John, List: JFS: I searched CP for all occurrences of 'harmonize' to see what Peirce had to say, favorable or unfavorable.
That is fine, but not really relevant, since I have never claimed that what I have in mind by "harmonize" matches *Peirce's *usage of that particular word. Coincidentally, a new issue <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.55.issue-1> of *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society *came out last week; and it includes T. L. Short's generally favorable review of Robert Lane's recent book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, which I read more than a year ago and now plan to revisit. The following *methodological *remarks by Short caught my eye for reasons that I trust are obvious. TLS: ... Lane’s readings apply the famous ‘principle of charity’: if something Peirce said, read literally, contradicts something else he said in the same writing or in closely related writings, or if it entails some obvious absurdity, then Lane concludes that that literal reading is not what Peirce meant, because it clearly could not have been what he thought. As changes in Peirce’s thought over time are thereby exposed, Lane’s method, thirdly, is to attempt to account for those changes--as much as possible on the basis of what Peirce himself said about them, but in any case on grounds of sound arguments employing ideas found in his writings. This more or less describes my approach to "harmonizing," "synthesizing," and "systematizing" Peirce's thought. It is an interpretative practice that (1) attempts to discern his intended meaning in any given passage, assuming as much as possible that it is consistent with what he wrote elsewhere; and then (2) develops new hypotheses accordingly, recognizing that they are always fallible and thus subject to good-faith criticism. Ideally, what Short's immediately subsequent paragraph says about Lane and his book would likewise be descriptive of me and my List posts. TLS: In consequence of the care and thoroughness with which Lane goes about his work, this book not only is a useful guide to the study of Peirce but will serve as a touchstone of defensible interpretation. By that I mean this. No doubt there are many points on which one may reasonably disagree with Lane, as I am sure he himself would admit; but his readings are so well-grounded that no one can hope to establish a contrary view without coming to grips with the evidence and argument Lane has provided. His book cannot be ignored. This, rather than "a definitive version of Peirce's philosophy," is the most that I could ever dare to aspire to achieve. If someone disagrees with what I post on the List--whether a particular reading of Peirce's words, or my own suggestion "inspired by" them--then the proper response is to offer a *better* argument, instead of just complaining about *mine*. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:17 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Edwina, Jerry, and Helmut, > > This discussion gets into issues that are fundamental to methodeutic. > > > JFS: All my objections would vanish if Jon would make one simple > > change: replace every occurrence of 'harmony' with 'hypothesis'. > > > > JAS: As an alternative, I respectfully request that you accept my > > explanations and not try to dictate how I express myself. > > > > ET: Jon - I don't think you realize what you are doing. There is > > no need to be so defensive about what others write to you with > > regard to your comments/interpretations! > > I'm trying to be as constructive as I can. And I hope that other > people would apply the same criteria to what I write. I would > welcome any criticism anyone may have about what I write. I may > agree or not. But that's what I would expect. > > Re harmonizing: I searched CP for all occurrences of 'harmonize' > to see what Peirce had to say, favorable or unfavorable. > > > CP 1.6. The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. > > ... I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying the > > philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science. > > But note what he wrote in the next paragraph: > > CP 1.7. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. > > The best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of > > all likelihood, in the general line of growth of scientific ideas, > > and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers. > > In short, this favorable example of harmonizing is a source for > *hypotheses* that must then be tested by scientific methodeutic. > > For a more critical comment about harmonizing, see below for an > extended excerpt from CP 5.406 to 5.408. In 5.406, Peirce praises > "The real spirit of Socrates, who I hope would have been delighted > to have been 'overcome in argument,' because he would have learned > something by it." > > Later in 5.406, Peirce is highly critical of "All the efforts of > the scholastic doctors [which] are directed toward harmonizing > their faith in Aristotle and their faith in the Church." In that > sense, their harmonization is more than a hypothesis. It's blend > of two preconceived theories, which they are trying to preserve > by any rhetorical methods they can muster. Peirce writes "they > betray their feeble hold of the conception of what truth is." > > In 5.407, Peirce states his famous definition of truth as "The > opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who > investigate." But in 5.408, he warns "Our perversity and that of > others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion; it might > even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally > accepted as long as the human race should last... [Yet] if, after > the extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties > and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be the > one which they would ultimately come to." > > In summary, harmonizing a variety of sources can be a good method > for developing a starting hypothesis. But a premature harmonization > that is not subjected to open-ended and unrestricted scientific > methodeutic can be "perversity" that blocks the way of inquiry. > > > JFS: I googled those two terms ["the Plastic Nature of Cudworth" > > and "artifex of nature"] to see how Peirce regarded the Graphist. > > > > JLRC: Thank you John, for posting this reference to Ralph Cudworth’s > > work. The online article was rather fascinating wrt. some of the > > roots of CSP’s philosophy that lies outside of logic and chemical > > logic. > > > > It is an alternate historical view of “three-ness”... and an early > > view of “system’s thinking”. > > Yes. I have found that studying Peirce's sources *and* later > developments in the 20th & 21st c. helps to put his ideas in > perspective. For the record, following is URL for Cudworth: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plastic_Principle > > HR > > But I guess it would be quite helpful to combine Peircean theories > > with something like systems theories and ontology, whether or not > > Peirce would have liked that. > > Peirce was a voracious reader, and many of his best insights came > from his reaction to what he was reading. After he moved to Arisbe, > he no longer had daily access to a research library. But his letters > to and from Lady Welby and her group had a very strong influence on > the later development of his semeiotic. > > The changes in his thoughts and subject matter are probably more > strongly affected by his reading than by a deliberate rejection of > his earlier writings. To be faithful to his legacy, we should > remember his principle that the meaning of any general is in its > implications for the future. > > John > _____________________________________________________________________ > > CP 5.406. > ... The real spirit of Socrates, who I hope would have been delighted > to have been "overcome in argument," because he would have learned > something by it, is in curious contrast with the naive idea of the > glossist, for whom (as for "the born missionary" of today) discussion > would seem to have been simply a struggle. When philosophy began to > awake from its long slumber, and before theology completely dominated > it, the practice seems to have been for each professor to seize upon any > philosophical position he found unoccupied and which seemed a strong > one, to intrench himself in it, and to sally forth from time to time to > give battle to the others... > > All the efforts of the scholastic doctors are directed toward > harmonizing their faith in Aristotle and their faith in the Church, > and one may search their ponderous folios through without finding an > argument which goes any further. It is noticeable that where different > faiths flourish side by side, renegades are looked upon with contempt > even by the party whose belief they adopt; so completely has the idea of > loyalty replaced that of truth-seeking. Since the time of Descartes, > the defect in the conception of truth has been less apparent. Still, it > will sometimes strike a scientific man that the philosophers have been > less intent on finding out what the facts are, than on inquiring what > belief is most in harmony with their system. It is hard to convince a > follower of the a priori method by adducing facts; but show him that an > opinion he is defending is inconsistent with what he has laid down > elsewhere, and he will be very apt to retract it. These minds do not > seem to believe that disputation is ever to cease; they seem to think > that the opinion which is natural for one man is not so for another, > and that belief will, consequently, never be settled. In contenting > themselves with fixing their own opinions by a method which would lead > another man to a different result, they betray their feeble hold of the > conception of what truth is. > > CP 5.407. > On the other hand, all the followers of science are animated by a > cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far > enough, will give one certain solution to each question to which they > apply it. One man may investigate the velocity of light by studying > the transits of Venus and the aberration of the stars; another by the > oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites; a third by > the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by the > motions of the curves of Lissajoux; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth, and a > ninth, may follow the different methods of comparing the measures of > statical and dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain different > results, but, as each perfects his method and his processes, the results > are found to move steadily together toward a destined centre. So > with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most > antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a > force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This > activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a > foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of > the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no > natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate > opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth and > reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by > all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object > represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would > explain reality. > > CP 5.408. > ... Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the > settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary > proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should > last. Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief, which > alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far; > and if, after the extinction of our race, another should arise with > faculties and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be > the one which they would ultimately come to. >
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