Gary F, Jeff BD, Dan,
GF
could it be you’re thinking of Peirce’s “Logic of Quantity,”
1893 (CP 4.85-92)
Kant declares that the question of his great work is “How are
synthetical judgments a priori possible?” By a priori he means
universal; by synthetical, experiential (i.e., relating to
experience, not necessarily derived wholly from experience).
The true question for him should have been, “How are universal
propositions relating to experience to be justified?”
That's not the quotation I was thinking of, but it's related.
In any case, the quotations at the end of this note are clearer.
JBD
Richard Smyth has two monographs that deal squarely with these sorts
of questions... One of the salient points that Smyth makes is that
Kant's distinctions between what is a priori and a posteriori, on the
one hand, and the what is analytic and what is synthetic apply first
and foremost to the classification of different sorts of cognitions...
That point is relevant to the a priori issues. But I was looking for
quotations about the distinction between innate ideas (acquired by
evolution) and ideas derived from an individual's experience. Since
you mentioned Smyth's book, that reminded me of a book that I bought
at a conference a couple of years ago: Wilson, Aaron Bruce (2016)
Peirce’s Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality, Lexington Books.
In Chapter 5, Wilson discusses Thomas Reid's critical common sense
and quoted related passages by Peirce. I copied some of the passages
Wilson quoted from CP. See the end of this note.
DE
A significant difference between Peirce’s a priori and Kant’s is
that Kant’s is necessarily not derived from experience.
Yes. And as Peirce says below (CP 5.504), "Now every animal must
have habits. Consequently, it must have innate habits."
Peirce had also studied some Arabic and Ancient Egyptian, and he
was acquainted with Chinese and Basque. He did not want to limit
his logic and semeiotic to Indo-European (or has he called it,
Aryan). Unlike the Chomskyan linguists, I think Peirce would
have been delighted to learn something about Pirahã.
John
___________________________________________________________________
it seems to me there is the most positive historic proof that innate
truths are particularly uncertain and mixed up with error, and
therefore a fortiori not without exception. This historical proof is,
of course, not infallible; but it is very strong. Therefore, I ask
how do you know that a priori truth is certain, exceptionless, and
exact? You cannot know it by reasoning. For that would be subject
to uncertainty and inexactitude. Then, it must amount to this that
you know it a priori; that is, you take a priori judgments at their
own valuation, without criticism or credentials. That is barring
the gate of inquiry. (CP 1.144, c 1897)
Now every animal must have habits. Consequently, it must have innate
habits. In so far as it has cognitive powers, it must have _in posse_
innate cognitive habits, which is all that anybody but John Locke
ever meant by innate ideas. To say that I hold this for true is
implied in my confession of the doctrine of Common-Sense -- not quite
that of the old Scotch School, but a critical philosophy of common-
sense. It is impossible rightly to apprehend the pragmaticist's
position without fully understanding that nowhere would he be less
at home than in the ranks of individualists, whether metaphysical
(and so denying scholastic realism), or epistemological (and so
denying innate ideas). (CP 5.504, 1905)
Now those vague beliefs that appear to be indubitable have the same
sort of basis as scientific results have. That is to say, they rest
on experience -- on the total everyday experience of many generations
of multitudinous populations. Such experience is worthless for
distinctively scientific purposes, because it does not make the minute
distinctions with which science is chiefly concerned; nor does it relate
to the recondite subjects of science, although all science, without
being aware of it, virtually supposes the truth of the vague results
of uncontrolled thought upon such experiences, cannot help doing so,
and would have to shut up shop if she should manage to escape
accepting them. (CP 5.522, 1905)
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