List,
Before I sign off on this topic (pun intended), I just want to add a little
something to help, I hope, get at--not *what* I've been arguing, since in
that matter I've said pretty much all I can think of to say--but *why* I've
been arguing for a thoughtful consideration of what Peirce calls the "the
sign in itself".
Take for example, the symbol. When we refer to a "symbol" we know that it
will be either a rheme, a dicisign, or an argument. And conversely, and
quite obviously, when we think of any of these three, at least in the back
of our minds we're aware that each and all are symbols. Now, in a passage I
quoted in my last post Peirce states that "*any Symbol, is necessarily
itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign*." So, any
and all symbols are legisigns.
To paraphrase Tevye in *Fiddler on the Roof*, would it spoil some vast,
eternal plan if, when we think of symbols we also think that they are all
legisigns?
*But further*, *that not all legisigns are symbols*. Symbols are, in
Peirce's parlance, the only "genuine" signs, but some "degenerate" signs
are analyzed by him as legisigns. I mentioned sign no. 7 in my last message
as an example of a legisign which is not a symbol: the Dicent Indexical
Legisign ("a street cry"). But so are signs no. 5 and 6.
As I see it, Peirce put a lot of thought and time and *meaning* into the
classification of signs which appears in "Nomenclature," and I for one
think we ought to reflect on why Peirce considered the types of "the sign
in itself" (which, again, is either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign) as
significant.
OK. Now I'll drop the mic--I'm done.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 11:52 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Jon, Gary F, Helmut, Auke,List,
>
> Gary's list of "counts of occurrences of the noun and adjectival forms of
> icon/iconic, index/indexical/ symbol/symbolic showing that the adjectival
> form appears less frequently doesn't address the *crucial *fact that
> Peirce wrote:
>
> "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the sign in
> itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law;
> secondly,
> according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in the sign's
> having
> some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that Object,
> or in its
> relation to an Interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant
> represents it
> as a sign of possibility, or as a sign of fact, or a sign of reason.
>
> "According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a
> Sinsign,
> or a Legisign.
>
> "A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a
> sign until
> it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as
> a
> sign. // "A Sinsign [. . .] is an actual existent thing or event which is
> a sign. . . //
> "A Legisign is a law that is a sign. [. . .] EP2:291
>
> My response is, "So what that Peirce used what I've been referring to as
> the kind of 'shorthand' *we all use* in referring to signs?" Gary F
> continued:
>
> GF: Call it “shorthand” if you like, but if it’s good enough for Peirce,
> it’s good enough for me.
>
>
> It's good enough for me too. No one, not Peirce, nor me, nor you or Jon or
> anyone I know of, is, for example, going to refer (informally) to a
> rhematic sign, as Peirce does in his triangle of the 10 classes as a
> "Rhematic Symbolic *Legisign*." No, we say, simply, 'Rheme'. But Peirce
> analyzed it as a *Legisign *in "Nomenclature, etc." Again, we all call
> such signs "Rhemes"--but *Rhemes ARE Legisigns*. As Jon wrote:
>
>
> JAS: Since Peirce invented these terms, and clearly went back and forth
> between adjective and noun forms, we are also authorized to do so.
>
>
> OK, but that doesn't imply that, for example, all symbols (the Rheme,
> Dicisign, and Argument) aren't Legisigns.
>
>
> GF: Clearly, for Peirce, an icon is a sign, an index is a sign, and a
> symbol is a sign.
>
>
> Most certainly there *are* *iconic* signs: the Qualisign (Rhematic Iconic
> Qualisign, no. 1), the Sinsign (Rhematic Iconic Sinsign, no. 2) or the
> Legisign (a Rhematic Iconic Legisign, no. 5). NOTE: these three iconic
> signs represent *all three types of the Sign qua sign*: "according as the
> sign in
> itself is a mere *quality*, is an *actual existent*, or is a* general law*"
> (boldface added) *For Sign class no. 1 it is a Qualisign, for no. 2 it is
> a Sinsign, for no. 5 it is a Legisign.*
>
> The same sort of analysis goes for the indexical signs (4 of them). And
> note that sign class No. 7 is analyzed by Peirce as a Legisign.
>
> And consider what Peirce has to say about the following Sign, the first of
> the three symbolic signs, class no. 8 (and despite, as Jon has pointed out,
> Peirce will willy nilly informally (I'd argue) switch the order and the
> noun/adjectival facets of each Class trichotomy, here referring to Sign
> class no. 8 as "a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, " informally, I say,
> because this class:
>
> .
> . . is a sign connected with
> its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its
> Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits
> or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the
> Replica is interpreted as a sign of an Object that is an instance of that
> concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the
> logicians call a general term. *The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is
> necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign
> *(boldface
> added).
>
> So, it looks like we will most likely have to agree to disagree on this
> matter. I've said all that I have to say on the topic as it relates to the
> matters taken up in "Nomenclature" (Jon's remarks go beyond this in
> consideration of later classifications. Btw, thanks, Jon, for catching my
> typo). I'll let either--or both--of you have the last word.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 8:30 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., Gary F., List:
>>
>> GR: There are three classes among the 10 of Sinsigns. In relation to
>> their Interpretants they are either Rhematic (Signs 2 and 3) or *Dicent
>> *(Sign
>> 4). In relation to their Objects they are either Iconic (Sign 2) or
>> Indexical (Signs 3 and 4).
>>
>>
>> The bold is my correction of something that I believe you mistyped.
>> Since Peirce invented these terms, and clearly went back and forth between
>> adjective and noun forms, we are also authorized to do so. In relation to
>> their (Final) Interpretants, all Sinsigns are either Rhemes or Dicisigns.
>> In relation to their (Dynamic) Objects, they are either Icons or Indices.
>> Every trichotomy is a division of *Signs*, so each name therein can be
>> properly used as a noun denoting a *class *of Signs accordingly.
>>
>> GR: I could continue this analysis as above, but I think it's clear that
>> I see the above examples as instances of Peirce's using a loose shorthand
>> kind of language at times.
>>
>>
>> I find it utterly implausible that Peirce was being *unintentionally *loose
>> in his terminology here. If he considered adjective vs. noun to be
>> significant, he surely would have been consistent about maintaining it.
>> But he *did not* say that a Qualisign is necessarily "iconic" and
>> "rhematic," or that an Iconic Sinsign or Legisign is "rhematic," or that a
>> Dicent Sinsign is "indexical"; and he *did *say that a Rhematic Symbol
>> can just as well be called a Symbolic Rheme.
>>
>> GR: ... I am not convinced that such loose talk *by us* is very helpful
>> in a careful consideration of Peirce's analysis of the trichotomic nature
>> of each SIgn: that it has a relation to its Object (which is Iconic,
>> Indexical, or Symbolic), a relation to its Interpretant (which is Rhematic,
>> Dicentic, or Argumentative ...
>>
>>
>> The Sign's *relation *to its (Dynamic) Object is indeed iconic,
>> indexical, or symbolic; but the Sign *itself *is either an Icon, an
>> Index, or a Symbol *according to* the nature of that relation. The
>> Sign's *relation *to its (Final) Interpretant is indeed rhematic,
>> dicent, or argumentative; but the Sign *itself *is either a Rheme
>> (Seme), a Dicisign (Proposition), or an Argument *according to* the
>> nature of that relation. Moreover, as far as I can tell, Peirce *never *used
>> the words "Semic" or "Delomic," and he *only *used the word "Phemic"
>> when referring to the Sheet of Assertion in EGs.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 7:19 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary R,
>>>
>>> You can call it “loose talk” if you are so inclined, but it’s not a
>>> matter of Peirce using it “at times,” he uses it *almost all the time*
>>> in his writings on semiotic. A quick search through those writings yields
>>> the following count of occurrences of the noun and adjective forms:
>>>
>>> icon 135, icons 54; iconic 61
>>>
>>> index 177, indices 76; indexical 33
>>>
>>> symbol 248, symbols 125; symbolic 27
>>>
>>> rheme 26, rhemes 3; rhematic 12
>>>
>>> dicisign 21, dicisigns 7; dicent 18
>>>
>>> argument 299, arguments 113; argumentative 2
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As for seme, Peirce *never* used an adjective form, as far as I can
>>> tell.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Call it “shorthand” if you like, but if it’s good enough for Peirce,
>>> it’s good enough for me.
>>>
>>> Clearly, for Peirce, an icon is a sign, an index is a sign, and a symbol
>>> is a sign. And so on.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
>>> *Sent:* 28-Mar-19 18:25
>>> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]>
>>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's
>>> semeiotic (was Ambiguities...
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary F, Jon, Helmut,
>>>
>>> Gary F quoted Peirce: CP 2.250. According to the third trichotomy, a
>>> Sign may be termed a *Rheme,* a *Dicisign* or*Dicent Sign* (that is, a
>>> proposition or quasi-proposition), or an Argument.
>>>
>>> But this is "According to the third trichotomy. . ."
>>>
>>> The three symbolic signs, the Rheme, the Dicisign, and the Argument are
>>> yet all three *Legisigns*. The "Sign *in itself*' is still either a
>>> Qualisign, a Sinsign, or a Legisign.
>>>
>>> Jon quoted Peirce:
>>>
>>> CSP: ... a Qualisign is necessarily an Icon ... it can only be
>>> interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as a Rheme ...
>>>
>>> But, again, the only Qualisign of the 10 classes, even if necessarily
>>> rhematic (in relation to its Interpretant) or Iconic (in relation to its
>>> Object) is yet a Qualisign *qua *sign.
>>>
>>> ... an Iconic Sinsign ... Being an Icon ... can only be interpreted as a
>>> sign of essence, or Rheme ...
>>>
>>> There are three classes among the 10 of Sinsigns. In relation to their
>>> Interpretants they are either Rhematic (Signs 2 and 3) or Indexical (Sign
>>> 4). In relation to their Objects they are either Iconic (Sign 2) or
>>> Indexical (Signs 3 and 4). But *qua* Sign in itself, they are all three
>>> Sinsigns.
>>>
>>> ... a Dicent Sinsign is necessarily an Index ...
>>>
>>> ... an Iconic Legisign ... Being an Icon, it must be a Rheme ...
>>>
>>> ... a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme ... (CP 2.254-261, EP
>>> 2:294-295; 1903)
>>>
>>> I could continue this analysis as above, but I think it's clear that I
>>> see the above examples as instances of Peirce's using a loose shorthand
>>> kind of language at times.
>>>
>>> But unless one is willing to deny that, as he writes: ""Signs are
>>> divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as *the sign
>>> in itself* is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law,"
>>> then I am not convinced that such loose talk *by us *is very helpful in
>>> a careful consideration of Peirce's analysis of the trichotomic nature of
>>> each SIgn: that it has a relation to its Object (which is Iconic,
>>> Indexical, or Symbolic), a relation to its Interpretant (which is Rhematic,
>>> Dicentic, or Argumentative: and, yes, since there is but one Argumentative
>>> sign, there's no need to speak or write the awkward "Argumentative Symbolic
>>> Legisign--"Argument will suffice"-- yet it remains in its relation to
>>> itself as a Sign, a Legisign; and, mutatis mutandis for shorthand
>>> expressions for other signs as well), and is either a Quali-, Sin- or
>>> Legisign "according as *the sign in itself* is a mere quality, is an
>>> actual existent, or is a general law."
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>
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