunctive, denoting something in the > Universe of Tendencies/Necessitants; "possessing the purpose/habit of." > > #1 is strictly a matter of interpretation, and has no effect on EGs > themselves. #2 provides a convention for arranging three or more Pegs, > such as my fourth example, that justifies and extends Peirce's own > practice. #3 mainly distinguishes a purpose/habit from the relation that > has the same name; looking at my last example, the only difference between > the EGs for "your heart is pumping blood" and "your heart is *for *pumping > blood" is the color/font of "pumping." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 6:00 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon S, List, >> >> I, too, am interested in the way the EGs, as a mathematical tool, might >> help us clarify the nature of propositions and inferences and the roles >> that they serve in processes of inquiry. In order to apply such >> mathematical tools to questions in any part of a semiotic theory (conceived >> as a normative science), it will help to be clear about the way we are >> interpreting the various signs in the mathematical system. As such, a close >> examination of what, in our common experience, is being represented in each >> part of the formal system will require proper use of a phenomenological >> theory. >> >> Consider the converse direction of the inquiry. As Peirce tries to get >> clear about the syntax, conventions, precepts and other starting points >> that have served, up to a given point in his inquiries, as the elements for >> the formal systems of the EGs, he is progressively trying to formulate >> clearer postulates from which deductions might proceed. On the one hand, >> deduction from postulates within a formal system will not be improved by an >> appeal to a philosophical theory of phenomenology or semiotics. >> Mathematicians don't need assistance from philosophers in making such >> deductions. That is their forte. On the other hand, the task of developing >> and clarifying the postulates for a system that is under development >> or revision is a task that may very well be benefitted from proper input >> from philosophy--including theories of phenomenology and semiotics. >> >> Having stated these general points, let me formulate the points you are >> making in different terms. Instead of starting with semes, let's start >> with rhemes. These are signs of unsaturated predicates that typically are >> formed by precisive abstraction. And, instead of asking how a seme is >> represented in the Beta or Gamma system, let's ask how a rheme is >> represented in the Alpha system. In doing so, we get a much clearer sense >> that the rheme is represented by an area on the sheet of assertion. Each >> indeterminate point in that area is a possible object that belongs to the >> class represented by the rheme. So, if one expresses the rheme "__is >> red" on the sheet using the index A, then the points in the area of A on >> the sheet are taken to encompass all white things in the universe of >> discourse. >> >> It is important to keep in mind that, in the EGs, unlike the Euler graphs >> or system of Venn diagrams, the system is understood to be intensional in >> character and not extensional. What do I mean by that? The basic way in >> which areas in the alpha system are related is in terms of the scroll. If >> A, then B. All assertions, including those are categorical in terms of >> their surface grammar, are understood on the model of conditionals. Let's >> suppose that the conditional expresses: "if anything is red, then it is >> colored." This is a positive assertion, even though it does not represent >> any actual thing to exist as an individual. >> >> The upshot of my suggestion is that, when it comes to clarifying the >> ideas that are guiding the development of the postulates for the EGs, >> phenomenology can and should provide considerable guidance as we seek to >> clarify what each sign in the system means. As such, I recommend >> considering the role of phenomenological analysis of our experience of >> engaging in acts of self-controlled reasoning (nicely illustrated in the >> first Lowell Lecture) in the way Peirce is developing and refining >> the postulates stated, for instance, in "On the Simplest Branch of >> Mathematics, Dyadics," MSS 2-3, MSS 511-512, 1903. Note that the first >> set of postulates for the alpha system provides an account of the precepts >> governing the assertion of a proposition (e.g., what counts as a >> well-formed formula in the system). The second set of postulates >> provides an account of the postulates for transforming any proposition in >> that system in a way that ensures the validity of the inference. These are >> the inference rules. How are the guiding principles of deductive inference >> represented as rules in the alpha system? Look at the postulates. More >> importantly, look at how those postulates are being formed and what each >> means. What are the features of common experience--such as the experience >> of drawing a self-controlled deductive inference that is taken to be >> valid--that Peirce is trying to represent in each postulate? >> >> Let me try to state the upshot of what I'm suggesting again, but in >> simpler terms. Phenomenology can guide us in two ways when it comes to >> mathematical systems of logic such as we find in the EGs: >> >> 1) In the application of the mathematical tools to philosophical >> problems--such as those in semiotics. >> >> 2) In the development and refinement of the postulates for a system. >> >> The second task is particularly difficult. It is one that Peirce seems >> to excel at. >> >> Is your aim in the remarks you are making along the lines of 1 or 2? >> Either way, the emphasis you are placing on semes, spots and lines of >> identity may lead to misinterpreting the postulates in the alpha system. As >> a result, it may lead to a misinterpretation of the other systems built on >> alpha. >> >> --Jeff >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >>>
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