Jon, list, Thanks for further clarifying the difference between entitative graphs and existential graphs. They seem at first glance to me to be something of mirror images of each other, especially as I've read that the alpha part of existential graphs is dual to entitative graphs in the sense of an "involution operation" (which I understand to be that if the dual of A is B, then the dual of B is A). Is that correct? . What is not yet clear to me is exactly why Peirce ceased work on his entitative graphs and decided to develop his existential graphs (not that I have a great deal of facility with either graph type, actually none whatsoever with entitative graphs). Or, another way of asking this question--sure to show my ignorance of graphical logic--why did Peirce just stop at the sentential part of entitative graphs while going on to develop his existential graphs as isomorphic to first-order and modal logic?
I have also very recently read in an encyclopedia article that Spencer-Brown's primary algebra as presented in *Laws of Form* is isomophic to entitative graphs, while earlier I'd only read of its similarities to existential graphs. Perhaps Mary Libertin can put some light on this matter. Now, given my ignorance of graphical logic generally, answers to these questions may prove more valuable to others on the list than to me. But the topic seems intrinsically of interest to those with facility in graphical logics. I certainly hope to learn a bit more myself. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 8:53 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Hoping to resume this discussion, I checked to see whether Don Roberts > happened to say anything in his 1973 book, *The Existential Graphs of > Charles S. Peirce*, about why Peirce named his initial system of logical > graphs "entitative." Sure enough, I found the following paragraph on page > 30, which concludes chapter 2 on "The Development of Existential Graphs." > > DDR: Why did Peirce choose these names? Because the "fundamental symbol" > of the one system "expresses an entitative relation", and the fundamental > symbol of the other "expresses the relation of existence" (Ms 485, p. 1). > The second is easy enough to understand. In EG, to scribe or write > something is to "aver that such a thing *exists*" (Ms 513), and is to > claim that something having the character described exists in the universe > which the sheet represents (Ms Am 806*). Not so easy is the meaning of the > other name, which is that "being involves necessarily the truth of the > description" (Ms 513). > > > Roberts did not attempt any further unpacking of these somewhat cryptic > remarks from three different manuscripts (Ms Am 806* = R 1589), all of > which are undated in the Robin catalog, but I will take a stab at it. To > provide context, here are longer excerpts from the two that mention > Entitative Graphs. > > CSP: Two efficient systems of logical graphs are known to me. They are > intimately allied. One of these I slightly sketched in *The Monist*, > Vol. VII. pp. 168-186 (Jan. 1897.) I call it the system of *Entitative > Graphs*, because its fundamental symbol expresses an entitative > relation. The other is the system herein described. I call it the system > of *Existential Graphs*, because its fundamental symbol expresses the > relation of existence. I speak of existence as a relation, because it > consists in the occurrence of a nature among a collection of individual > objects of experience,--not necessarily all actually experienced, but all > destined to be experienced, could the experience be rounded out to > completion. Any entitative graph may be converted into the equivalent > existential graph by, first, enclosing each spot separately and secondly > enclosing the whole graph. (R 485:1) > > CSP: I will first explain the graphical method. This method has two > varieties which I call Entitative Graphs and Existential Graphs. In the > Monist for January 1897 I have given a very slight and imperfect sketch of > the system of entitative graphs. I will here explain the existential > graphs which are less philosophical but are much easier to use. > In order to draw such a graph, the first step is to assign some sheet of > paper or enclosure upon a sheet, marked out by a bounding line, to > represent so much as we know or recollect of the universe. > > If on that sheet or in that enclosure we draw a picture, or write a > general description, or a letter which is an abbreviation for a general > description, the effect is to be understood and agreed upon as being that > we *assert* that to something in the universe that picture or description > applies. We aver that such a thing *exists*. Hence, I call this the > system of *existential* graphs. (On the entitative system the meaning > is, that being involves necessarily the truth of the description.) (R > 573:17-18) > > > The "fundamental symbol" in both systems is *juxtaposition*, which by > convention asserts *conjunction *in Existential Graphs vs. *disjunction *in > Entitative Graphs. In other words, when multiple propositions appear > unenclosed on a sheet, the claim in Existential Graphs is that *all *of > them are true, whereas the claim in Entitative Graphs is that *exactly > one* of them is true. Hence the relation represented by a pair of > Existential Graph-instances on the same sheet is that of *coexistence*, > while the relation represented by a pair of Entitative Graph-instances on > the same sheet is that of *conditional necessity*--if this, then not the > other, and vice-versa. That is consistent with what Peirce wrote in yet > another manuscript. > > CSP: There is more to be said about the Line of Identity, after the third > indispensible peculiar sign of the Syntax of Existential Graphs has been > considered. > This third is one that shall deny a Graph-instance, or scribed assertion. > For without that we could not, in Existential Graphs, express any > proposition [of] that form which is, *par excellence*, Critical; namely, > the conditional form, “If Antecedent then Consequent.["] No more could we > in Entitative Graphs (whose developement starts from the conditional form) > express a proposition of the particular form with which the development of > Existential Graphs begins. (R 670:11-12[10-11]; 1911 June 9-10). > > > Existential Graphs start with *copulative *propositions, and require Cuts > or (more iconically) shading to express *conditional *propositions; > conversely, *Entitative *Graphs start with *conditional *propositions, > and require Cuts to express *copulative *propositions. According to EP > 2:544n22 (1906), "The Being of a Form consists in the truth of a > conditional proposition"--i.e., "that being involves necessarily the truth > of the description"--and "The Form is in the Object, *entitatively *we > may say, meaning that that conditional relation ... is literally true of > the Object." According to CP 4.648 (1908), two classes are *entitatively > *diverse when they correspond to different essential > characters--different Forms, different conditional propositions--even if > they happen to include exactly the same singulars as their members, and are > thus existentially the same. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sat, Jun 15, 2019 at 1:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> Welcome back from your travels abroad--I hope that you enjoyed them--and >> thank you for your kind words. My goal was to summarize the ground that we >> have covered in recent List discussions, aside from the disputes about the >> Reality of God and the thread >> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-06/msg00012.html> on >> "Modes of Being and Modes of Meaning," which likewise has not prompted any >> responses so far. >> >> It sounds like I was successful, at least on your reading. I originally >> included numerous citations from Peirce's writings throughout, but >> ultimately decided to omit them for the sake of a less cluttered >> presentation. I kept a copy of that version for myself, and can post it if >> anyone is interested. It indicates that I was using "entitatively" >> precisely as Peirce himself did in the following passage. >> >> CSP: That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the >> Interpretant is a Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing >> were first in the Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the >> Object, it must thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is >> communicated does not necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to >> be in a different thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The >> Being of a Form consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under >> given circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object, >> entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or >> following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is >> literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be >> embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, >> in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the >> Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under >> favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22; 1906) >> >> >> In this context, he (and I) simply meant that the conditional proposition >> corresponding to the Being of the Form that the Sign communicates "is >> literally true of the Object." If I say "some apple is red," or scribe the >> Existential Graph "apple---red," I am asserting that an indefinite >> individual *really *possesses the essential characters of every apple, >> and also *really *possesses the character of redness. However, the >> words "apple" and "red" obviously need not do so, since as Instances of >> Signs it is sufficient that they embody the corresponding Forms >> *representatively*. >> >> It is an interesting question why Peirce named his initial system of >> logical graphs "entitative" vs. "existential" for his later (preferred) >> system. Here is a passage from "The Fourth Curiosity" where he directly >> contrasted these two terms, while explaining the distinction between a kind >> and a class. >> >> CSP: I consider a *kind *to be an *ens rationis*, although that may be >> open to dispute, at least as regards some kinds; but there can, I think, be >> no doubt that a *class *is an *ens rationis*. For a *class*, unlike a >> *kind*, is not a character, but is the totality of all those singulars >> that possess a definite existent character, which is the *essential >> character* of the class. Should observation show that two classes having >> different essential characters embraced the very same singulars, then since >> it is the singulars, and not the kinds, that constitute the existence of >> the class, we should say that the two classes, though *entitatively*, >> that is, in their possibilities, they were diverse, were yet *existentially >> *one. Such, I think, is the modern notion of a class, though I must >> confess that it appears to me to be rather hazy. The characters which go to >> define a class are not necessarily permanent characters of the singulars, >> as a kind is. On the contrary we speak with perfect propriety of the class >> of human males between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one, though there is >> evidently no such *kind*. (CP 4.648; 1908) >> >> >> A kind is always a *permanent *character of the singulars that belong to >> it, but a class need not be. As a result, two different classes >> designating two different essential characters can have all the same >> singulars as their members; and this makes them *existentially *the >> same, but still *entitatively *different. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 5:55 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, list, >>> >>> Your post of June 7th is such a clear, complete (as an outline), yet >>> extraordinarily succinct articulation of the semeiotic preconditions for >>> the formation of "a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an >>> intelligence capable of learning by experience" that I'm surprised it >>> hasn't been commented on here since its posting. >>> >>> I've just very recently returned from a European holiday and so haven't >>> had time to study it. But having read it twice, I'm determined to do just >>> that (my approach will be to create a formal outline of your argumentation >>> which will hopefully clarify it for me, after which I may have some >>> substantial comments or questions). >>> >>> Yet, while I'm still suffering from jet lag (worse for me flying >>> east-west), even in my present foggy-minded state I do have one question >>> regarding a term you used in your concluding paragraph: >>> >>> JAS: 3ns of 3ns is a genuine triadic relation in which the Object >>> determines the Sign, but the Sign has no effect whatsoever on the Object. >>> Consequently, the Sign can only *mediate* between its Object and its >>> Interpretant to the extent that the Object is also *semeiosic* in >>> nature; i.e., *intelligible*, possessing a Form *entitatively* that the >>> Sign embodies *representatively*. After all, the ideal function of a >>> Sign is to determine a Quasi-mind to the very same Interpretant as if the >>> Object *itself* had acted upon it. By contrast, 2ns of 3ns is a *dual* >>> consciousness, >>> encompassing both *passive* perception (including sensation) and >>> Experience on the one hand, and *active* intention and volition on the >>> other. >>> >>> >>> When you write ". . .the Sign can only *mediate* between its Object and >>> its Interpretant to the extent that the Object is also *semeiosic* in >>> nature; i.e., *intelligible*, possessing a Form *entitatively* that the >>> Sign embodies *representatively,*" are you referencing Peirce's >>> 'entiative graphs'? If so, how so? >>> >>> Or, rather, are you employing the term in one of its vernacular >>> meanings? For example, Merriam-Webster gives these: >>> >>> E*ntitative* >>> >>> 1: considered as mere entity >>> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity> abstracted from all >>> circumstances or relations >>> 2: being an entity : having real existence >>> In a word, are you using 'entitative' formally (as Peirce did) or >>> colloquially? Or is it a formal term in your analysis while not directly >>> related to the entitative graphs? >>> >>> Your conclusion seems to me to epitomize the semeiosic foundation of >>> scientific inquiry. >>> >>> JAS: Having been determined to an Interpretant by a Sign of an Object, I >>> can *subsequently* affect that Object by an exercise of my will. In >>> particular, I can design and conduct *experiments* to corroborate or >>> falsify my previous Perceptual Judgments by putting myself in a position to >>> Experience new ones. >>> >>> >>> Perhaps more on this remarkable conclusion when my muddled head clears. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> >>
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