Gary R., List: Welcome back from your travels abroad--I hope that you enjoyed them--and thank you for your kind words. My goal was to summarize the ground that we have covered in recent List discussions, aside from the disputes about the Reality of God and the thread <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-06/msg00012.html> on "Modes of Being and Modes of Meaning," which likewise has not prompted any responses so far.
It sounds like I was successful, at least on your reading. I originally included numerous citations from Peirce's writings throughout, but ultimately decided to omit them for the sake of a less cluttered presentation. I kept a copy of that version for myself, and can post it if anyone is interested. It indicates that I was using "entitatively" precisely as Peirce himself did in the following passage. CSP: That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The Being of a Form consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object, entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22; 1906) In this context, he (and I) simply meant that the conditional proposition corresponding to the Being of the Form that the Sign communicates "is literally true of the Object." If I say "some apple is red," or scribe the Existential Graph "apple---red," I am asserting that an indefinite individual *really *possesses the essential characters of every apple, and also *really *possesses the character of redness. However, the words "apple" and "red" obviously need not do so, since as Instances of Signs it is sufficient that they embody the corresponding Forms *representatively*. It is an interesting question why Peirce named his initial system of logical graphs "entitative" vs. "existential" for his later (preferred) system. Here is a passage from "The Fourth Curiosity" where he directly contrasted these two terms, while explaining the distinction between a kind and a class. CSP: I consider a *kind *to be an *ens rationis*, although that may be open to dispute, at least as regards some kinds; but there can, I think, be no doubt that a *class *is an *ens rationis*. For a *class*, unlike a *kind*, is not a character, but is the totality of all those singulars that possess a definite existent character, which is the *essential character* of the class. Should observation show that two classes having different essential characters embraced the very same singulars, then since it is the singulars, and not the kinds, that constitute the existence of the class, we should say that the two classes, though *entitatively*, that is, in their possibilities, they were diverse, were yet *existentially *one. Such, I think, is the modern notion of a class, though I must confess that it appears to me to be rather hazy. The characters which go to define a class are not necessarily permanent characters of the singulars, as a kind is. On the contrary we speak with perfect propriety of the class of human males between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one, though there is evidently no such *kind*. (CP 4.648; 1908) A kind is always a *permanent *character of the singulars that belong to it, but a class need not be. As a result, two different classes designating two different essential characters can have all the same singulars as their members; and this makes them *existentially *the same, but still *entitatively *different. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 5:55 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > Your post of June 7th is such a clear, complete (as an outline), yet > extraordinarily succinct articulation of the semeiotic preconditions for > the formation of "a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an > intelligence capable of learning by experience" that I'm surprised it > hasn't been commented on here since its posting. > > I've just very recently returned from a European holiday and so haven't > had time to study it. But having read it twice, I'm determined to do just > that (my approach will be to create a formal outline of your argumentation > which will hopefully clarify it for me, after which I may have some > substantial comments or questions). > > Yet, while I'm still suffering from jet lag (worse for me flying > east-west), even in my present foggy-minded state I do have one question > regarding a term you used in your concluding paragraph: > > JAS: 3ns of 3ns is a genuine triadic relation in which the Object > determines the Sign, but the Sign has no effect whatsoever on the Object. > Consequently, the Sign can only *mediate* between its Object and its > Interpretant to the extent that the Object is also *semeiosic* in nature; > i.e., *intelligible*, possessing a Form *entitatively* that the Sign > embodies *representatively*. After all, the ideal function of a Sign is > to determine a Quasi-mind to the very same Interpretant as if the Object > *itself* had acted upon it. By contrast, 2ns of 3ns is a *dual* > consciousness, > encompassing both *passive* perception (including sensation) and > Experience on the one hand, and *active* intention and volition on the > other. > > > When you write ". . .the Sign can only *mediate* between its Object and > its Interpretant to the extent that the Object is also *semeiosic* in > nature; i.e., *intelligible*, possessing a Form *entitatively* that the > Sign embodies *representatively,*" are you referencing Peirce's > 'entiative graphs'? If so, how so? > > Or, rather, are you employing the term in one of its vernacular meanings? > For example, Merriam-Webster gives these: > > E*ntitative* > > 1: considered as mere entity > <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity> abstracted from all > circumstances or relations > 2: being an entity : having real existence > In a word, are you using 'entitative' formally (as Peirce did) or > colloquially? Or is it a formal term in your analysis while not directly > related to the entitative graphs? > > Your conclusion seems to me to epitomize the semeiosic foundation of > scientific inquiry. > > JAS: Having been determined to an Interpretant by a Sign of an Object, I > can *subsequently* affect that Object by an exercise of my will. In > particular, I can design and conduct *experiments* to corroborate or > falsify my previous Perceptual Judgments by putting myself in a position to > Experience new ones. > > > Perhaps more on this remarkable conclusion when my muddled head clears. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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