John, list,
talking about harmony, I want to say, that harmony in music is not an easy thing: In ancient times, music scales (Pythagorean) were separate in the way, that it was impossible to switch from one scale to another. This is for a mathematical reason: It really is impossible, strictly. Later, Wertheim and Bach have established the "well-tempered piano"- scale, that divides an octave into twelve parts, of which any of the twelve scales each consisting of seven tones can be picked of, and it is possible to go from one scale to another. But this is only a compromise: Chords are not completely in harmony anymore, especially not the septimes- but they are a bit disharmonic anyway, so nobody gets it. But: For some reason it is so, that dividing an octave into twelve parts comes close, but not exactly, to a situation in which the tones fit each other in the sense of multiples of overtones. This is a very funny coincidence. On this coincidence the whole music sytem of nowadays is based on, other than in ancient times (Pythagoras). You may say, that, other than in Pythagorean times, nowaday´s music is, due to this compromise, hot. Though so little that it is hard to hear. Otherwise Bach would not have tolerated it.
21. Juni 2019 um 23:17 Uhr
"John F Sowa" <[email protected]>wrote:
Jon, Edwina, Jerry, and Helmut,
This discussion gets into issues that are fundamental to methodeutic.
> JFS: All my objections would vanish if Jon would make one simple
> change: replace every occurrence of 'harmony' with 'hypothesis'.
>
> JAS: As an alternative, I respectfully request that you accept my
> explanations and not try to dictate how I express myself.
>
> ET: Jon - I don't think you realize what you are doing. There is
> no need to be so defensive about what others write to you with
> regard to your comments/interpretations!
I'm trying to be as constructive as I can. And I hope that other
people would apply the same criteria to what I write. I would
welcome any criticism anyone may have about what I write. I may
agree or not. But that's what I would expect.
Re harmonizing: I searched CP for all occurrences of 'harmonize'
to see what Peirce had to say, favorable or unfavorable.
> CP 1.6. The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me.
> ... I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying the
> philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science.
But note what he wrote in the next paragraph:
> CP 1.7. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine.
> The best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of
> all likelihood, in the general line of growth of scientific ideas,
> and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers.
In short, this favorable example of harmonizing is a source for
*hypotheses* that must then be tested by scientific methodeutic.
For a more critical comment about harmonizing, see below for an
extended excerpt from CP 5.406 to 5.408. In 5.406, Peirce praises
"The real spirit of Socrates, who I hope would have been delighted
to have been 'overcome in argument,' because he would have learned
something by it."
Later in 5.406, Peirce is highly critical of "All the efforts of
the scholastic doctors [which] are directed toward harmonizing
their faith in Aristotle and their faith in the Church." In that
sense, their harmonization is more than a hypothesis. It's blend
of two preconceived theories, which they are trying to preserve
by any rhetorical methods they can muster. Peirce writes "they
betray their feeble hold of the conception of what truth is."
In 5.407, Peirce states his famous definition of truth as "The
opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate." But in 5.408, he warns "Our perversity and that of
others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion; it might
even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally
accepted as long as the human race should last... [Yet] if, after
the extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties
and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be the
one which they would ultimately come to."
In summary, harmonizing a variety of sources can be a good method
for developing a starting hypothesis. But a premature harmonization
that is not subjected to open-ended and unrestricted scientific
methodeutic can be "perversity" that blocks the way of inquiry.
> JFS: I googled those two terms ["the Plastic Nature of Cudworth"
> and "artifex of nature"] to see how Peirce regarded the Graphist.
>
> JLRC: Thank you John, for posting this reference to Ralph Cudworth’s
> work. The online article was rather fascinating wrt. some of the
> roots of CSP’s philosophy that lies outside of logic and chemical
> logic.
>
> It is an alternate historical view of “three-ness”... and an early
> view of “system’s thinking”.
Yes. I have found that studying Peirce's sources *and* later
developments in the 20th & 21st c. helps to put his ideas in
perspective. For the record, following is URL for Cudworth:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plastic_Principle
HR
> But I guess it would be quite helpful to combine Peircean theories
> with something like systems theories and ontology, whether or not
> Peirce would have liked that.
Peirce was a voracious reader, and many of his best insights came
from his reaction to what he was reading. After he moved to Arisbe,
he no longer had daily access to a research library. But his letters
to and from Lady Welby and her group had a very strong influence on
the later development of his semeiotic.
The changes in his thoughts and subject matter are probably more
strongly affected by his reading than by a deliberate rejection of
his earlier writings. To be faithful to his legacy, we should
remember his principle that the meaning of any general is in its
implications for the future.
John
_____________________________________________________________________
CP 5.406.
... The real spirit of Socrates, who I hope would have been delighted
to have been "overcome in argument," because he would have learned
something by it, is in curious contrast with the naive idea of the
glossist, for whom (as for "the born missionary" of today) discussion
would seem to have been simply a struggle. When philosophy began to
awake from its long slumber, and before theology completely dominated
it, the practice seems to have been for each professor to seize upon any
philosophical position he found unoccupied and which seemed a strong
one, to intrench himself in it, and to sally forth from time to time to
give battle to the others...
All the efforts of the scholastic doctors are directed toward
harmonizing their faith in Aristotle and their faith in the Church,
and one may search their ponderous folios through without finding an
argument which goes any further. It is noticeable that where different
faiths flourish side by side, renegades are looked upon with contempt
even by the party whose belief they adopt; so completely has the idea of
loyalty replaced that of truth-seeking. Since the time of Descartes,
the defect in the conception of truth has been less apparent. Still, it
will sometimes strike a scientific man that the philosophers have been
less intent on finding out what the facts are, than on inquiring what
belief is most in harmony with their system. It is hard to convince a
follower of the a priori method by adducing facts; but show him that an
opinion he is defending is inconsistent with what he has laid down
elsewhere, and he will be very apt to retract it. These minds do not
seem to believe that disputation is ever to cease; they seem to think
that the opinion which is natural for one man is not so for another,
and that belief will, consequently, never be settled. In contenting
themselves with fixing their own opinions by a method which would lead
another man to a different result, they betray their feeble hold of the
conception of what truth is.
CP 5.407.
On the other hand, all the followers of science are animated by a
cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far
enough, will give one certain solution to each question to which they
apply it. One man may investigate the velocity of light by studying
the transits of Venus and the aberration of the stars; another by the
oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites; a third by
the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by the
motions of the curves of Lissajoux; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth, and a
ninth, may follow the different methods of comparing the measures of
statical and dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain different
results, but, as each perfects his method and his processes, the results
are found to move steadily together toward a destined centre. So
with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most
antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a
force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This
activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a
foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of
the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no
natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate
opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth and
reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would
explain reality.
CP 5.408.
... Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the
settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary
proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should
last. Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief, which
alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far;
and if, after the extinction of our race, another should arise with
faculties and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be
the one which they would ultimately come to.
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
This discussion gets into issues that are fundamental to methodeutic.
> JFS: All my objections would vanish if Jon would make one simple
> change: replace every occurrence of 'harmony' with 'hypothesis'.
>
> JAS: As an alternative, I respectfully request that you accept my
> explanations and not try to dictate how I express myself.
>
> ET: Jon - I don't think you realize what you are doing. There is
> no need to be so defensive about what others write to you with
> regard to your comments/interpretations!
I'm trying to be as constructive as I can. And I hope that other
people would apply the same criteria to what I write. I would
welcome any criticism anyone may have about what I write. I may
agree or not. But that's what I would expect.
Re harmonizing: I searched CP for all occurrences of 'harmonize'
to see what Peirce had to say, favorable or unfavorable.
> CP 1.6. The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me.
> ... I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying the
> philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science.
But note what he wrote in the next paragraph:
> CP 1.7. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine.
> The best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of
> all likelihood, in the general line of growth of scientific ideas,
> and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers.
In short, this favorable example of harmonizing is a source for
*hypotheses* that must then be tested by scientific methodeutic.
For a more critical comment about harmonizing, see below for an
extended excerpt from CP 5.406 to 5.408. In 5.406, Peirce praises
"The real spirit of Socrates, who I hope would have been delighted
to have been 'overcome in argument,' because he would have learned
something by it."
Later in 5.406, Peirce is highly critical of "All the efforts of
the scholastic doctors [which] are directed toward harmonizing
their faith in Aristotle and their faith in the Church." In that
sense, their harmonization is more than a hypothesis. It's blend
of two preconceived theories, which they are trying to preserve
by any rhetorical methods they can muster. Peirce writes "they
betray their feeble hold of the conception of what truth is."
In 5.407, Peirce states his famous definition of truth as "The
opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate." But in 5.408, he warns "Our perversity and that of
others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion; it might
even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally
accepted as long as the human race should last... [Yet] if, after
the extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties
and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be the
one which they would ultimately come to."
In summary, harmonizing a variety of sources can be a good method
for developing a starting hypothesis. But a premature harmonization
that is not subjected to open-ended and unrestricted scientific
methodeutic can be "perversity" that blocks the way of inquiry.
> JFS: I googled those two terms ["the Plastic Nature of Cudworth"
> and "artifex of nature"] to see how Peirce regarded the Graphist.
>
> JLRC: Thank you John, for posting this reference to Ralph Cudworth’s
> work. The online article was rather fascinating wrt. some of the
> roots of CSP’s philosophy that lies outside of logic and chemical
> logic.
>
> It is an alternate historical view of “three-ness”... and an early
> view of “system’s thinking”.
Yes. I have found that studying Peirce's sources *and* later
developments in the 20th & 21st c. helps to put his ideas in
perspective. For the record, following is URL for Cudworth:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plastic_Principle
HR
> But I guess it would be quite helpful to combine Peircean theories
> with something like systems theories and ontology, whether or not
> Peirce would have liked that.
Peirce was a voracious reader, and many of his best insights came
from his reaction to what he was reading. After he moved to Arisbe,
he no longer had daily access to a research library. But his letters
to and from Lady Welby and her group had a very strong influence on
the later development of his semeiotic.
The changes in his thoughts and subject matter are probably more
strongly affected by his reading than by a deliberate rejection of
his earlier writings. To be faithful to his legacy, we should
remember his principle that the meaning of any general is in its
implications for the future.
John
_____________________________________________________________________
CP 5.406.
... The real spirit of Socrates, who I hope would have been delighted
to have been "overcome in argument," because he would have learned
something by it, is in curious contrast with the naive idea of the
glossist, for whom (as for "the born missionary" of today) discussion
would seem to have been simply a struggle. When philosophy began to
awake from its long slumber, and before theology completely dominated
it, the practice seems to have been for each professor to seize upon any
philosophical position he found unoccupied and which seemed a strong
one, to intrench himself in it, and to sally forth from time to time to
give battle to the others...
All the efforts of the scholastic doctors are directed toward
harmonizing their faith in Aristotle and their faith in the Church,
and one may search their ponderous folios through without finding an
argument which goes any further. It is noticeable that where different
faiths flourish side by side, renegades are looked upon with contempt
even by the party whose belief they adopt; so completely has the idea of
loyalty replaced that of truth-seeking. Since the time of Descartes,
the defect in the conception of truth has been less apparent. Still, it
will sometimes strike a scientific man that the philosophers have been
less intent on finding out what the facts are, than on inquiring what
belief is most in harmony with their system. It is hard to convince a
follower of the a priori method by adducing facts; but show him that an
opinion he is defending is inconsistent with what he has laid down
elsewhere, and he will be very apt to retract it. These minds do not
seem to believe that disputation is ever to cease; they seem to think
that the opinion which is natural for one man is not so for another,
and that belief will, consequently, never be settled. In contenting
themselves with fixing their own opinions by a method which would lead
another man to a different result, they betray their feeble hold of the
conception of what truth is.
CP 5.407.
On the other hand, all the followers of science are animated by a
cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far
enough, will give one certain solution to each question to which they
apply it. One man may investigate the velocity of light by studying
the transits of Venus and the aberration of the stars; another by the
oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites; a third by
the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by the
motions of the curves of Lissajoux; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth, and a
ninth, may follow the different methods of comparing the measures of
statical and dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain different
results, but, as each perfects his method and his processes, the results
are found to move steadily together toward a destined centre. So
with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most
antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a
force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This
activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a
foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of
the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no
natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate
opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth and
reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would
explain reality.
CP 5.408.
... Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the
settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary
proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should
last. Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief, which
alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far;
and if, after the extinction of our race, another should arise with
faculties and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be
the one which they would ultimately come to.
-----------------------------
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