John, List: JAS: If someone wishes to claim that a particular statement is being taken out of context, then that person has the burden of *showing *that this is the case, not merely *asserting *it.
JFS: Absolutely! That is an essential part of the methodeutic. I am glad that we agree about this, but then ... JFS: No. That claim is another example of ignoring the full context. This is yet another bald assertion, with no supporting argumentation from Peirce's writings JFS: Note that the great majority of Peirce's examples of signs are physical things. Please provide a few of those examples to clarify and substantiate this claim. JFS: Also look at the eleven senses of the word 'sign' that Peirce defined for the Century Dictionary. I would be glad to do so, if you would be so kind as to quote them. JFS: Each one defines 'sign' as a physical thing. None of them mentions the word 'percept'. That seems dubious, since Peirce clearly considered Qualisigns/Tones and Legisigns/Types to be Signs, not just Sinsigns/Tokens; and he stated quite plainly that a Seme is a Sign and a Percept is a Seme (cf. CP 4.537-539; 1906), which entails that a Percept is a Sign. JFS: Wait a minute. In the paragraph above, you denied that physical things can be signs. And in this one, you claim that the physical universe is a sign. You can't have it both ways. Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical things can be signs"? In your specific example of a rock, the rock is not the Sign, it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily construct a *different *scenario in which the rock is a Sign of something else--perhaps a treasure that is buried below it. I have acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything is a Sign of itself in a *trivial *sense, but unless it *represents *something else (Object) to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., *mediates *between two other correlates--it is not properly called a *Sign*. JFS: In any case, Peirce said "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448). The word 'perfuse' is rare: it only occurs once in CP. The clause beginning with 'if' is tentative, and being composed of signs is not the same as being a sign. I agree that Peirce did not *assert *in the quoted statement (CP 5.448n1p5, EP 2:394; 1906) that the Universe is *composed *of Signs, only that it is *perfused *with Signs, although the sentence construction implies that he would not have been surprised one bit if it turned out to be "composed exclusively of signs" after all. Note also *which *universe Peirce had in mind--"not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth.'" That is reminiscent of the following. CSP: The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be *that Universe in its aspect as a sign*, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is *the ultimate interpretant of every sign*. (EP 2:304; 1904, bold added) Moreover, if the entire Universe *is *composed of Signs, then Peirce's theorem of the science of semeiotics entails that the entire Universe constitutes *one *Sign. For more on that, please see what I just posted in the other thread, including the fact that Peirce *explicitly *stated, "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904). JFS: Nothing about that quotation is clear, and Peirce did not mention God or any aspect of God in the surrounding context. I never claimed otherwise. At most, that particular statement only provides partial warrant for my minor premiss, which is that the entire Universe is a Sign. JFS: Finally, since 5.448 is silent about God, a Satanist could take your argument, replace every occurrence of the word 'God' with the word 'Satan' and conclude that Satan is the creator. God only enters my Semeiotic Argumentation *after *its deductive conclusion, which is that the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself. Anyone is welcome to claim that Satan (or anything else) is that Object, but thereby accepts the burden of making a case for it based on the *attributes *that such an Object *must *have. I suspect that it would amount to nothing more than *equating *the proper names "Satan" and "God." JFS: And as we have seen, there is no supporting argumentation for the claim that CP 5.448 implies that God is the creator. By itself, of course not; again, only to the extent that it serves as one of *several *premisses in a supporting argumentation that I have now presented, expounded, and defended at considerable length. Taking my own statements out of context is just as inappropriate as doing so with Peirce's statements. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 2:51 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > On 5/18/2019 12:30 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > If someone wishes to claim that a particular statement is being > > taken out of context, then that person has the burden of showing > > that this is the case, not merely /asserting/ it. > > Absolutely! That is an essential part of the methodeutic. > > > what I see is a Percept that has no parts, which I then interpret > > by prescinding predicates and abstracting subjects to formulate > > the Propositional Judgment, "That is a rock. > > No. That claim is another example of ignoring the full context. > Note that the great majority of Peirce's examples of signs are > physical things. > > Also look at the eleven senses of the word 'sign' that Peirce > defined for the Century Dictionary. Each one defines 'sign' > as a physical thing. None of them mentions the word 'percept'. > > If Peirce's technical sense of the word 'sign' were inconsistent > with *every* sense by everybody (including himself in nontechnical > usage), that would be a gross violation of his ethics of terminology. > > > if the entire Universe--i.e., all three Universes of Experience, > > taken together--is a Sign, then what is its Object? Clearly it > > cannot be anything within any or all of the three Universes, > > so it must be something outside them. > > Wait a minute. In the paragraph above, you denied that physical things > can be signs. And in this one, you claim that the physical universe is > a sign. You can't have it both ways. > > In any case, Peirce said "all this universe is perfused with signs, if > it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448). The word 'perfuse' > is rare: it only occurs once in CP. The clause beginning with 'if' > is tentative, and being composed of signs is not the same as being > a sign. Nothing about that quotation is clear, and Peirce did not > mention God or any aspect of God in the surrounding context. > > Finally, since 5.448 is silent about God, a Satanist could take your > argument, replace every occurrence of the word 'God' with the word > 'Satan' and conclude that Satan is the creator. The ability to > derive two contradictory propositions Q and not-Q from P is a > reductio ad absurdum that demonstrates the falsehood of P. > > > To make bald assertions without offering any supporting > > argumentation violates every principle of responsible scholarship. > > I'm delighted that you agree. > > And as we have seen, there is no supporting argumentation > for the claim that CP 5.448 implies that God is the creator. > > As Stephen said, "Enough already." > > John >
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