Hi Eugene Thanks for this. I know the quote well. Reid’s common-sensism certainly was nativist. And here Peirce does seem to echo that.
However I do not believe that he means by “innate” here the same that is implied by modern usage of that word. I am working on a discussion of how the word “innate” is used by Reid, Peirce, Hume, Locke (who in fact did believe in innate capacities), and others. And how they are often interpreted anachronistically. Certainly Peirce believed in inborn capacities (most everyone does). But not, I believe, in innate content (eg Fodor), a distinction I discuss at length in Dark Matter. Dan Sent from my iPhone > On Apr 7, 2019, at 19:57, Eugene Halton <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Dear Dan, > You say, "I discuss Kant’s work in my book, Dark Matter of the Mind, > where I argue that there is no innate knowledge. 'Duty' 'respect' even things > like colors are largely cultural constructs, in a way that I believe fits in > quite well with Peirce’s phaneroscopy. I am not aware of any statement in > Peirce’s architectonic where innate, a priori knowledge plays a crucial > causal role for building his philosophy." > > Peirce's critical common-sensism marks a sharp contrast to your claim that > innate ideas play no crucial causal role in Peirce's philosophy. Consider his > statement from "Consequences of Common-Sensism" in the Collected Papers: > > “Now every animal must have habits. Consequently, it must have innate habits. > In so far as it has has cognitive powers, it must have in posse innate > cognitive habits, which is all that anybody but John Locke ever meant by > innate ideas. To say that I hold this for true is implied in my confession of > the doctrine of Common-Sense—not quite of the old Scotch School, but a > critical philosophy of common-sense. It is impossible rightly to apprehend > the pragmatist’s position without fully understanding that nowhere would he > be less at home than in the ranks of individualists, whether metaphysical > (and so denying scholastic realism) or epistemological (and so denying innate > ideas).” Peirce, 5.504 > Gene Halton > >> On Sun, Apr 7, 2019 at 3:49 PM Dan Everett <[email protected]> wrote: >> John, >> >> I agree with you on this. A significant difference between Peirce’s a priori >> and Kant’s is that Kant’s is necessarily not derived from experience. Peirce >> did, as you say, allow that some things might be prior to experience, but >> one gets the feeling that he would be quite happy if it could be shown that >> they were not, apart from logical constraints. One strong difference between >> Peirce’s use of the term “universal grammar” and Chomsky’s later use of the >> same phrase (going back to the Modistae, as readers of this list know) is >> that for Peirce universal/speculative grammar is neither nature nor nurture. >> I think that he would have been pleased with any demonstration that showed >> the same for non-logically required categories. >> >> I discuss Kant’s work in my book, Dark Matter of the Mind, where I argue >> that there is no innate knowledge. >> >> “Duty” “respect” even things like colors are largely cultural constructs, in >> a way that I believe fits in quite well with Peirce’s phaneroscopy. >> >> I am not aware of any statement in Peirce’s architectonic where innate, a >> priori knowledge plays a crucial causal role for building his philosophy. >> >> Like Hume’s use of “instinct” Peirce’s use of that term (or phylogentic >> habits) does not necessarily support nativism as widely conceived in >> contemporary literature. >> >> - Dan >> >> Sent from my iPad >> >> > On Apr 7, 2019, at 3:29 PM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: >> > >> >> On 4/7/2019 1:59 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: >> >> As an example of an /a priori/ element in moral cognition, consider the >> >> role of the /feeling/ of respect in deliberation about the what is >> >> required as a matter of duty. As an example of an a priori element in >> >> aesthetic judgment, consider the condition of seeking harmony in the >> >> experience of the beautiful. As an example of an /a priori/ element in >> >> mathematical cognition, consider the role of the intuition of the whole >> >> of ideal space in geometrical reasoning. >> >> In each case, I tend to think that Peirce agrees with Kant that these are >> >> /a priori/ and not merely /a posteriori/ elements in our practical, >> >> aesthetic and mathematical cognition. >> > >> > That's an interesting argument. But I recall something Peirce said >> > about that issue (but it would require quite a bit of search to find >> > exactly where). >> > >> > He said that Kant's Critik drV was his basic training in philosophy >> > (when he was 16). But he diverged from Kant about what is a priori. >> > Peirce admitted that there are probably some innate tendencies and >> > preferences that determine value judgments. But experience (i.e., >> > informal phaneroscopy) is essential to develop the details. >> > >> > John >> > >> > >> > >> > ----------------------------- >> > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> > . >> > >> > >> > >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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