John, List: JFS: Therefore, the pattern of graphs on our Phemic Sheet is just a possibility. It's a Seme with respect to the Truth.
Peirce's definition of "Seme" says nothing whatsoever about "possibility." It is simply "anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906). As I said before, the Phemic Sheet is a Seme of the Truth because it serves as a substitute for the Truth for the purpose of diagramming Propositions. JAS: Drawing attention to something actual is denoting that Object, which is the function of an Index (EP 2:306-307; 1904); and a Rheme obviously can be an Index, so it is false that a Rheme "can refer only to possible objects." JFS: No. A rheme is never an index. As I already pointed out, Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of Signs *explicitly *included two classes of Rhemes that *are *Indices--Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns and Rhematic Indexical Legisigns. *Every *Sign in *either *of these classes is *both* a Rheme according to its relation to the (Final) Interpretant *and *an Index according to its relation to the (Dynamic) Object. Any Sign that is *not *a Rheme *must *be either a Dicisign or an Argument; any Sign that is *not* an Index *must *be either an Icon or a Symbol. CSP: ... a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign [e.g., a spontaneous cry] is any object of direct experience so far as it directs attention to an Object by which its presence is caused. (CP 2.256, EP 2:294; 1903) JFS: The rhematic aspect is the auditory form of the cry. That would be a quasi-predicate that could describe any possible cry of that kind. But the indexical effect is the result of the direction of the sound, which is the auditory equivalent of a pointing finger. "Rheme" and "Index" do not denote *aspects *of Signs, they denote *divisions *of Signs according to two different *relations*. Again, a spontaneous cry is *both *a Rheme *and *an Index (and a Sinsign), and it refers to something *actual*. Claiming otherwise is once more exhibiting a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar. If anything, the *iconic *(or perhaps "qualisignic") aspect is the auditory form of the cry; the *rhematic *aspect is not separately representing the Object, as a Dicisign does, or the Interpretant, as an Argument does. JFS: The rheme and index are determined by two distinct aspects of the experience. We are discussing *one *Sign, not two *different *Signs. Is a spontaneous cry a Rheme, a Dicisign, or an Argument? Clearly it is a Rheme. Is it an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol? Clearly it is an Index. Does it refer to something actual, or only something possible? Clearly something actual. Therefore, it is straightforwardly *false *that a Rheme is never an Index and can never refer to something actual. CSP: The value of an icon consists in its exhibiting the features of a state of things regarded as if it were purely imaginary. The value of an index is that it assures us of positive fact. The value of a symbol is that it serves to make thought and conduct rational and enables us to predict the future. It is frequently desirable that a representamen should exercise one of those three functions to the exclusion of the other two, or two of them to the exclusion of the third; but the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic, indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as equally as possible. (CP 4.448; 1903) JFS: In short, the "characters" of the three members of any trichotomy are defined as disjoint. But any particular instance of a sign (such as the spontaneous cry) may blend or exhibit aspects of all three. That is the reason for Peirce's ten classes of signs. In that quote, Peirce referred specifically to blending or exhibiting aspects of all three functions *across a single trichotomy*. In particular, Symbols *involve *Indices, which *involve *Icons; and a pure Symbol, pure Index, or pure Icon is hypothetical, rather than actual. However, each of the ten (or 66) classes designates *every *Sign as having one *primary *function *within each trichotomy*. The three divisions of 1903 or ten divisions of 1906-1908 are disjoint *from each other*, except that the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481) limits which combinations are possible. Since Icon/Index/Symbol logically *precedes *Rheme/Dicisign/Argument, the combination of Index and Rheme is possible, which is why it corresponds to two of the ten Sign classes in the 1903 taxonomy. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 9:48 AM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon AS, Francesco, Gary R, Gary F, Jerry LRC, and List, > > I haven't had time to respond to the recent notes, but I dug into > more of Peirce's writings. There is much more to say. But in > this note, I'll recommend an article Jon cited, and show how the > quotation cited by Francesco clarifies the ambiguity about 'subject'. > > JAS > > an interesting 1997 book chapter by Mary Keeler and Christian Kloesel, > > http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/keelermargins1997.pdf > > That's a good 53-page paper, which emphasizes the interconnections > among all aspects of Peirce's thought. It reinforces the points I've > made: Every aspect of Peirce's writings, especially on fundamental > issues of logic, language, phaneroscopy, semeiotic, and metaphysics, > must be interpreted in the context of all the others. > > JAS > > [Peirce] would not have called a single one of his writings as > > "'finished,' ;definitive,' or 'final.'" That is obviously > > problematic for anyone like me who has a strong "regularizing" > > tendency, as Gary F. has helpfully (and accurately) described it. > > Yes. Passages that were crossed out or rejected for publication > are clues to Peirce's thinking processes. The differences between > different drafts will often highlight important distinctions. > > For example, Peirce defined the words 'term' and 'subject' in the > Century Dictionary. For 'subject', he defined 8 senses. For 'term', > his definition takes more than a page. It even includes a brief essay > about Aristotelian syllogisms. > > To "regularize" his terminology, Peirce coined many neologisms. > For common words, such as 'subject', he would often add an > adjective, such as 'grammatical'. (CP has 26 occurrences of the > word 'grammatical'.) > > CSP as quoted by FB > > "The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which > > thereby becomes the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter > > are at one, being a Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest > > Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is > > tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from > > the outset of their discussion, shall be a sheet, called the Phemic > > Sheet upon which [graphs can be scribed and erased]" > > ("Prolegomena", pp. 525–526) > > That quotation is important. But note that a pattern of graphs > on a sheet of paper is a Mark, which may be interpreted as a Token > of two different Types: as an icon (Seme) that maps to some pattern > in the Universe of Reality; or as a conjunction of EGs that assert > some proposition (Pheme). > > Consider an example: In previous notes, we discussed the EG for > "Bob owns a red car". The EG for that sentence asserts a proposition > on a Phemic Sheet that represents the Quasi-mind of our discussion. > The UoD for that discussion contains two individuals, Bob and a car. > They are definite individuals, but only within the UoD of our example. > > Now consider the pattern of EGs on that sheet in relation to > "the widest Universe of Reality". In that UoD, there are millions > of people named Bob, many of whom own red cars. But there is no > index that relates our Bob to any of the Bobs in Reality. Therefore, > the pattern of graphs on our Phemic Sheet is just a possibility. > It's a Seme with respect to the Truth. > > JAS > > Drawing attention to something actual is denoting that Object, > > which is the function of an Index (EP 2:306-307; 1904); and > > a Rheme obviously can be an Index, so it is false that a Rheme > > "can refer only to possible objects." > > No. A rheme is never an index. > > Tony Jappy explains the difference between the "form" of a percept > (which may be represented by a predicate) and the indexical effect > of its position and direction in a particular occurrence. See > > https://www.ocula.it/files/OCULA-15-JAPPY-Peirce-rhetoric-and-the-still-image.pdf > > Consider Peirce's example: "a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign [e.g., > a spontaneous cry] is any object of direct experience so far as it > directs attention to an Object by which its presence is caused." > > The rhematic aspect is the auditory form of the cry. That would be > a quasi-predicate that could describe any possible cry of that kind. > But the indexical effect is the result of the direction of the sound, > which is the auditory equivalent of a pointing finger. > > As another example, consider a dog barking on your left, and a > doorbell ringing on your right. In both cases, the pattern of > sound is the Rheme, and the direction of the sound is the Index. > > A person who is deaf in one ear will recognize barking and bell, > but not know which way to look. But by moving or turning, that > person could detect a difference in volume that provides the > indexical effect. The rheme and index are determined by two > distinct aspects of the experience. In an EG, they map to a > monad for the form (rheme) and a line of identity for the index. > > Peirce discussed those issues in CP 4.448: > > > The value of an icon consists in its exhibiting the features of a > > state of things regarded as if it were purely imaginary. The value > > of an index is that it assures us of positive fact. The value of > > a symbol is that it serves to make thought and conduct rational and > > enables us to predict the future. It is frequently desirable that > > a representamen should exercise one of those three functions to the > > exclusion of the other two, or two of them to the exclusion of the > > third; but the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic, > > indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as equally as possible. > > In short, the "characters" of the three members of any trichotomy > are defined as disjoint. But any particular instance of a sign > (such as the spontaneous cry) may blend or exhibit aspects of all > three. That is the reason for Peirce's ten classes of signs. > > In his article, Jappy has many examples of perceptual occurrences > and the analyses that determine the icon and the index. In his 2014 > article and his 2017 book, Jappy goes beyond Peirce's ten classes > to the 28 classes mentioned in a letter to Lady Welby in 1908. > > Those classes (10 or 28) are "blends". But every trichotomy defines > three disjoint partitions, which map to disjoint parts of an EG. > > John >
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