Jon S, List,
Let me make my purpose more explicit. In the last email, I was not attempting to provide an interpretation of any particular text by Peirce. Rather, my intention was to think a bit more about some large questions in metaphysics and the special sciences drawing on Peirce for guidance. In doing so, I distinguished three periods in the history of the universe, and started by asking how we might frame questions about the evolution of order in the first of the three. My own understanding of the (currently best) theoretical explanations of that stage of the universe is rather fragmented and indefinite. Consequently, I was deliberately trying to frame the questions and the initial hypotheses in vague terms. The terms used in those few paragraphs may be considerably vaguer and less considered than what Peirce has to offer in his many pages written on the subject. My way of putting things appears to be vaguer than your own understanding of the matter. My strategy is one of being cautious, perhaps overly so, about stating things in an overly definite way. Having made those general points about my aim, let me respond to some of the particular points you made. JD: ... is there a Quasi-mind that is the interpreter of the Sign-Universe initially uttered? JS: According to Peirce, the "utterance" of the Universe is not an event that happened thousands or billions of years in the past--it is still very much in progress. CSP: This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903). JD: Yes. Not only do I accept that point, I was trying to emphasize it. As I indicated, I was trying to restate Gary F's questions (and so I used his language), and to do so with respect to three periods in the evolution of the universe. JS: Moreover, neither an utterer nor an interpreter is essential to a Sign--only an Object and an Interpretant (cf. EP 2:404-410; 1907). JD: I would put it differently. In the most general definition of a sign that is meant to apply to all signs of any class, the only things that are taken to be essential are the sign and its relations to its object(s), and the sign and its relations to some possible interpretant (s). This definition of a sign is meant, initially, as a nominal definition that will help us pick out signs and distinguish them from other sorts of things. Furthermore, the general definition involves a fair bit of logical analysis meant to clarify the key conceptions employed in the definition. It is not clear to me that the definition is meant to be a real definition that is adequate for the wide range of explanatory purposes that might guide inquiries in philosophy or in the special sciences. More is needed, I tend to think, to achieve a higher third grade of clarity. JD: ... I have no qualms about using the proper name God to refer to the Quasi-mind of the universe considered as a whole. JS: Again, a Quasi-mind is itself a Sign (SS 195; 1906 Mar 9), so how do you square such an approach with Peirce's unambiguous statements on multiple occasions that every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself? JD: Is every sign determined by an object other than itself? As far as I can see, this point can be most clearly stated with respect to objects and signs that have the character of individual existents. As such, I do accept that every indexical sinsign is determined by a dynamical object that is other than itself. Is that true of all signs, including symbols? Or, do some signs and their objects determine each other, reciprocally? Given the context and the summary character of questions and hypotheses I was trying to frame, I'd be interested in exploring the following account of a symbolic argument: Tenth: An Argument is a sign whose interpretant represents its object as being an ulterior sign through a law, namely, the law that the passage from all such premisses to such conclusions tends to the truth. Manifestly, then, its object must be general; that is, the Argument must be a Symbol. As a Symbol it must, further, be a Legisign. Its Replica is a Dicent Sinsign. (CP 2.263) What kinds of relations hold between a law of logic, considered as the object of a symbolic argument, and a leading principle, considered as one premiss in an argument? In my own case, I take my own understanding (in my logica utens) of the law of logic to be incomplete and indefinite. After all, I am capable of being in error about the laws of logic, and I will be in error whenever my own formulation of such a law as a principle guiding my inference is inadequate in some respects. What should we say of the Quasi-mind of the universe insofar as it may be both utterer and interpreter in an ongoing dialogue in each of the three periods in the history of the universe? In what respects might it be in error about the laws of logic? Yours, Jeff ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, May 13, 2019 11:19 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited Jeff, List: JD: ... is there a Quasi-mind that is the interpreter of the Sign-Universe initially uttered? According to Peirce, the "utterance" of the Universe is not an event that happened thousands or billions of years in the past--it is still very much in progress. CSP: This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903). The Universe as an Argument and a Perfect Sign is not something static; it is an ongoing "inferential process" of semeiosis, and Peirce considered its very continuity to be one of many hints suggesting the Reality of God. CSP: To my humble intelligence, the Rationality of Continuity, the chief character of the foundation stones of the real universe, adds another to the hundred already interpretable revelations of our Super-august and Gracious Father. (R S30 [Copy T:7]; c. 1906) Moreover, neither an utterer nor an interpreter is essential to a Sign--only an Object and an Interpretant (cf. EP 2:404-410; 1907). JD: ... I have no qualms about using the proper name God to refer to the Quasi-mind of the universe considered as a whole. Again, a Quasi-mind is itself a Sign (SS 195; 1906 Mar 9), so how do you square such an approach with Peirce's unambiguous statements on multiple occasions that every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself? What do you make of his emphatic assertions in four different manuscript drafts of "A Neglected Argument" (R 843) that the proper name "God" does not denote anything that is immanent in nature or the three Universes, but rather its/their "Sole Creator"? Do you simply disagree with him on these points? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 11:42 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Gary F, Jon S, List, For the sake of clarifying the questions, consider a few periods from the history of the universe. Here is an abbreviated timeline: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronology_of_the_universe Let me divide the story into the following three periods: 1. Opening chapters: from the first moments of the Planck era to the dark ages. 2. Middle Chapters: from the beginning of star formation to the present age. 3. Future Chapters: from the near future to the distant future. The questions might be reformulated in the following way. For the first of these periods, is there a Quasi-mind that is the interpreter of the Sign-Universe initially uttered? In what sense might such a Quasi-mind which is realized, perhaps, in the lawful habits that are taking shape in each chapter, speaking to itself? As a great body called the cosmos, it appears that the universe has undergone a remarkable series of metamorphoses over the course of its evolution. As the body of the universe as a whole has evolved, in what manner might the parts of that body be communicating information, meaning or purpose in relation to the other parts and to the larger whole of that body? In that first period, is the ongoing creation of more or less ordered relations in the three universes of possible experience given direction by some kind of ideal? Did such an all-encompassing ideal itself evolve? How did it take shape? Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the operation of chance itself has a kind of living character--especially insofar as we imagine that the seeds of the growth of order were spread throughout the universe of chance, conceived in terms of its potential qualities, from the start? Furthermore, let us assume that the ongoing sprouting and growth of the seeds of order is governed by a law of mind in virtue of which the qualities of the parts of the cosmos--at every scale--grow in their relations to one another in virtue of their affectability and, furthermore, that those facts that do occur at any time tend to increase the odds of what might happen next. The operation of this law of mind might be understood, from a more external point of view, in terms of its governance of a universe of facts. The formation and growth of the habits governing these facts happens via a process of association by resemblance and contiguity. Or, from a more internal point of view, we might understand the operation of the law of mind as the governance of the laws of nature--considered as representations in a Quasi-mind--via patterns of synthetic inference in that are abductive and inductive in character. How do these hypotheses concerning the priority of the law of mind vis a vis all other laws shape our understanding of the questions posed above? Turning now to the middle period when galaxies, stars and solar systems having biological forms of life evolved, how might we understand the questions and hypotheses considered above? Can the questions be clarified further? Do the hypotheses that are offered as possible answers to the questions take a different shape when it comes to explaining the evolution of the forms of order that are governing the universe in this period? Do the questions and hypotheses take yet a different shape as we look to the near and distant future? Insofar as some of us in the community of inquiry accept the sorts of hypotheses listed above, I have no qualms about using the proper name God to refer to the Quasi-mind of the universe considered as a whole. As a matter of fact, my own inquiries in philosophy are shaped by such grand hypothesis. In turn, I hope that my actions and the cultivation of my habits of feeling are similarly guided. For those who do have qualms about the use of that proper name, I'm also fine if they prefer to call it the Quasi-mind of the universe. If we adopt the hypotheses that Peirce recommends as plausible, then this great Quasi-mind is growing in its reasonableness as the cosmos comes to be governed by richer systems of physical, chemical, biological and other types of laws. While these aren't the only hypotheses available to explain the ongoing evolution of the cosmos, they do form a set of conjectures that I find particularly attractive. As such, I'd be interested in seeing how those hypotheses might be used to frame the more detailed explanations being developed in the special sciences to explain the origins of (1) physical order, (2) life and (3) self-controlled forms of thought in nature. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
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