Thanks John. I quite like Bruce’s book. Those are good quotes.
Dan Sent from my iPhone > On Apr 7, 2019, at 23:16, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > > Gary F, Jeff BD, Dan, > > GF >>> could it be you’re thinking of Peirce’s “Logic of Quantity,” >>> 1893 (CP 4.85-92) >> Kant declares that the question of his great work is “How are >> synthetical judgments a priori possible?” By a priori he means >> universal; by synthetical, experiential (i.e., relating to >> experience, not necessarily derived wholly from experience). >> The true question for him should have been, “How are universal >> propositions relating to experience to be justified?” > > That's not the quotation I was thinking of, but it's related. > In any case, the quotations at the end of this note are clearer. > > JBD >> Richard Smyth has two monographs that deal squarely with these sorts >> of questions... One of the salient points that Smyth makes is that >> Kant's distinctions between what is a priori and a posteriori, on the >> one hand, and the what is analytic and what is synthetic apply first >> and foremost to the classification of different sorts of cognitions... > > That point is relevant to the a priori issues. But I was looking for > quotations about the distinction between innate ideas (acquired by > evolution) and ideas derived from an individual's experience. Since > you mentioned Smyth's book, that reminded me of a book that I bought > at a conference a couple of years ago: Wilson, Aaron Bruce (2016) > Peirce’s Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality, Lexington Books. > > In Chapter 5, Wilson discusses Thomas Reid's critical common sense > and quoted related passages by Peirce. I copied some of the passages > Wilson quoted from CP. See the end of this note. > > DE >> A significant difference between Peirce’s a priori and Kant’s is >> that Kant’s is necessarily not derived from experience. > > Yes. And as Peirce says below (CP 5.504), "Now every animal must > have habits. Consequently, it must have innate habits." > > Peirce had also studied some Arabic and Ancient Egyptian, and he > was acquainted with Chinese and Basque. He did not want to limit > his logic and semeiotic to Indo-European (or has he called it, > Aryan). Unlike the Chomskyan linguists, I think Peirce would > have been delighted to learn something about Pirahã. > > John > ___________________________________________________________________ > > it seems to me there is the most positive historic proof that innate > truths are particularly uncertain and mixed up with error, and > therefore a fortiori not without exception. This historical proof is, > of course, not infallible; but it is very strong. Therefore, I ask > how do you know that a priori truth is certain, exceptionless, and > exact? You cannot know it by reasoning. For that would be subject > to uncertainty and inexactitude. Then, it must amount to this that > you know it a priori; that is, you take a priori judgments at their > own valuation, without criticism or credentials. That is barring > the gate of inquiry. (CP 1.144, c 1897) > > Now every animal must have habits. Consequently, it must have innate > habits. In so far as it has cognitive powers, it must have _in posse_ > innate cognitive habits, which is all that anybody but John Locke > ever meant by innate ideas. To say that I hold this for true is > implied in my confession of the doctrine of Common-Sense -- not quite > that of the old Scotch School, but a critical philosophy of common- > sense. It is impossible rightly to apprehend the pragmaticist's > position without fully understanding that nowhere would he be less > at home than in the ranks of individualists, whether metaphysical > (and so denying scholastic realism), or epistemological (and so > denying innate ideas). (CP 5.504, 1905) > > Now those vague beliefs that appear to be indubitable have the same > sort of basis as scientific results have. That is to say, they rest > on experience -- on the total everyday experience of many generations > of multitudinous populations. Such experience is worthless for > distinctively scientific purposes, because it does not make the minute > distinctions with which science is chiefly concerned; nor does it relate > to the recondite subjects of science, although all science, without > being aware of it, virtually supposes the truth of the vague results > of uncontrolled thought upon such experiences, cannot help doing so, > and would have to shut up shop if she should manage to escape > accepting them. (CP 5.522, 1905) > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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