Jeff, List: After reviewing the context of the quoted passage in R 637, I became curious about the various other manuscript drafts that Peirce wrote for the preface of his proposed collection of essays under the general title, "Meaning." Robin's summary of R 634 concludes, "Nothing is able to represent itself exclusively," so I decided to take a closer look at that one in particular. Here is what I found.
CSP: Every Sign represents or is in some sort a substitute for an Object, always regarded as Real and for the most part rightly so, and every Sign is capable of being interpreted through the mind. Must the Object always be something other than the Sign? In some sense this diverseness seems quite essential to the idea of acting as a Sign: an Object that merely presents itself represents nothing. Yet a map is incontestably a Sign, no matter how minutely accurate it is, and every point of it represents a corresponding position on the ground mapped. Suppose, then, that an absolutely correct and infinitely detailed map of Governor's Island in New York Harbour be laid down on the ground there. Then since the map represents the topography and all the features at the time the map is lying there, the map must show the map itself lying there; and must so show that map that, in the map of the map, may be seen the map lying upon it, and on that map of the map of the map may again be seen the map, with a sufficient microscope and so on, *ad infinitum*, that is, down to a mathematical point which will be nothing but the map of itself and the same will be true with every map of its own environment, unless it be ring-shaped; and it is much the same with any book whose last word is *Finis*. But hold! A mere point cannot, of itself, be said to constitute a map. Cut it out, and it will not represent anything unless it be *some* point, and no more one than another,--*any* point, in short. As the self representing point was supposed to stand on the map just imagined, it did not merely represent itself; for it represented its relations to the other points of Governor's Island. Indeed, it represented itself *only* in so far as it represented those relations. A relation, however, is not comprised in one of the terms of the relation, but only in the two together; and what is true of the point on the map is equally so of the word *Finis*; and so it is in all like cases. A Relation, in the usual sense of this word, may be defined as a fact concerning a collection of objects, but a fact regarded *as* regarded as belonging to one of them primarily, and to another secondarily in an opposed way, and some relations are triadic, that is, to a third correlate in still another way, (like the relation of giving), etc. If, in place of "regarded *as* regarded as," we put simply "regarded as," we have another sense of the word relation, but a sense probably of less frequent occurrence among correct thinkers. Neither the point of the map then, nor any such self-sign represents itself solely and simply; and the first statement, that nothing can represent itself exclusively, may, after all, be adhered to. Yet it will doubtless be admitted that very many signs represent themselves to represent their objects. (R 634:19-22; 1909 Sep 16) As I have acknowledged before (including below), everything represents itself in a *trivial *sense; but in order to qualify as a *Sign*, it must also represent *something else*, because "an Object that merely presents itself represents nothing." Regards, Jon S. On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 8:31 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, List, > > My aim was to raise questions about one premiss in the argument. In the > versions I've seen, it was a general assertion about the object being > separate from the sign. > > JonS response: "Peirce's emphasis on the non-immanence of the latter > rules out the possibility that the entire Universe as a Sign is a part of > another Sign." > > This claim seems separate from the premiss I was calling into question. My > own interests are primarily in the semiotic theory. Given these interests, > I was focusing on the assertion about objects being separate from their > signs considered as a result of Peirce's semiotic inquiries. > > As a methodological matter, it would seem odd to support claims about the > relations between signs and objects in a speculative grammar with > assertions about the real nature of the universe or about the non-immanent > character of God. Perhaps I am misunderstanding the gist of your response. > JD: In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as > the object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a > sign (of itself)? > > JonS: I have acknowledged repeatedly that anything is a Sign of itself in > a *trivial *sense, but it is not in the relation of *representing *unless > it stands for something *other than* itself. > > The example of the crucifix doesn't look a trivial sense of a sign also > being its object in a trivial sense. Your comments on each of these > examples don't seem to provide much guidance for understanding the larger > point Peirce is making. Here is that point again: > > i) Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and > since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional > explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make > up a still larger Sign; > ii) and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach > a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its > significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has > some other part as its Object. > > Two things stand out to me. First, the claim that the sign and the > explanation make up another sign is iterated, endlessly. Second, the > relation of a whole to its part--and the parts of those parts, etc.-appears > to be important for the sake understanding the point he is making. > > It might help to consider some further examples involving relations > between objects and signs. I suggest that we consider Peirce's example of > patterns of inference by abduction, deduction and induction in the example > of the beans in the bag. If this example of the beans in the bag seems > forced as an illustration of how the forms of inference function as parts > of a larger cycle of inquiry, then consider a simplified case like > sampling colored beans from an urn with replacement. > > Yours, > > Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Tuesday, May 21, 2019 5:15:11 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited > > Jeff, List: > > CSP: But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as > we say, something else, called its *Object*, although the condition that > a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we > insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign > that is a part of a Sign. (CP 2.230; 1910) > > > I am having trouble seeing the relevance of this quote for either the > continuity of semeiosis or the ongoing discussion of my Semeiotic > Argumentation for the Reality of God, since Peirce's emphasis on the > non-immanence of the latter rules out the possibility that the entire > Universe as a Sign is a part of another Sign. > > JD: In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as > the object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a > sign (of itself)? > > > I have acknowledged repeatedly that anything is a Sign of itself in a > *trivial *sense, but it is not in the relation of *representing *unless > it stands for something *other than* itself. > > JD: This example suggests that the relations that are represented as > holding between subjects in a proposition are, themselves, also the objects > of the proposition. > > > I disagree with this analysis. "Cain," "Abel," and "killing" are the > subjects of the Proposition, which therefore denote its Objects (or "one > complex Object"). The relation between them corresponds to the continuous > predicate, "_____ stands in the relation of _____ to _____," which > therefore signifies the Proposition's Interpretant. In fact, this is > precisely the example that Peirce gave elsewhere of a sentence in which the > continuous predicate is expressed entirely by *syntax*. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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