List: According to Peirce, Semeiotic is the science of determining "what *must be* the characters of all signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227; c. 1897). He later described thought as *genuine* 3ns--how a mind (1ns of 3ns) *goes about* learning (3ns of 3ns) by Experience (2ns of 3ns).
CSP: Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere *mind* capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The *second* is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That is, it is of the general nature of *experience* or *information*. The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or *cognition*. But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign. (CP 1.537; 1903) As discussed in the thread <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-05/msg00023.html> on "Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited," the operation of a Sign (i.e., an Argument) is a *continuous *inferential process of semeiosis in which *definite *Propositions--including Semes that serve as subjects (denoting Objects) and continuous predicates that marry them (signifying Interpretants)--are creations of thought (*entia rationis*) for describing *hypothetical *instantaneous states, which are *Facts*. That is why it is incorrect to say that an Argument is *built up* of Propositions, or that a Proposition is *built up* of Semes--just as it is incorrect to say that a motion is *built up* of positions, or that a line is *built up* of points. As a *real* continuum, it has no *definite* parts, only *material* parts--i.e., *potential *parts--which we are free to identify and distinguish as we please. What does this suggest about perception and Experience? CSP: In the last degree of degeneracy of Thirdness, there is thought, but no conveyance or embodiment of thought at all. It is merely that a fact of which there must be, I suppose, something like knowledge is *apprehended* according to a possible idea. There is an *instigation* without any *prompting*. For example, you look at something and say, "It is red." Well, I ask you what justification you have for such a [Perceptual] judgment. You reply, "I saw it was red." Not at all. You saw nothing in the least like that. You saw an image [Percept]. There was no subject or predicate in it. It was just one unseparated image, not resembling a proposition in the smallest particular. It instigated you to your judgment, owing to a possibility of thought; but it never told you so. Now in all imagination and perception there is such an operation by which thought springs up; and its only justification is that it subsequently turns out to be useful. (CP 1.538; 1903) As discussed in the thread <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-06/msg00000.html> on "Direct vs. Indirect Experience," Experience is likewise a *continuous *inferential process of semeiosis in which *definite *Perceptual Judgments--including prescinded predicates and hypostatically abstracted subjects--are creations of thought (*entia rationis*) for describing *hypothetical *instantaneous states, which are *Percepts*. However, Experience is *broader *than perception, because Perceptual Judgments purport to represent not only the *content* of Percepts themselves, but also the *relations* between them. We *mark *positions within a motion or points within a line for a particular purpose, and we *isolate *Percepts within perception or events within Experience by *attending to* the corresponding Perceptual Judgments. Peirce hinted at this in one of his explanations of Existential Graphs. CSP: Namely, although the sheet that is actually employed may be quite small, we make believe that the so-called sheet of assertion is only a particular region, or area, of an immense surface ... Upon the great surface the Graphist alone has the power to scribe any graph; while he scribes what he sees fit. ... We further conceive that this feigned sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth sufficient effort. (R 280:82-83[29-30]; c. 1904-1905) My Experience is forced upon me as a *continuous *stream of Perceptual Judgments, often subconsciously, like EGs that the Graphist perpetually scribes *anywhere *on the immense surface. A *discontinuity *in the flow of perception tends to draw my attention to it *involuntarily*, such that the EG for *that *Perceptual Judgment appears on the Sheet of Assertion. If I *choose *to attend to it further--perhaps because it conflicts with my current *beliefs* as derived from previous Perceptual Judgments, causing the irritation of *doubt* that motivates all *inquiry*--then it serves as a premiss for my subsequent *deliberate *reasoning; i.e., *transforming *that EG along with previously scribed or transformed EGs. If *truth *is the end in view, then this *ought *to be done in accordance with the logical leading principles for Retroductive, Deductive, and Inductive Arguments; in the case of *necessary *reasoning with EGs, the rules for erasure and insertion. CSP: Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the object but is affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey thought, that is, must be of the nature of thought or of a sign. Every thought is a sign. But in the first degree of degeneracy the Thirdness affects the object, so that this is not of the nature of a Thirdness--not so, at least, as far as this operation of degenerate Thirdness is concerned. It is that the third brings about a Secondness but does not regard that Secondness as anything more than a fact. In short it is the operation of executing an *intention*. (CP 1.538; 1903) 3ns of 3ns is a genuine triadic relation in which the Object determines the Sign, but the Sign has no effect whatsoever on the Object. Consequently, the Sign can only *mediate* between its Object and its Interpretant to the extent that the Object is also *semeiosic* in nature; i.e., *intelligible*, possessing a Form *entitatively* that the Sign embodies *representatively*. After all, the ideal function of a Sign is to determine a Quasi-mind to the very same Interpretant as if the Object *itself* had acted upon it. By contrast, 2ns of 3ns is a *dual* consciousness, encompassing both *passive* perception (including sensation) and Experience on the one hand, and *active* intention and volition on the other. Having been determined to an Interpretant by a Sign of an Object, I can *subsequently* affect that Object by an exercise of my will. In particular, I can design and conduct *experiments* to corroborate or falsify my previous Perceptual Judgments by putting myself in a position to Experience new ones. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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