Gary F., List: On March 25, I stated the following.
JAS: ... I suggest that logical analysis can *never *decompose a Seme into any *other *kinds of parts. This is what I take to be the upshot of [Gary F.'s] observation below that a Seme is only a "first" *relative to* a Proposition or an Argument; i.e., it is the *simplest *class of Signs according to the relation to the Final Interpretant. When we have carried logical analysis of *any *Sign to its ultimate elements *in that respect*, we will find that we have only *Semes*, *continuous predicates* that marry those Semes in Propositions, and *leading principles* that marry those Propositions in Arguments. JAS: Now, consider each of these elements from the standpoint of *valency*. A Seme can be a monad, but a continuous predicate is *at least* a dyad joining two Semes as subjects in a Proposition, and a leading principle is *at least* a triad joining three Propositions as premisses and conclusion in an Argument. Consistent with Peirce's classification of the sciences, logical analysis (*logica utens*) thus confirms that this aspect of Speculative Grammar--the first branch of the Normative Science of logic (*logica docens*)--fully conforms to the principles provided by Phaneroscopy. On March 27, I added the following. JAS: ... a Seme can be a monad (one-Peg Subject Spot) and a continuous predicate is at least a dyad (Line of Connection); but does it reveal anything about the valency of a leading principle? In EGs, the latter corresponds to a *transformation rule*, which brings to mind part of what Gary F. quoted in the "Phaneroscopy and logic" thread earlier today. CSP: Suppose then a Triad to be in the Phaneron. It connects three objects, *A*, *B*, *C*, however indefinite *A*, *B*, and *C* may be. There must, then, be one of the three, at least, say *C*, which establishes a relation between the other two, *A* and *B*. (EP 2:364; 1905) JAS: Can we say that *A* is the initial Graph, *B* is the subsequent Graph, and *C* is the convention that permits the change from *A* to *B*? If so, does this confirm that a leading principle is at least a triad? I recently came across this manuscript passage, which seem to confirm that logical leading principles and the corresponding transformation rules for EGs are indeed *triadic*. CSP: ... Reasoning, to which appeal is usually made in an endeavor for self-control, is manifestly a triadic phenomenon, as I shall show you. Meanwhile let it suffice to note that a syllogism is a relation between two premisses and a conclusion. The simplest form of syllogism is the *modus ponens* by which from a consequence and its antecedent we infer its consequent. It can do no harm to show how such an inference is performed by Existential Graphs ... Thus the inference is analyzed into three distinct steps, of which the first is plainly triadic, requiring two distinct conditions, namely that a graph-instance should be in an area, and that a second instance of the same graph should be outside that area not enclosed in any cut not enclosing the other, whereupon we are permitted to erase an oddly enclosed graph-instance. The *modus tollens*, by which from a consequence and the falsity of its consequent we infer the falsity of its antecedent appears in Existential Graphs as involving precisely the same triadic step and otherwise as being even simpler than the *modus ponens*. (R 650:35-37[34-36]; 1910 July 28) In accordance with principles provided by Mathematics and Phaneroscopy, Semeiotic--specifically, Speculative Grammar--recognizes the *indecomposable elements* of all Signs as Semes, continuous predicates, and leading principles. Continuous predicates are the only mode of connection between Semes, marrying them into Propositions; and leading principles are the only mode of connection between Propositions, marrying them into Arguments. >From these postulates, as I outlined on March 29, Peirce's theorem of the science of semeiotics follows--"if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; 1904). Since the entire Universe is a system of connected Signs (CP 5.448n1p5, EP 2:394; 1906)--facts as true Propositions (EP 2:304; 1904) married by the logic of events as leading principles (CP 6.218; 1898)--it constitutes one Sign, "a perfect sign" (EP 2:545n25; 1906); specifically, an Argument and therefore a Symbol, but involving "Indices of Reactions" and "Icons of Qualities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903). Like all Symbols, it is indeterminate to some degree (EP 2:322; 1904); but like all Signs, it is determined by an Object *other than itself* (CP 8.177, EP 2:492; 1909), constantly being made *more *determinate--the ongoing aspect of Creation (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903). This is reflected in EGs by how they represent the *continuous relations* of (ter)identity and (ter)coexistence. Any individual subject (Line of Identity) that exists in any logical Universe (Sheet of Assertion) is capable of further determination by attaching *more *predicates (Spots), and any logical Universe is *itself *capable of further determination by attaching *more *individual subjects and *their *predicates. CSP: The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of being. (CP 6.341; 1908) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 6:25 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, thanks for this — it not only answers my question, but also clarifies > (for me anyway) the usefulness of Existential Graphs for *directing > attention to features of experience*. I’ll probably never study this > semiotic system in as much detail as you are doing, but maybe I’m starting > to get Peirce’s pragmaticistic point about what can (and can’t) be done > with *language* as a means of exploring *meaning spaces* (as I called > them in my book). One thing I can’t do with language is explain why such > exploration is worthwhile … it’s like trying to explain why evolution is > worthwhile. > > Message ends. > > Gary f. > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > > *Sent:* 13-Apr-19 21:11 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Analysis of Signs (was Phaneroscopy > and logic) > > > > Gary F., List: > I agree that the color assignments are arbitrary, as evidenced by Peirce's > own inconsistency, and thus strictly conventional rather than iconic. As > he himself recognized, that shortcoming pertains to tinctured surfaces just > as much as colored Spots and/or Lines. The main utility that I see for the > latter comes when we analyze a *discrete *predicate into a hypostatically > abstracted subject and a *continuous *predicate. The color reflects the > Universe to which the Dynamic Object denoted by the Spot belongs, as well > as the corresponding continuous predicate that the Line attached to it > signifies. However, I am starting to question this approach myself, in > part because of another passage that I recently encountered, which also > addresses your last point below. > > CSP: We remark among Existential Graphs two that are *continuous*; that > is, they may be regarded as consisting of parts; but all parts of them are > perfectly homogeneous with the whole. Continuity is not an Existential > character; it only belongs to the Object of the nature of Laws. > Consequently, the Continuous Graphs do not express Existential Predicates > but only Logical Predicates. The two continuous Graphs are the Blank, which > expresses Coëxistence and the Line of Identity, which expresses Numerical > (i.e. individual) “Sameness.” The peculiarities of these two Graphs are > partly Essential, and belong to the Phaneron, and are partly Accidental. > This connection through the blank depends on the Creative power of the mind > by which it makes *entia rationis*. The triad of combination is > *associative*. All this should be said at this point. And point out that > it supposes a *triad*. > > That ordinary Graphs are connected with the Blank is a totally different > manner from their connection with one another is to be regarded as an > accident of the particular mode of diagrammatization employed. In employing > Graphs to study the properties of the Phaneron, two different ways of > conceiving the relations of ordinary Graphs to the Blank, or Graph of > Coëxistence, present themselves. One is to consider the latter Graph as a > Graph of Inexhaustible, because Infinite, Valency; the other is that every > Graph should be conceived as having an additional Peg by which it is joined > to the Blank, or Graph of Coëxistence or Cobeing. And now the part of the > Blank to which any Graph is joined should be regarded as a triad, so that > the valency is not diminished by the junction. I mean that if *p* represents > a Peg of the general Graph of Coëxistence, and the Graph *g* is joined to > that Graph, it should be conceived as joined to a special portion of the > Blank which is triadic, so that the junction still leaves a Peg free. For > the representation of identity, on the other hand, the mode of > diagrammatization of the System is entirely satisfactory, the special Graph > of Teridentity being introduced when it is needed. (R 499s; 1906) > > I take "Existential Predicates" to be what I have been calling "discrete > predicates," and "Logical Predicates" to be what Peirce elsewhere called > "continuous predicates." This then seems to warrant my claim that the > continuous *relations *of coexistence and identity can also be > characterized as continuous *predicates*. The noteworthy difference > between these and *other *continuous predicates, besides their being > *symmetrical > *(cf. R 284:88[83]; 1905), is that although they are generally treated as > *dyadic*, they are really degenerate forms of *triadic > *relations--tercoexistence > and teridentity--in the sense that there is always room for another > attachment. > > CSP: It follows in the first place that every line of identity ought to > be considered as bristling with microscopic points of teridentity ... > > In the second place it follows that using “coexistence” in such a sense > that it is mere otherness, then since if anything is not coexistent with > itself the same is equally true of anything else ... it follows that a very > appropriate symbol for ter-coexistence ... is simply any blank point of the > sheet ... (SS 199; 1906 March 9) > > This explains what I noted in my post yesterday--the continuity of > (ter)coexistence and (ter)identity is expressed with an infinite series of > indefinite intermediate subjects, while that of "possessing a character" or > "standing in a relation" is not. The former have "Inexhaustible, because > Infinite, Valency"; while the latter have finite valency, but are still > indecomposable once everything requiring Collateral Experience/Observation > has been thrown into the subject. Put another way, we can add any number > of Graphs to the Sheet of Assertion, and any number of branches to a Line > of Identity at Spots of Teridentity; but a Line for "possessing the > character of" (or "belongs to the class/collection of") could only be > attached to *exactly two *Spots*. *Moreover, another convention would be > needed for which Spot belongs at each end of the latter, since the > signified relation is *asymmetric*. > > Perhaps I should adopt one of Peirce's proposed solutions after all--use > red for a Concretive Spot ("Solomon"), blue for an Abstractive Spot (" > wisdom"), and purple for the Line between them ("possesses"); or simply > revert to traditional black Lines of Identity and use a two-Peg Predicate > Spot for "possesses" (the character of) attached to a red Concretive Spot > on the left Peg and a blue Abstractive Spot on the right Peg. The latter > is consistent with using a Predicate Spot for "stands" (in the relation of) > that has three or more Pegs, but would be very cumbersome for any sentence > with multiple adjectives. Maybe I will just go back to one of my earlier > ideas--color only each Subject Spot (if anything), and consider its single > Peg to represent the corresponding continuous predicate. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Apr 13, 2019 at 6:42 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > > … > > I don’t see “continuous predicate” and “continuous relation” as > interchangeable, and I don’t see the line of identity (or coexistence) as a > *predicate*, because I don’t see it as *signifying* anything. Do you? And > if so, what advantage do you see in looking at it this way? > > Gary f. > >
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