Gary F, Jon, Helmut, Gary F quoted Peirce: CP 2.250. According to the third trichotomy, a Sign may be termed a *Rheme,* a *Dicisign* or*Dicent Sign* (that is, a proposition or quasi-proposition), or an Argument.
But this is "According to the third trichotomy. . ." The three symbolic signs, the Rheme, the Dicisign, and the Argument are yet all three *Legisigns*. The "Sign *in itself*' is still either a Qualisign, a Sinsign, or a Legisign. Jon quoted Peirce: CSP: ... a Qualisign is necessarily an Icon ... it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as a Rheme ... But, again, the only Qualisign of the 10 classes, even if necessarily rhematic (in relation to its Interpretant) or Iconic (in relation to its Object) is yet a Qualisign *qua *sign. ... an Iconic Sinsign ... Being an Icon ... can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme ... There are three classes among the 10 of Sinsigns. In relation to their Interpretants they are either Rhematic (Signs 2 and 3) or Indexical (Sign 4). In relation to their Objects they are either Iconic (Sign 2) or Indexical (Signs 3 and 4). But *qua* Sign in itself, they are all three Sinsigns. ... a Dicent Sinsign is necessarily an Index ... ... an Iconic Legisign ... Being an Icon, it must be a Rheme ... ... a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme ... (CP 2.254-261, EP 2:294-295; 1903) I could continue this analysis as above, but I think it's clear that I see the above examples as instances of Peirce's using a loose shorthand kind of language at times. But unless one is willing to deny that, as he writes: ""Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as *the sign in **itself* is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law," then I am not convinced that such loose talk *by us *is very helpful in a careful consideration of Peirce's analysis of the trichotomic nature of each SIgn: that it has a relation to its Object (which is Iconic, Indexical, or Symbolic), a relation to its Interpretant (which is Rhematic, Dicentic, or Argumentative: and, yes, since there is but one Argumentative sign, there's no need to speak or write the awkward "Argumentative Symbolic Legisign--"Argument will suffice"-- yet it remains in its relation to itself as a Sign, a Legisign; and, mutatis mutandis for shorthand expressions for other signs as well), and is either a Quali-, Sin- or Legisign "according as *the sign in **itself* is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law." Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 5:30 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, Jon, list, > > GR: That Peirce expresses the relation of the sign to the Interpretant > and to the Object *adjectivally* is significant. Or, if one doesn't think > it's significant, why not? > > GF: Because Peirce does *not* express those relations adjectivally. One > may get this impression from looking at the triangle diagram alone, but the > text defining those sign types names them using nouns, just as it does with > the first trichotomy. > > > > [[ CP 2.250. According to the third trichotomy, a Sign may be termed a > *Rheme,* a *Dicisign* or *Dicent Sign* (that is, a proposition or > quasi-proposition), or an Argument. > > A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative > Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of > possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it > is not interpreted as doing so. > > 251. A *Dicent Sign* is a Sign, which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of > actual existence. It cannot, therefore, be an Icon, which affords no ground > for an interpretation of it as referring to actual existence. A Dicisign > necessarily involves, as a part of it, a Rheme, to describe the fact which > it is interpreted as indicating. But this is a peculiar kind of Rheme; and > while it is essential to the Dicisign, it by no means constitutes it. > > 252. An *Argument* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of > law. ]] > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 28-Mar-19 16:45 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic > (was Ambiguities... > > > > Helmut, Jon, Gary F, > > > > For each and every of the 10 sign classes given at EP2:296, "Nomenclature > and Division of Triadic Relations," for example, the central sign class in > the triangle, Rhematic Indexical Legisign, the first term refers to the > relation of the sign to its Interpretant, the second to the sign in its > relation to the Object, and only the third to the Sign in itself. Peirce is > explicit about this. > > > > "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the sign in > > itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; > secondly, > > according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in the sign's > having > > some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that Object, > or in its > > relation to an Interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant > represents it > > as a sign of possibility, or as a sign of fact, or a sign of reason. > > > > "According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a > Sinsign, > > or a Legisign. > > > > "A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a > sign until > > it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as > a > > sign. > > > > "A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning "being only once," > as > > in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event > which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it > involves a qualisign, > > or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind > and > > only form a sign through being actually embodied. > > > > "A Legisign is a law that is a sign. This law is usually established by > men. > > Every conventional sign is a legisign. It is not a single object, but a > general > > type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign > signifies > > through an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of > it. > EP2:291 > > > > In the diagram of the 10 Classes of Signs Peirce reverse the above order > so that for each class the SIgn in itself is given last. > > > > We've taken this matter up several times on the list, for example, in > consideration of Peirce's saying that there are no pure icons: so, some > signs are 'iconic'. I would suggest that that is so for the 'indexical' > signs as well. > > > > That Peirce expresses the relation of the sign to the Interpretant and to > the Object *adjectivally* is significant. Or, if one doesn't think it's > significant, why not? As I see it Helmut has a point from this purely > theoretical standpoint (vs. the use of signs in, say, a proposition, or, > the placement of signs in a particular Existential Graph). > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > > > > On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 3:56 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > > Helmut, > > No, Jon has it exactly right. Study the “Nomenclature and Division of > Triadic Relations” (in EP2 or CP) and you’ll see. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 28-Mar-19 15:09 > > > > Jon, Auke, list, > > isnt it so, that in the context of sign classification a sign is either a > quali-, sin-, or legisign, all of which may or may not have the adjective > "rhematic"? So, in this context, "a rheme" is not regarded as a sign, but > "rhematic" is regarded as an adjective, a trait of a sign resp. its > interpretant relation? > > Leaving this context, but still to be in accord with it , I would propose > saying, that a rheme or seme (I havent got the difference) "is" not a sign, > but can function as a sign, if it is perceived, and then this sign "is" > rhematic, but "is" a quali-, sin-, or legisign, but not "is a rheme"? > > Best, > > Helmut > > > > 28. März 2019 um 19:39 Uhr > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Auke, List: > > > > AvB: I prefer terms like Rhematic in order to underscore that it always > is about sign aspects ... > > > > No, it is not. Again, the trichtomies do not identify "sign aspects" or > "aspects of signs"; there are *zero* instances of *any *such phrase in > the eight volumes of CP and two volumes of EP. Peirce proposed the three > trichotomies of 1903 and the ten trichotomies of 1906-1908 as alternative > bases for identifying mutually exclusive *classes *of Signs. Every Sign > *theoretically > *belongs to *exactly one* of the ten classes of 1903, and would belong to > *exactly > one* of the 66 classes of 1906-1908 if anyone ever managed to sort them > all out. > > > > Every Sign is either a Seme, a Proposition, or an Argument; and every Sign > is either an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol. In accordance with the "rule of > determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), every Argument is a Symbol, and every > Proposition is either an Index or a Symbol; while a Seme can be an Icon, an > Index, or a Symbol. > > > > AvB: Although a rheme cannot perform an indexical function ... > > > > I am aware of no warrant for this statement whatsoever from Peirce's > writings. If a Sign is a Rhematic Index (Indexical Seme), then by > definition it is a Rheme (Seme) that *can* and *does *perform an > indexical function. > > > > AvB: When we think of a composite sentence like "there is a cow". 'there' > is the replica index and 'a cow' the symbolical, rhematic legisign of the > compound forged by the copula. > > > > In this context, "there" is a pronoun, hence a Rhematic Indexical > Legisign; i.e., a Rheme (Seme) that performs an indexical function. By > itself, it is certainly not a Dicisign (Proposition), which is the only > alternative classification for an Index. > > > > AvB: I don't see any harm in distinguishing an index as a possible, > without actual indexical function and an index in actu. > > > > If a Sign is not performing any actual indexical function, how could it be > properly classified as an Index at all? > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > > >
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