List: More than a year ago, I made a case on-List that what Peirce described as "the perfect Sign" in R 283 (partially published as EP 2:545n25; 1906) is the Universe. I think that interpretation holds up well in light of what I have been discussing in this thread.
CSP: There are so many different ways of easily proving that there could not be a single sign without any connection with another sign, that it would be superfluous to occupy space with that. We need not just now consider the nature of the connection: suffice it that it exists. Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and we may call it a *perfect* sign, in the sense that it involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself. (R 283:259[114]) All Signs are connected with other Signs, such that "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551; 1906); and "if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; 1904)--in this case, a *perfect* Sign. CSP: Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes. (R 283:260[115-116]) Just as all matter is always in continuous motion, a perfect Sign as an aggregate of connected Signs is always in continuous "Thought-motion"--i.e., *semeiosis*. Any static description of an *instantaneous state*--a discrete position in space at a discrete instant in time, or a definite Proposition that attributes a concept to an individual--is a real but non-existent abstraction. CSP: Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its outlines becoming more indefinite. On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant. In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua sponte* but not by *its* will. They are phenomena of growth. (R 283:260-261[116-117]; 1906) Left to itself, the perfect Sign would exhibit the semeiosic equivalent of *entropy*--losing energy and definiteness, becoming "dead matter" as "the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201; 1898). Instead, it constantly receives infusions of new Signs and "fresh energy" from its Object, as well as spontaneous changes that "are phenomena of growth." CSP: Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs. This description must remain inadequate though it is, or we should throw open the doors at once to a jam of considerations, which must be taken into account, if at all, in orderly succession. This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. (R 283:261-262[117-118]) As Peirce similarly wrote elsewhere, "The blank leaf itself is the quasi-mind ... This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign" (SS 195; 1906 Mar 9). Specifically, it is "a Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion" (CP 4.553; 1906). The only kind of modification allowed is scribing EGs on it to express true Propositions, thereby making it *more determinate* with each additional Graph-Instance. This is also a phenomenon of growth, increasing the Logical *Breadth* of each Sign of a concept (Spot) and the Logical *Depth* of each Sign of an individual (Line). Likewise, the perfect Sign's Object is always *further determining* it to develop toward the Entelechy of absolute Truth. But if the perfect Sign is the entire Universe, what *is* its Object--"something external to and independent of the sign which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself" (R 145s:27; 1905)? What is perpetually acting upon it with new Signs that give it fresh energy and kindle its previously dormant energy? What has the absolute freedom to introduce spontaneous changes into it? In other words, what *sustains* the Universe as something that is *living* and *growing*? It seems to me that the unavoidable answer is a straightforward restatement of my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God. - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself, and - The entire Universe is a Sign; therefore, - The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself, and - This we call God--"*the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908). Moreover, since truth is the conformity of a Sign to its Object, the Final Interpretant of the Universe as an Argument--the *ideal* conclusion of the *continuous* "inferential process" of semeiosis--is *knowledge* of God. In other words, God's purpose in *uttering* the Universe is the revelation of Himself. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, May 8, 2019 at 9:43 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > List: > > Peirce's concluding words in an address to the National Academy of > Sciences--immediately after noting that a Line of Identity is really "a > graph of indefinitely multiple identity," always capable of *further > determination*--seem appropriate for this thread, as well. > > CSP: We here reach a point at which novel considerations about the > constitution of knowledge and therefore of the constitution of nature burst > in upon the mind with cataclysmal multitude and resistlessness. It is that > synthesis of tychism and of pragmatism for which I long ago proposed the > name, Synechism, to which one thus returns; but this time with stronger > reasons than ever before. But I cannot, consistently with my own > convictions, ask the Academy to listen to a discourse upon Metaphysics. (R > 490:45-46, CP 4.584; 1906) > > > I personally find it regrettable that Peirce chose not to engage in such a > discourse on that particular occasion, and apparently did not record > elsewhere what he otherwise would have proceeded to say. Perhaps it > would have been along the lines of what he wrote less than two years later. > > CSP: The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of > the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living > intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as > of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of > being. (CP 6.341; 1908). > > > Compare this with another passage that I have quoted in the past. > > CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a > proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The > purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other > signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant > which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at > least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle > gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never > succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that > is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in > such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with > the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, > then, the Universe *qua* fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a > sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted > but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304; 1904) > > > The purpose of every Sign is to express fact, and every fact has the > structure of a Proposition; so the purpose of every Sign is to express > Propositions. The purpose of such *definite *Propositions is to describe > a *continuous *Argument--namely, the entire Universe--whose Interpretant > (conclusion) is the perfect or absolute Truth. Hence any Sign is ideal > or perfect to the extent that it achieves this Entelechy (3ns), which is > the real unity of Matter (2ns) and Form (1ns). Put yet another way ... > > CSP: A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of > such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but > one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the > all of reality. A *fact* is so highly a prescissively abstract state of > things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the > term "simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative > expression ... > Now thought is of the nature of a sign. In that case, then, if we can find > out the right method of thinking and can follow it out,--the right method > of transforming signs,--then truth can be nothing more nor less than the > last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately > carry us ... > Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object,--*its* object, > ITS object, mind you ... There must be an action of the object upon the > sign to render the latter true. Without that, the object is not the > representamen's object ... > So, then, a sign, in order to fulfill its office, to actualize its > potency, must be compelled by its object. (EP 2:378-380; 1906) > > > Any fact that a Proposition expresses is a "state of things," "an abstract > constituent part of reality," and therefore *indeterminate *to some > degree--*general *concepts attributed to *indefinite *individuals--since > only "the all of reality" is "completely determinate." The simpler the > Proposition, the more "highly a prescissively abstract state of things" it > represents. As a Normative Science, Logic as Semeiotic reveals "the > right method of thinking," which is "the right method of transforming > signs" in a *continuous* process, of which Propositions are > *instantaneous* descriptions. Truth is then the *telos* of all such > semeiosis, the conclusion of the entire Universe as an ongoing Argument, > the ultimate conformity of its Interpretant to its Object--which is brought > about by the action of that very Object through the mediation of the Sign. > > CSP: As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to > its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it > determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is > to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon > the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its > relation to the Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the > Interpretant without being itself thereby affected ... [such that] the Sign > produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object > itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 544n22; 1906) > > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:05 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> List: >> >> Summarizing my previous posts in this thread ... >> >> - The continuity of semeiosis as an "inferential process" is *real*, >> analogous to continuous motion. >> - Propositions are the *material parts* of the real semeiosic >> continuum, the vast Argument that constitutes the entire Universe. >> - Definite Propositions are "artificial creations of thought" that >> describe hypothetical *instantaneous states* of Arguments, analogous >> to discrete positions. >> - Semes are "creations of a second order" for the purpose of >> *representing* Propositions. >> - Concepts are *general* Types, abstractions that are "an inevitable >> result of sufficient thought." >> - The Immediate Objects of an EG are its *subjects*--Spots and Lines >> of Identity, whose Dynamic Objects are concepts and indefinite >> individuals, >> respectively. >> - The Immediate Interpretant of an EG is its *predicate*--the >> attribution of concepts (Spots) to individuals (Lines) by means of >> *continuous* predicates (Pegs). >> >> Calling a concept "an inevitable result of sufficient thought" makes it >> sound like a *Final* Interpretant--"that which *would finally *be >> decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were >> carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached" (CP 8.184, EP 2:496; >> 1909 Feb 26), or "the effect the Sign *would *produce upon any mind upon >> which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS >> 110; 1909 Mar 14). However ... >> >> CSP: I do not deny that a concept, proposition, or argument may be a >> logical interpretant. I only insist that it cannot be the final logical >> interpretant, for the reason that it is itself a sign of that very kind >> that has itself a logical interpretant. The habit alone, though it may be a >> sign in some other way, is not a sign in that way in which the sign of >> which it is the logical interpretant is a sign. The habit conjoined with >> the motive and the conditions has the action for its energetic >> interpretant; but action cannot be a logical interpretant, because it lacks >> generality. The concept which is a logical interpretant is only imperfectly >> so. It somewhat partakes of the nature of a verbal definition, and is as >> inferior to the habit, and much in the same way, as a verbal definition is >> inferior to the real definition. (CP 5.491, EP 2:418; 1907) >> >> >> As a *general* Sign, a concept can be a *Logical* Interpretant; but it >> will determine a Quasi-mind to *another* Logical Interpretant, so it >> cannot be a *Final* Interpretant. Semeiosis can terminate with an >> *action* as an *Energetic* Interpretant--i.e., an Exertion as a *Dynamic* >> Interpretant (CP 4.536; 1906)--but since this is an *individual* >> occurrence, it cannot be a *Logical* Interpretant. A "verbal >> definition" achieves Peirce's *second* grade of clarity, so "the real >> definition" presumably achieves his *third* grade in accordance with the >> maxim of pragmaticism, specifying a *habit* as the Final Logical >> Interpretant of a concept. >> >> CSP: The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any >> mind does act but in the way in which every mind would act. That is, it >> consists in a truth which might be expressed in a conditional proposition >> of this type: "If so and so were to happen to any mind, this sign would >> determine that mind to such and such *conduct*." By "conduct," I mean >> *action* under an intention of self-control. No event that occurs to any >> mind, no action of any mind, can constitute the truth of that conditional >> proposition. (CP 8.315, EP 2:499; 1909 Apr 1) >> >> >> Peirce elsewhere characterized the Final Interpretant as "the manner in >> which the Sign tends to represent itself to be related to its Object" (CP >> 4.536; 1906); and as a Symbol, a concept--along with any Spot that denotes >> it in an EG--is *only* related to its Object by virtue of a habit. >> Consequently, >> the function of Propositions--whether expressed in words or in EGs--is to >> predicate such *general* concepts of *individual* subjects as the "one >> mode of combination of ideas," in which "two indeterminate propositions >> mutually determine each other in a measure" (R 490:41-42, CP 4.583; 1906). >> >> CSP: Intellectual concepts ... essentially carry some implication >> concerning the general behavior either of some conscious being or of some >> inanimate object, and so convey more, not merely than any feeling, but >> more, too, than any existential fact, namely, the "*would-acts*" of >> habitual behavior; and no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever >> completely fill up the meaning of a "would be." But that the *total* >> meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept consists in affirming >> that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind, the subject of >> the predication would (or would not) behave in a certain way,--that is, >> that it either would, or would not, be true that under given experiential >> circumstances (or under a given proportion of them, taken *as they would >> occur* in experience) certain facts would exist,--*that* proposition I >> take to be the kernel of pragmatism. More simply stated, the whole meaning >> of an intellectual predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen, >> once in so often, in the course of experience, under certain kinds of >> existential circumstances. (EP 2:401-402; 1907) >> >> >> Like an Argument, a habit requires Propositions to *describe* it, but >> cannot be *built up* of those Propositions. Rather, the *meaning* of >> every concept--its "real definition" and "final logical interpretant"--is >> the *continuum* of its conceivable effects on self-controlled habits of >> conduct. >> >> CSP: The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit--self-analyzing >> because formed by the aid of analysis of the exercises that nourished >> it--is the living definition, the veritable and final logical interpretant. >> Consequently, the most perfect account of a concept that words can convey >> will consist in a description of the habit which that concept is calculated >> to produce. But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a >> description of the kind of action to which it gives rise, with the >> specification of the conditions and of the motive? (CP 5.491, EP 2:418; >> 1907) >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 7:46 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> List: >>> >>> EGs express Propositions that correspond to *instantaneous states* of >>> Arguments, which are *entia rationis* for the sake of analysis, since >>> the real "inferential process" of semeiosis is *continuous*. The >>> transformation rules for EGs correspond to the leading principles of valid >>> Arguments, and ultimately permit either deletion or insertion of an EG at >>> each discrete step. >>> >>> CSP: The following is a fundamental condition, (worthy of Italic >>> dress,) of a perfect analysis of the legitimate transformations of Graphs: >>> *Every >>> undeduced permission to transform a Graph should be a permission under >>> defined conditions either to delete an indecomposable Graph or to insert an >>> indecomposable Graph in a defined place.* For such a transformation can >>> evidently never be resolved into a series of simpler steps. But any other >>> can, since a transformation of one complex Graph into another can be >>> resolved into a series of transformations of simple Graphs, and since if it >>> be permissible to transform one simple Graph, A, into another, B, it is >>> permissible to transform A into AB, which is merely the copulate of A and >>> B, and then to transform AB into B, thus resolving the transformation into >>> an inclusion followed by a deletion. (R S30 [Copy T:3-4]; c. 1906) >>> >>> >>> Notice Peirce's claim here that there are *indecomposable *EGs. He >>> implied something similar about Propositions in the sentence that I omitted >>> at the ellipsis in the very first long CSP quote in my initial post of this >>> thread. >>> >>> CSP: As for a Proposition, it is represented in this System by a Graph; >>> and the smallest significant bit of a Graph is still a Graph, that is to >>> say, *the smallest constituent of a Proposition is a Proposition*. (R >>> 295:117[102]; 1906, bold added) >>> >>> >>> This appears to be in direct contradiction with another passage that I >>> have quoted previously, which he wrote at about the same time. >>> >>> CSP: ... what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of >>> propositions and which must be true of *them*, since every proposition >>> can be analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of >>> concepts that are *not* propositional; and this argument is supported >>> by the evident truth that no sign of a thing or kind of thing--the ideas of >>> signs to which concepts belong--can arise except in a proposition; and no >>> logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a >>> proposition; so that *non-propositional signs can only exist as >>> constituents of propositions*. But it is not true, as ordinarily >>> represented, that a proposition can be built up of non-propositional signs. >>> (R 490:43-44, CP 4.583; 1906, bold added) >>> >>> >>> Fortunately, Peirce went on to clarify what he meant by "an >>> indecomposable Graph." >>> >>> CSP: But two remarks are called for by way of explanation of the >>> adjective "indecomposable" in the above maxim. One is that *it is not >>> meant that the meaning is unanalyzable*, but merely that the graph in >>> question is not a Copulate of other Graphs. Indeed, I should have used the >>> participle "undecomposed," if I had not thought that that might prove still >>> more perplexing. The other remark relates to the application of the >>> adjective to *continuous* Graphs, like the Blank and the Line of >>> Identity, the essential property of which is that any portion of an >>> Instance of such a Graph is itself an Instance of the same Graph ... From >>> this it follows that the Graphs of Coëxistence (the Blank) and of Identity >>> are "indecomposable," i.e. partless, in the sense of the maxim, although >>> they and their Instances can be separated into parts of any multitude we >>> like, whenever we like, and with such boundaries as we choose to impose. (R >>> S30 [Copy T:4-5&8]; c. 1906, bold added) >>> >>> >>> An EG is indecomposable--or rather, undecomposed--if it cannot be broken >>> down into *simpler *EGs, even though its *meaning *as a Proposition can >>> still be analyzed into subjects and predicate. The two *continuous *EGs >>> (Blank and Line of Identity) are *always >>> *indecomposable/undecomposed/partless >>> in this sense, even though they and their Instances can still be analyzed >>> into as many parts as necessary in order to make them sufficiently >>> *determinate* for some purpose. A Seme (unattached Spot) is a >>> non-propositional Sign that only exists as a *constituent of *Propositions >>> (EGs), but it serves there as a substitute for its Object (cf. CP 4.538), >>> which is a *concept*. >>> >>> CSP: The truth is that concepts are nothing but indefinite problematic >>> judgments. The concept of *man* necessarily involves the thought of the >>> possible being of a man; and thus it is precisely the judgment, "There may >>> be a man." (R 490:44, CP 4.583; 1906) >>> >>> >>> Every concept thus *corresponds to* a Proposition--one that affirms a >>> *possibility*, rather than asserting an *actuality*. >>> >>> CSP: An abstraction is a creation of thought; but the real fact which >>> is important in this connection is not that actual thinking has caused the >>> predicate to be converted into a subject, but that this is *possible*. >>> The abstraction, in any important sense, is not an actual thought but a >>> general type to which thought may conform. This general type is not a >>> creation of actual thinking, but is an inevitable result of sufficient >>> thought. Now that is the sort of stuff that truth is made of. (NEM 3:918; >>> 1904 Nov 21) >>> >>> >>> The word that labels a Spot functions as a proper name, >>> *indexically denoting *an abstract general concept as a *subject* of >>> the Proposition that the EG expresses. The Spot itself has a certain >>> number of Pegs, *iconically signifying *its valency as a *predicate* >>> that the Proposition *attributes *to its other subjects--the indefinite >>> individuals denoted by Lines of Identity--thereby making them *more >>> determinate*. Those connections are *continuous* predicates, such as >>> "possesses the character of" or "belongs to the class/collection of" for >>> Spots with one Peg, and "stands in the relation of" for Spots with two or >>> more Pegs. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon S. >>> >>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 9:23 AM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> List: >>>> >>>> Semes are creations of thought for the purpose of representing >>>> Propositions, which are creations of thought for the purpose of describing >>>> Arguments. By contrast, the *continuity* of the latter as the >>>> "inferential process" of semeiosis--i.e., thought itself--is *real*. >>>> >>>> CSP: ... I conceive that a Continuum has, IN ITSELF, no definite >>>> parts, although to endow it with definite parts of no matter what >>>> multitude, and even parts of lesser dimensionality down to absolute >>>> simplicity, it is only necessary that these should be marked off, and >>>> although even the operation of thought suffices to impart an approach to >>>> definiteness of parts of any multitude we please.* >>>> *This indubitably proves that the possession of parts by a continuum is >>>> not a real character of it. For the real is that whose being one way or >>>> another does not depend upon how individual persons may imagine it to be. >>>> It shows, too, that Continuity is of a Rational nature. But it conveys no >>>> gleam of evidence that Continuity itself is Unreal ... (R S30 [Copy T:6-7]; >>>> c. 1906) >>>> >>>> >>>> The continuity of a line is fundamental, such that it cannot be *built >>>> up* of points, or even of *definite *line segments. Likewise, the >>>> continuity of semeiosis is fundamental, such that a Proposition cannot be >>>> *built >>>> up* of Semes, and (especially) an Argument cannot be *built up* of >>>> definite Propositions. Nevertheless, those parts can be "marked off" as >>>> needed or desired, up to "any multitude that we please." But what about >>>> Peirce's subsequent characterization of a continuum as something that is >>>> *composed *of "material parts"? >>>> >>>> CSP: Whatever is continuous has *material parts* ... The *material >>>> parts* of a thing or other object, *W*, that is composed of such >>>> parts, are whatever things are, firstly, each and every one of them, other >>>> than *W*; secondly, are all of some one internal nature (for example, >>>> are all places, or all times, or all spatial realities, or are all >>>> spiritual realities, or are all ideas, or are all characters, or are all >>>> relations, or are all external representations, etc.); thirdly, form >>>> together a collection of objects in which no one occurs twice over and, >>>> fourthly, are such that the Being of each of them together with the modes >>>> of connexion between all subcollections of them, constitute the being of >>>> *W*. (R 300:82-83[40-41], CP 6.174; 1908) >>>> >>>> >>>> Taking *W* as the real *semeiosic *continuum--the entire Universe as a >>>> vast Argument (cf. CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903), which "is perfused with >>>> signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n1p5, EP 2:394; >>>> 1906)--Propositions certainly meet the first two requirements to be its >>>> material parts, as well as the third since every *occurrence *of >>>> a Proposition is a different *Instance *of it. As for the fourth, >>>> Peirce affirmed elsewhere that "the mode of being of the composition of >>>> thought" is "always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a >>>> subject" (CP 6.341; 1908)--which is precisely the nature of a Proposition. >>>> Returning to the quote above, he even went on to acknowledge the element of >>>> *arbitrariness* in identifying any continuum's material parts. >>>> >>>> CSP: Almost everything which has material parts has different sets of >>>> such parts, often various *ad libitum*. Nothing which has an Essence >>>> (such as an essential purpose or use, like the jackknife of the celebrated >>>> poser) has any material parts in the strict sense just defined. (R >>>> 300:83-84[41-42], CP 6.174; 1908) >>>> >>>> >>>> He then affirmed that those parts are either vague (i.e., indefinite) >>>> or *entia rationis* corresponding to some *state *of the whole when >>>> something prevents the latter "from having any material parts in the strict >>>> sense." >>>> >>>> CSP: But the term "material parts" may, without confusion (if a little >>>> care be exerted), be used in a somewhat looser sense. Namely, if the Being >>>> (generally, a Concept) of an object, *T*, essentially involves >>>> something *C* which prevents it from having any material parts in the >>>> strict sense, and if there be something, *W*, which differs from *T* only >>>> in the absence of *C* and of any other such hindrances, so that *W* has >>>> material parts, then the material parts of *W* may loosely be termed >>>> material parts of *T*; but in such case the concept of *W* so derived >>>> from *T* is nearly or quite always somewhat vague, so that either the >>>> material parts will be so too, or else they must be conceived as merely the >>>> parts of some *state* of it, and very likely of an instantaneous state >>>> that is an *ens rationis* closely approximating to the nature of a >>>> fiction. It will be seen that the definition of Material Parts involves the >>>> concept of *Connexion*, even if there be no other connexion between >>>> them than co-being; and in case no other connexion be essential to the >>>> concept of *W*, this latter is called a *Collection* … (R >>>> 300:84-85[42-43], CP 6.174; 1908) >>>> >>>> >>>> Still taking *W* as the real *semeiosic *continuum, a candidate for an >>>> example of *T* is the System of Existential Graphs, with Propositions >>>> as its material parts in the *loose *sense; i.e., the Graphs >>>> *themselves*, since "Every graph expresses some proposition" (R >>>> 490:36; 1906). This includes the Blank as the Graph of >>>> Coexistence--everything taken for granted at the outset--along with any >>>> number of Graphs that are explicitly scribed on the Sheet of Assertion. >>>> They can only ever be the parts of a *hypothetical* "instantaneous >>>> state" of a *real* Argument for the purpose of analysis--a >>>> *Collection *of Propositions connected *only *by co-being, since >>>> leading principles correspond to the transformation rules governing >>>> "Thought-motion" from one state to another. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon S. >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 2:52 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> List: >>>>> >>>>> Nearly four months ago, I posted the following. >>>>> >>>>> JAS: I have been musing recently on the well-known remark by Peirce >>>>> that "just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a >>>>> body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in >>>>> us" (CP 5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868). He also asserted in the same series of >>>>> articles that "all thought is in signs" (CP 5.253, EP 1:24; 1868), so by >>>>> substitution we ought to say that our individual (Quasi-)minds are in >>>>> semiosis, and not that signs are in our individual (Quasi-)minds. As >>>>> Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit of Einstein's insights, >>>>> Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by understanding *continuous *motion >>>>> through space-time as a more fundamental reality than *discrete *positions >>>>> in space and/or moments in time. We arbitrarily *mark *the latter to >>>>> facilitate measurement and calculation for particular purposes, but space >>>>> is not *composed *of points and time is not *composed *of >>>>> instants. Likewise, I suggest that semiosis is *continuous*, and we >>>>> arbitrarily isolate *discrete *signs--or rather, Instances of >>>>> Signs--to facilitate analysis for particular purposes. We can say that a >>>>> Dynamic Object determines a Token of a Type to determine a Dynamic >>>>> Interpretant in an individual (Quasi-)mind, treating this as an actual >>>>> event "occurring just when and where it does" (CP 4.537; 1906). >>>>> Nevertheless, the Type is not *composed *of its Tokens. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In the wake of our various discussions since then, I believe that >>>>> these comments still hold up quite well. In fact, I recently came across >>>>> a >>>>> passage in a discarded manuscript draft for the end of "Prolegomena to an >>>>> Apology for Pragmaticism" (CP 4.572) that sheds further light on the >>>>> matter. >>>>> >>>>> CSP: [I mentioned on an early page of this paper that this System >>>>> leads to a different conception of the Proposition and Argument from] the >>>>> traditional view that a Proposition is built up of Names, and an Argument >>>>> of Propositions. It is true that of the four meanings of the term Argument >>>>> (for the Middle Term, for the Copulation of Premisses, for the setting out >>>>> of Premisses and Conclusion, and for the Logical operation of converting >>>>> Premisses into Conclusion), the second and third justify the traditional >>>>> account. But in the last sense, which alone is the essential one, an >>>>> Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built up of >>>>> positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it ... Just >>>>> as >>>>> it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact Position >>>>> (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or *ens >>>>> rationis*), but Positions are either vaguely described states of >>>>> motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are *entia >>>>> rationis* (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no >>>>> longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of >>>>> states >>>>> of motion; so likewise, Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, >>>>> or >>>>> the essence of Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or >>>>> be >>>>> anything but inferential process; and propositions are either roughly >>>>> described states of Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended >>>>> to >>>>> render the description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations >>>>> of a second order serving to render the representation of propositions >>>>> possible. (R 295:117-118[102-103]; 1906) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Semeiosis is a continuous "inferential process," analogous to *motion*; >>>>> definite Propositions are "artificial creations" for the purpose of >>>>> describing that Argument, analogous to *positions*; and Semes are >>>>> "creations of a second order" for the purpose of representing those >>>>> Propositions--perhaps analogous to coordinates? I suspect that Peirce had >>>>> something similar in mind when he wrote another passage less than two >>>>> years >>>>> earlier, which I have quoted previously. >>>>> >>>>> CSP: Experience is first forced upon us in the form of a flow of >>>>> images. Thereupon thought makes certain assertions. It professes to pick >>>>> the image into pieces and to detect in it certain characters. This is not >>>>> literally true. The image has no parts, least of all predicates. Thus >>>>> predication involves precisive abstraction. Precisive abstraction creates >>>>> predicates. Subjectal abstraction creates subjects. Both predicates and >>>>> subjects are creations of thought. But this is hardly more than a phrase; >>>>> for *creation *and *thought *have different meanings as applied to >>>>> the two … That the abstract subject is an *ens rationis*, or creation >>>>> of thought does not mean that it is a fiction. (NEM 3:917-918; 1904 Nov >>>>> 21) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> An Argument can be *analyzed *into definite Propositions married by a >>>>> logical leading principle, and a Proposition can be *analyzed *into >>>>> abstracted subjects married by a prescinded predicate. However, >>>>> these parts are all "creations of thought," *entia rationis*, >>>>> Perceptual Judgments rather than Percepts themselves--which is presumably >>>>> why "A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more >>>>> ways than one" (NEM 3:885; 1908 Dec 5). >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>> >>>>
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