Jon, list,

Your post of June 7th is such a clear, complete (as an outline), yet
extraordinarily succinct articulation of the semeiotic preconditions for
the formation of "a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an
intelligence capable of learning by experience" that I'm surprised it
hasn't been commented on here since its posting.

I've just very recently returned from a European holiday and so haven't had
time to study it. But having read it twice, I'm determined to do just that
(my approach will be to create a formal outline of your argumentation which
will hopefully clarify it for me, after which I may have some substantial
comments or questions).

Yet, while I'm still suffering from jet lag (worse for me flying
east-west), even in my present foggy-minded state I do have one question
regarding a term you used in your concluding paragraph:

JAS: 3ns of 3ns is a genuine triadic relation in which the Object
determines the Sign, but the Sign has no effect whatsoever on the
Object.  Consequently,
the Sign can only *mediate* between its Object and its Interpretant to the
extent that the Object is also *semeiosic* in nature; i.e., *intelligible*,
possessing a Form *entitatively* that the Sign embodies *representatively*.
  After all, the ideal function of a Sign is to determine a Quasi-mind to
the very same Interpretant as if the Object *itself* had acted upon it.  By
contrast, 2ns of 3ns is a *dual* consciousness, encompassing both
*passive* perception
(including sensation) and Experience on the one hand, and *active* intention
and volition on the other.


When you write ". . .the Sign can only *mediate* between its Object and its
Interpretant to the extent that the Object is also *semeiosic* in nature;
i.e., *intelligible*, possessing a Form *entitatively* that the Sign
embodies *representatively,*" are you referencing Peirce's 'entiative
graphs'? If so, how so?

Or, rather, are you employing the term in one of its vernacular meanings?
For example, Merriam-Webster gives these:

E*ntitative*

1: considered as mere entity
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity> abstracted from all
circumstances or relations
2: being an entity : having real existence

In a word, are you using 'entitative' formally (as Peirce did) or
colloquially? Or is it a formal term in your analysis while not directly
related to the entitative graphs?

Your conclusion seems to me to epitomize the semeiosic foundation of
scientific inquiry.

JAS: Having been determined to an Interpretant by a Sign of an Object, I
can *subsequently* affect that Object by an exercise of my will.  In
particular, I can design and conduct *experiments* to corroborate or
falsify my previous Perceptual Judgments by putting myself in a position to
Experience new ones.


Perhaps more on this remarkable conclusion when my muddled head clears.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




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On Fri, Jun 7, 2019 at 10:04 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:

> List:
>
> According to Peirce, Semeiotic is the science of determining "what *must
> be* the characters of all signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that
> is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227;
> c. 1897).
>
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