Jon S, Gary F, John S, Edwina, Gary R, List
I'd like to raise some questions about the assertion that every sign has an object that is separate, in some sense, from that sign. The basis of the claim that the object must be separate from the sign, I am supposing, is that the object determines the sign. As a matter of principle, an object cannot be the kind of thing that determines a sign if that object is not separate from the sign. This assertion seems, at least to me, to be clearest in the case of the actual objects that determine indexical sinsigns--where the objects and signs stand in the relation of agent and patient. This type of relation is classified as a dynamical dyadic relation that is formally ordered. For this type of sign, the object, as agent, cannot determine the indexical sinsign, as patient, if the two are identical. Diversity is requisite for the relation to hold. If we can all agree on this much, then what shall we say about the case of a sign that is part of a sign? In order to anchor the discussion of this question about Peirce's semiotics in a text, l'd like to focus our attention on the following clarification that is offered in "Meaning" from 1910: "But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign." Here is the larger paragraph from which this sentence has been abstracted: SIGNS AND THEIR OBJECTS The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "fast," which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island. A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a Precept of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the "species" of the Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the "ratio," or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) [CP 2.230] Consider the three examples Peirce offers to illustrate this point about a sign that is part of a sign: a) "Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance." Bulwer is the author who penned the famous phrase "the pen is mightier than the sword" in the play Richelieu. In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as the object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a sign (of itself)? b) "On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island." We've discussed this example earlier. The discussion following the three examples, seems to suggest that the point being made about the self-referential character of some signs is a rather general point. c) "A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object." This example suggests that the relations that are represented as holding between subjects in a proposition are, themselves, also the objects of the proposition. Taken together, the two subjects and the relation may be regarded as one complex object. In saying that the object is complex, it appears that it is something more than a mere aggregate. How might these examples be used to clarify the following parts of Peirce's central claim? i) Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; ii) and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, May 20, 2019 12:37 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity... John, List: JFS: But nothing in that argument that depends on the nature of the creator as benign or malevolent, perfect or imperfect, necessary or contingent. I have not claimed otherwise, except to quote Peirce himself as stating explicitly that God is Ens necessarium ("A Neglected Argument") and possesses the attribute of Infinite Benignity (manuscript drafts). JFS: You quoted Peirce, but you claim that the argument is unavoidable. No, I do not. For the third time, what I have said is that my Semeiotic Argumentation provides what seems to me to be the unavoidable answer to the question, "If the entire Universe is a Sign, then what is its Object?" JFS: The absence of any hint in any of his MSS raises a serious doubt that Peirce would approve the reasoning that led to that argument. As Peirce himself surely would have recognized, this is an argument from silence, which is not logically valid. He never claimed to have worked out all of the ramifications of his own thought during his lifetime; on the contrary, he said more than once that he was counting on future generations to continue the work that he had started, especially in Semeiotic. JFS: Ideally, that would require a translation of each premise and every step of the reasoning to existential graphs and an application of the EG rules of inference. I thought that it was obvious that the form of my Semeiotic Argumentation is identical to Peirce's simple example of reasoning with EGs in his letter to Mr. Kehler (NEM 3:168-169; 1911 June 22), where S = the entire Universe, M = a Sign, and P = determined by an Object other than itself. JFS: 1. The claim that the object of every sign must be in a different universe of discourse than the physical sign of that object ... I'll accept the point that the object of a sign must be different from the sign itself. I have never made the first claim, only the second--that the Object of every Sign is external to, independent of, and unaffected by the Sign itself, as Peirce himself explicitly stated. JFS: 2. The claim the Creator (God, Satan, or some demiurge) cannot be in the same universe as the creation. 3. The claim that Peirce's three universes (Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity) are insufficient as a home for the Creator. The relevant claim is rather that the Creator of the three Universes of Experience and "every content of them without exception" cannot be within any or all of those Universes; i.e., God is "not immanent in" them, as Peirce explicitly stated. JFS: I forgot to mention that I had uploaded some of Peirce's definitions to http://jfsowa.com/peirce/defs/ See sign1.jpg and sign2.jpg . Thank you for the link; I agree that all of those 1890s definitions apply only to Sinsigns/Tokens, presumably because Peirce did not recognize the reality of Qualisigns/Tones and Legisigns/Types until 1903. JFS: CSP, Century Dictionary for 'universe'--1. The totality of all existing things; all that is in dynamical connection with general experience taken collectively--embracing (a} the Creator and creation; or (b) psychical and material objects, but excluding the Creator; or (c) material objects only. When I refer to "the entire Universe" in my Semeiotic Argumentation, I mean all three Universes of Experience taken together; i.e., what Peirce himself called "the entire universe--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth'" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906). That means sense (b) above plus the first Universe of Ideas/Possibles, assuming that we can take "material objects" to be the constituents of the second Universe of Actuality/Existents and "psychical objects" to be the constituents of the third Universe of Signs/Necessitants. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 10:56 AM John F Sowa <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, > Anyone is welcome to claim that Satan (or anything else) is that > Object [of the semeiotic proof], but thereby accepts the burden > of making a case for it based on the attributes that such an Object > must have. I suspect that it would amount to nothing more than > equating the proper names "Satan" and "God." That's true. But nothing in that argument that depends on the nature of the creator as benign or malevolent, perfect or imperfect, necessary or contingent. In the Timaeus, Plato attributes the creation to a demiurge (craftsman) who seems to be distinct from the supreme God. To explain the origin of evil, the Gnostics later claimed that the demiurge was flawed, imperfect, or even malevolent. The Neoplatonists, following Plotinus, identified the creator with the omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent God (which they called The One -- to Hen). The Neoplatonists had a strong influence on both Christianity and Islam. ('Al Lah' is Arabic for 'The One'.) Nothing in the semeiotic argument depends on any of these issues. > I have consistently referred to my Semeiotic Argumentation... > What I have said is that Peirce affirmed each of its premisses, > and I have provided ample evidence from his explicit statements > to support that claim. You quoted Peirce, but you claim that the argument is unavoidable. Peirce was the world expert in logic and semeiotic. He also had a high regard for Thomas Aquinas, who is generally regarded as one of the most profound theologians who ever lived. If there was any "unavoidable" argument that linked those topics, Peirce would certainly have noticed it. The absence of any hint in any of his MSS raises a serious doubt that Peirce would approve the reasoning that led to that argument. Such a strong claim requires a methodeutic for exact thinking: "What is needed above all, for metaphysics, is thorough and mature thinking; and the particular requisite to success in the critic of arguments is exact and diagrammatic thinking." (CP 3.406) Ideally, that would require a translation of each premise and every step of the reasoning to existential graphs and an application of the EG rules of inference. But the critical step, which is necessary for EGs, predicate calculus, or clear thinking in any language, is the selection of a set of predicates. The next step is to restate each of Peirce's statements in terms of the names of those predicates and no words other than the six basic words of first-order logic: and, or, not, if-then, some, every. Instead of pronouns, use letters (AKA selectives in EGs or variables in predicate calculus). If you perform this translation, that would make every step of reasoning so clear that any logician could translate the argument to his or her favorite version of logic. In fact, you would even have a publishable paper. But -- and this is a very big **BUT** -- there are three critical assumptions, which I have been criticizing in every one of my notes about this argument: 1. The claim that the object of every sign must be in a different universe of discourse than the physical sign of that object. 2. The claim the Creator (God, Satan, or some demiurge) cannot be in the same universe as the creation. 3. The claim that Peirce's three universes (Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity) are insufficient as a home for the Creator. I'll accept the point that the object of a sign must be different from the sign itself. But every proposition of any kind and every step of any argument can be stated on a single sheet of assertion. I doubt that Peirce would accept assumption #1. For #2, note that Peirce allowed modal statements on the same SA as ordinary FOL statements. That means that a single universe of discourse may include a mix of statements from more than one of his three universes. For #3, any reasoning must be carried out on a single SA. That implies a single universe of discourse. Any reasoning that could not be stated on an SA would violate the foundations of Peirce's logic. If he had ever considered such a violation, there would be many hints and comments scattered throughout his thousands of MSS. > JFS: Look at the eleven senses of the word 'sign' that Peirce defined > for the Century Dictionary. Each one defines 'sign' as a physical > thing. None of them mentions the word 'percept'. > > JAS: I would be glad to do so, if you would be so kind as to quote > them. I forgot to mention that I had uploaded some of Peirce's definitions to http://jfsowa.com/peirce/defs/ See sign1.jpg and sign2.jpg . For Peirce's definition of 'universe' in the Century Dictionary, see defs/universal.jpg. The same page includes the definition of universe. In that definition, Peirce included all the senses that were in common usage in the 19th c. He distinguished three major senses, with God included in 1a, excluded in 1b and 1c: CSP, Century Dictionary for 'universe' > 1. The totality of all existing things; all that is in dynamical > connection with general experience taken collectively -- embracing > (a} the Creator and creation; or (b) psychical and material objects, > but excluding the Creator; or (c) material objects only. Then in sense 3, he defines the universe of discourse in logic, and includes quotations by De Morgan and Venn. Sense 1 describes common usage with variations that include and exclude God. Sense 3 describes the universe of discourse in logic, but it does not mention his own variation with a universe of all possibilities, a universe of actualities, and a universe of necessities. Which version applies to the following? CSP (EP 2:304) > The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, > will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. > The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the > ultimate interpretant of every sign. This does not sound like senses 1 or 2 from the Century Dictionary. The words 'fact', 'sign', and 'truth' indicate that Peirce is talking about a universe of discourse that could be described by the EGs on a Sheet of Assertion. I admit Peirce wrote those definitions in the 1890s, before he developed his EGs and his more profound semeiotic. But they show that he was aware of the issues about God and the universe. He could not have avoided any "unavoidable" implication. I also admit that a doubt is not a refutation. But any claim that the argument follows from his writings requires a detailed methodeutic to make the ideas clear. It must be stated in terms that could support diagrammatic reasoning, and it must answer the three criticisms above. John
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