Gary R., List: GR: Gary's list of "counts of occurrences of the noun and adjectival forms of icon/iconic, index/indexical/ symbol/symbolic showing that the adjectival form appears less frequently doesn't address the crucial fact that Peirce wrote:"Signs are divisible by three trichotomies ..."
But notice what Peirce said *all three* trichotomies divide--*Signs*. A Qualisign (Tone) is a Sign, a Sinsign (Token) is a Sign, and a Legisign (Type) is a Sign. An Icon is a Sign, an Index is a Sign, and a Symbol is a Sign. A Rheme (Seme) is a Sign, a Dicisign (Proposition) is a Sign, and an Argument is a Sign. GR: Again, we all call such signs "Rhemes"--but *Rhemes ARE Legisigns.* According to the 1903 taxonomy, *some *Rhemes are Legisigns; others are Sinsigns, and still others are Qualisigns. Likewise, some Rhemes are Symbols; others are Indices, and still others are Icons. *Any *number of trichotomies can be used to classify Signs--the ten from 1906-1908 result in 66 classes of Signs, the three from 1903 produce ten classes of Signs, and *any one division* *by itself* designates three classes of Signs. GR: So, any and all symbols are legisigns. To paraphrase Tevye in *Fiddler on the Roof*, would it spoil some vast, eternal plan if, when we think of symbols we also think that they are all legisigns? *But further*, *that not all legisigns are symbols*. No one is disputing any of this. My point--and what I take to be Gary F.'s point, as well--is that it is a mistake to *overemphasize *Peirce's usage of adjectives vs. nouns in naming the Sign classes, as if the division according to the nature of the Sign itself is somehow *more significant* than the other two. A Rhematic Indexical Legisign is just as much a Rheme and an Index as it is a Legisign. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 8:02 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > Before I sign off on this topic (pun intended), I just want to add a > little something to help, I hope, get at--not *what* I've been arguing, > since in that matter I've said pretty much all I can think of to say--but > *why* I've been arguing for a thoughtful consideration of what Peirce > calls the "the sign in itself". > > Take for example, the symbol. When we refer to a "symbol" we know that it > will be either a rheme, a dicisign, or an argument. And conversely, and > quite obviously, when we think of any of these three, at least in the back > of our minds we're aware that each and all are symbols. Now, in a passage I > quoted in my last post Peirce states that "*any Symbol, is necessarily > itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign*." So, any > and all symbols are legisigns. > > To paraphrase Tevye in *Fiddler on the Roof*, would it spoil some vast, > eternal plan if, when we think of symbols we also think that they are all > legisigns? > > *But further*, *that not all legisigns are symbols*. Symbols are, in > Peirce's parlance, the only "genuine" signs, but some "degenerate" signs > are analyzed by him as legisigns. I mentioned sign no. 7 in my last message > as an example of a legisign which is not a symbol: the Dicent Indexical > Legisign ("a street cry"). But so are signs no. 5 and 6. > > As I see it, Peirce put a lot of thought and time and *meaning* into the > classification of signs which appears in "Nomenclature," and I for one > think we ought to reflect on why Peirce considered the types of "the sign > in itself" (which, again, is either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign) as > significant. > > OK. Now I'll drop the mic--I'm done. > > Best, > > Gary R > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 11:52 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, Gary F, Helmut, Auke,List, >> >> Gary's list of "counts of occurrences of the noun and adjectival forms of >> icon/iconic, index/indexical/ symbol/symbolic showing that the adjectival >> form appears less frequently doesn't address the *crucial *fact that >> Peirce wrote: >> >> "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the sign >> in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; >> secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in >> the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation >> to that Object, or in its relation to an Interpretant; thirdly, according >> as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility, or as a sign of >> fact, or a sign of reason. >> >> "According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a >> Sinsign, or a Legisign. >> >> "A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a >> sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its >> character as a sign. // "A Sinsign [. . .] is an actual existent thing or >> event which is a sign. . . // "A Legisign is a law that is a sign. [. . .] >> EP2:291 >> >> My response is, "So what that Peirce used what I've been referring to as >> the kind of 'shorthand' *we all use* in referring to signs?" Gary F >> continued: >> >> GF: Call it “shorthand” if you like, but if it’s good enough for Peirce, >> it’s good enough for me. >> >> >> It's good enough for me too. No one, not Peirce, nor me, nor you or Jon >> or anyone I know of, is, for example, going to refer (informally) to a >> rhematic sign, as Peirce does in his triangle of the 10 classes as a >> "Rhematic Symbolic *Legisign*." No, we say, simply, 'Rheme'. But Peirce >> analyzed it as a *Legisign *in "Nomenclature, etc." Again, we all call >> such signs "Rhemes"--but *Rhemes ARE Legisigns*. As Jon wrote: >> >> >> JAS: Since Peirce invented these terms, and clearly went back and forth >> between adjective and noun forms, we are also authorized to do so. >> >> >> OK, but that doesn't imply that, for example, all symbols (the Rheme, >> Dicisign, and Argument) aren't Legisigns. >> >> >> GF: Clearly, for Peirce, an icon is a sign, an index is a sign, and a >> symbol is a sign. >> >> >> Most certainly there *are* *iconic* signs: the Qualisign (Rhematic >> Iconic Qualisign, no. 1), the Sinsign (Rhematic Iconic Sinsign, no. 2) or >> the Legisign (a Rhematic Iconic Legisign, no. 5). NOTE: these three iconic >> signs represent *all three types of the Sign qua sign*: "according as >> the sign in itself is a mere *quality*, is an *actual existent*, or is a* >> general law*" (boldface added) *For Sign class no. 1 it is a Qualisign, >> for no. 2 it is a Sinsign, for no. 5 it is a Legisign.* >> >> The same sort of analysis goes for the indexical signs (4 of them). And >> note that sign class No. 7 is analyzed by Peirce as a Legisign. >> >> And consider what Peirce has to say about the following Sign, the first >> of the three symbolic signs, class no. 8 (and despite, as Jon has pointed >> out, Peirce will willy nilly informally (I'd argue) switch the order and >> the noun/adjectival facets of each Class trichotomy, here referring to Sign >> class no. 8 as "a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, " informally, I say, >> because this class: . . . is a sign connected with its Object by an >> association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls up an >> image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of >> that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is >> interpreted as a sign of an Object that is an instance of that concept. >> Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the logicians >> call a general term. *The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is >> necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign >> *(boldface >> added). >> >> So, it looks like we will most likely have to agree to disagree on this >> matter. I've said all that I have to say on the topic as it relates to the >> matters taken up in "Nomenclature" (Jon's remarks go beyond this in >> consideration of later classifications. Btw, thanks, Jon, for catching my >> typo). I'll let either--or both--of you have the last word. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >>>
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