John, List: JFS: The practice of quoting clouds of words out of context is useless for resolving any questions about what Peirce meant.
It is not feasible in an e-mail discussion, or even in a scholarly paper of reasonable length, to provide extensive excerpts that include the complete context of every quote. If someone wishes to claim that a particular statement is being taken out of context, then that person has the burden of *showing *that this is the case, not merely *asserting* it. JFS: When you see a rock, the thing you see is a sign that it exists where you happen to see it. No, what I *see *is a Percept that has no parts, which I then *interpret *by prescinding predicates and abstracting subjects to formulate the Propositional Judgment, "That is a rock." JFS: The sign you see is the form of a rock. No, the Form is not the Sign itself; rather, the Form is what is *communicated *from the Object (rock) through the Sign (Percept) to the Interpretant (Perceptual Judgment). JFS: Neither the predicate nor the index nor the proposition is the rock. Right, and *none *of those Signs has *any effect whatsoever* on the rock itself, which is the Dynamic Object that determines them. JFS: It shows that nothing in Peirce's semeiotic justifies the assumption that any sign about anything in the universe of actuality implies anything outside that universe. Maybe, but if the *entire *Universe--i.e., *all three* Universes of Experience, taken together--is a Sign, then what is *its *Object? Clearly it cannot be anything *within *any or all of the three Universes, so it must be something *outside *them. The only alternative is to deny, *contra *Peirce, that the Universe is a Sign. JFS: But the claim that anything in Peirce's semeiotic implies anything pro or con about God is unjustified. On the contrary, my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God *demonstrates *otherwise, unless there is another candidate to be the Object of the Universe as a Sign--something *external *to it, *independent *of it, and *unaffected *by it. Again, as with any deductive argumentation, anyone who rejects the conclusion is *rationally required* to deny at least one of the premisses--each of which Peirce *explicitly *affirmed. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:08 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina and Jon, > > ET > > And again - all we are doing is quoting the same passages to each > > other, and interpreting them in different ways. I suggest we allow > > each other the 'grace' to do this - rather than insisting that one > > or the other is 'right' - and the other is a 'misinterpretation. > > Yes. The practice of quoting clouds of words out of context > is useless for resolving any questions about what Peirce meant. > To avoid endless debates, I suggest a methodeutic for analyzing > the quotations and determining their relevance. > > For Peirce, logic and mathematics are a solid and dependable > foundation. If there is any dispute of any kind, translate the > interpretation to EGs as a check. If the dispute is about EGs, > translate the EGs to Peirce's algebraic notation and/or the > equivalent in any of the more recent notations. > > Finally, if the dispute is about Peirce's technical terminology, > translate the questions to ordinary language and use commonsense > examples that can be stated without any of his technical terms. > Analyze those examples without those terms. Then determine how > and whether those terms could clarify the issues. > > JAS > > Whether or how any particular Instance of a Sign is actually > > interpreted has no bearing whatsoever on what its Dynamic > > object is. Different Dynamic Interpretants can... > > > > CSP: In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is > > to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an > > effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. > > (EP 2:544n22; 1906). > > This is just one of eight short quotations, all taken out of contexts > in which Peirce never denies the obvious: When you see a rock, the > thing you see is a sign that it exists where you happen to see it. > That is the commonsense example. > > For the context, note the continuation of EP 2:544n22: "That which > is communicated from the object through the Sign to the Interpretant > is the Form." The sign you see is the form of a rock. That form > defines a monadic predicate. The direction of your gaze determines > an index of the rock's position. That index, combined with the > predicate, determines the proposition "There is a rock at the > location and position where I'm looking." > > Neither the predicate nor the index nor the proposition is the rock. > But parts of the statement of the proposition (in English or an EG) > refer to the rock and to its location. That kind of knowledge is > the basis for everything we do in our daily lives -- and we get it > from the signs of things in our environment *and* the background > knowledge learned from previous experience. > > Peirce's term for background knowledge is "collateral experience". > See below for CP 6.338, where he says that "the substance of thought" > consists of three "species of ingredients": icons, indices, and > collateral observations or experience. > > Every one of those three ingredients is mapped to some part or parts > of any proposition stated in English, EGs, or the algebra. Whatever > does not appear in the proposition is irrelevant. It conveys no > information directly or indirectly related to the object. > > CSP (CP 8.177, EP 2:492; 1909) as quoted by JAS: > > A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined > > (i.e., specialized, bestimmt) by something other than itself, > > called its Object... > > That is another quotation taken out of context. It's part of a > long letter to William James (NEM 3:836-866). Immediately after > that quotation, Peirce wrote: > > CSP (NEM 3:839) > > (or, in some cases, if the Sign be the sentence 'Cain killed Abel,' > > in which Cain and Abel are equally Partial Objects, it may be more > > convenient to say that which determines the Sign is the Complexus, > > or Totality, of Partial Objects. And in every case the Object is > > accurately the Universe of which the Special Object is member, or part) > > Note that the interpretation of a sign may be "something other than > itself", but it stays within the same universe of discourse. There > may be propositions that involve more than one universe. But that > occurs only when a different universe is explicitly introduced, > as Peirce discussed on the next page. > > CSP (NEM 3:840) > > The Object of a Sign may be something to be created by the Sign... > > The Object of the sentence "Hamlet was insane" is the Universe of > > Shakespeare's creation sofar as it is determined by Hamlet being > > part of it. > > These points show that the objects of a sign remain in the same > universe at the sign itself, unless there is some sign that creates > or moves to a new universe. > > It shows that nothing in Peirce's semeiotic justifies the assumption > that any sign about anything in the universe of actuality implies > anything outside that universe. > > If anyone wishes to discuss any of Peirce's beliefs about God, that's > a reasonable topic for Peirce List. But the claim that anything in > Peirce's semeiotic implies anything pro or con about God is unjustified. > > This example shows how the methodeutic provides criteria for resolving > some of the endless debates. > > John > ___________________________________ > > CP 6.338 > All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant > appeals to your deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking > is conducted in signs that are mainly of the same general structure as > words; those which are not so, being of the nature of those signs of > which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke > out the defects of words, or symbols. These non-symbolic thought-signs > are of two classes: first, pictures or diagrams or other images (I call > them Icons) such as have to be used to explain the significations of > words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to symptoms (I call > them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which we know > what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate > the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of > subject-thoughts. The substance of thoughts consists of these three > species of ingredients. >
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