BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list
I disagree with your comment:
" If someone disagrees with what I post on the List--whether a
particular reading of Peirce's words, or my own suggestion "inspired
by" them--then the proper response is to offer a better argument,
instead of just complaining about mine."
I don't think that critique of arguments should require offering a
'better argument'; I think that a critique ought to stand on its own.
For example, I disagree with your [JAS's] argument for the semeiosic
reality of God [where you move from 'the Universe is a 'perfusion of
signs'---to 'all signs are connected and thus can be understood as A
sign [one sign] '---to 'a sign must have an external object ---- to
'JAS calls this external Object 'God'.
I don't see that I should offer a 'better argument' for this
hypothesis, since I disagree with and thus, critique each of the
steps that you take. I think a critique should logically and
factually stand on its own merits and not require a 'better argument'
to validate it.
Edwina
On Mon 24/06/19 3:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent:
John, List:
JFS: I searched CP for all occurrences of 'harmonize' to see what
Peirce had to say, favorable or unfavorable.
That is fine, but not really relevant, since I have never claimed
that what I have in mind by "harmonize" matches Peirce's usage of
that particular word. Coincidentally, a new issue [1] of
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society came out last week; and
it includes T. L. Short's generally favorable review of Robert Lane's
recent book, Peirce on Realism and Idealism, which I read more than a
year ago and now plan to revisit. The following methodological
remarks by Short caught my eye for reasons that I trust are obvious.
TLS: ... Lane’s readings apply the famous ‘principle of
charity’: if something Peirce said, read literally, contradicts
something else he said in the same writing or in closely related
writings, or if it entails some obvious absurdity, then Lane
concludes that that literal reading is not what Peirce meant, because
it clearly could not have been what he thought. As changes in
Peirce’s thought over time are thereby exposed, Lane’s method,
thirdly, is to attempt to account for those changes--as much as
possible on the basis of what Peirce himself said about them, but in
any case on grounds of sound arguments employing ideas found in his
writings.
This more or less describes my approach to "harmonizing,"
"synthesizing," and "systematizing" Peirce's thought. It is an
interpretative practice that (1) attempts to discern his intended
meaning in any given passage, assuming as much as possible that it is
consistent with what he wrote elsewhere; and then (2) develops new
hypotheses accordingly, recognizing that they are always fallible and
thus subject to good-faith criticism. Ideally, what Short's
immediately subsequent paragraph says about Lane and his book would
likewise be descriptive of me and my List posts.
TLS: In consequence of the care and thoroughness with which Lane
goes about his work, this book not only is a useful guide to the
study of Peirce but will serve as a touchstone of defensible
interpretation. By that I mean this. No doubt there are many points
on which one may reasonably disagree with Lane, as I am sure he
himself would admit; but his readings are so well-grounded that no
one can hope to establish a contrary view without coming to grips
with the evidence and argument Lane has provided. His book cannot be
ignored.
This, rather than "a definitive version of Peirce's philosophy," is
the most that I could ever dare to aspire to achieve. If someone
disagrees with what I post on the List--whether a particular reading
of Peirce's words, or my own suggestion "inspired by" them--then the
proper response is to offer a better argument, instead of just
complaining about mine.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:17 PM John F Sowa wrote:
Jon, Edwina, Jerry, and Helmut,
This discussion gets into issues that are fundamental to
methodeutic.
> JFS: All my objections would vanish if Jon would make one simple
> change: replace every occurrence of 'harmony' with 'hypothesis'.
>
> JAS: As an alternative, I respectfully request that you accept my
> explanations and not try to dictate how I express myself.
>
> ET: Jon - I don't think you realize what you are doing. There is
> no need to be so defensive about what others write to you with
> regard to your comments/interpretations!
I'm trying to be as constructive as I can. And I hope that other
people would apply the same criteria to what I write. I would
welcome any criticism anyone may have about what I write. I may
agree or not. But that's what I would expect.
Re harmonizing: I searched CP for all occurrences of 'harmonize'
to see what Peirce had to say, favorable or unfavorable.
> CP 1.6. The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me.
> ... I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying the
> philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science.
But note what he wrote in the next paragraph:
> CP 1.7. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all
moonshine.
> The best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of
> all likelihood, in the general line of growth of scientific ideas,
> and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers.
In short, this favorable example of harmonizing is a source for
*hypotheses* that must then be tested by scientific methodeutic.
For a more critical comment about harmonizing, see below for an
extended excerpt from CP 5.406 to 5.408. In 5.406, Peirce praises
"The real spirit of Socrates, who I hope would have been delighted
to have been 'overcome in argument,' because he would have learned
something by it."
Later in 5.406, Peirce is highly critical of "All the efforts of
the scholastic doctors [which] are directed toward harmonizing
their faith in Aristotle and their faith in the Church." In that
sense, their harmonization is more than a hypothesis. It's blend
of two preconceived theories, which they are trying to preserve
by any rhetorical methods they can muster. Peirce writes "they
betray their feeble hold of the conception of what truth is."
In 5.407, Peirce states his famous definition of truth as "The
opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate." But in 5.408, he warns "Our perversity and that of
others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion; it might
even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally
accepted as long as the human race should last... [Yet] if, after
the extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties
and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be the
one which they would ultimately come to."
In summary, harmonizing a variety of sources can be a good method
for developing a starting hypothesis. But a premature harmonization
that is not subjected to open-ended and unrestricted scientific
methodeutic can be "perversity" that blocks the way of inquiry.
> JFS: I googled those two terms ["the Plastic Nature of Cudworth"
> and "artifex of nature"] to see how Peirce regarded the Graphist.
>
> JLRC: Thank you John, for posting this reference to Ralph
Cudworth’s
> work. The online article was rather fascinating wrt. some of the
> roots of CSP’s philosophy that lies outside of logic and
chemical
> logic.
>
> It is an alternate historical view of “three-ness”... and an
early
> view of “system’s thinking”.
Yes. I have found that studying Peirce's sources *and* later
developments in the 20th & 21st c. helps to put his ideas in
perspective. For the record, following is URL for Cudworth:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plastic_Principle [5]
HR
> But I guess it would be quite helpful to combine Peircean theories
> with something like systems theories and ontology, whether or not
> Peirce would have liked that.
Peirce was a voracious reader, and many of his best insights came
from his reaction to what he was reading. After he moved to Arisbe,
he no longer had daily access to a research library. But his
letters
to and from Lady Welby and her group had a very strong influence on
the later development of his semeiotic.
The changes in his thoughts and subject matter are probably more
strongly affected by his reading than by a deliberate rejection of
his earlier writings. To be faithful to his legacy, we should
remember his principle that the meaning of any general is in its
implications for the future.
John
_____________________________________________________________________
CP 5.406.
... The real spirit of Socrates, who I hope would have been
delighted
to have been "overcome in argument," because he would have learned
something by it, is in curious contrast with the naive idea of the
glossist, for whom (as for "the born missionary" of today)
discussion
would seem to have been simply a struggle. When philosophy began to
awake from its long slumber, and before theology completely
dominated
it, the practice seems to have been for each professor to seize upon
any
philosophical position he found unoccupied and which seemed a strong
one, to intrench himself in it, and to sally forth from time to time
to
give battle to the others...
All the efforts of the scholastic doctors are directed toward
harmonizing their faith in Aristotle and their faith in the Church,
and one may search their ponderous folios through without finding an
argument which goes any further. It is noticeable that where
different
faiths flourish side by side, renegades are looked upon with
contempt
even by the party whose belief they adopt; so completely has the
idea of
loyalty replaced that of truth-seeking. Since the time of
Descartes,
the defect in the conception of truth has been less apparent.
Still, it
will sometimes strike a scientific man that the philosophers have
been
less intent on finding out what the facts are, than on inquiring
what
belief is most in harmony with their system. It is hard to convince
a
follower of the a priori method by adducing facts; but show him that
an
opinion he is defending is inconsistent with what he has laid down
elsewhere, and he will be very apt to retract it. These minds do
not
seem to believe that disputation is ever to cease; they seem to
think
that the opinion which is natural for one man is not so for another,
and that belief will, consequently, never be settled. In contenting
themselves with fixing their own opinions by a method which would
lead
another man to a different result, they betray their feeble hold of
the
conception of what truth is.
CP 5.407.
On the other hand, all the followers of science are animated by a
cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed
far
enough, will give one certain solution to each question to which
they
apply it. One man may investigate the velocity of light by studying
the transits of Venus and the aberration of the stars; another by
the
oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites; a
third by
the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by the
motions of the curves of Lissajoux; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth,
and a
ninth, may follow the different methods of comparing the measures of
statical and dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain
different
results, but, as each perfects his method and his processes, the
results
are found to move steadily together toward a destined centre. So
with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the
most
antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them
by a
force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This
activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but
to a
foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No
modification of
the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no
natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the
predestinate
opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth and
reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would
explain reality.
CP 5.408.
... Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the
settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary
proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race
should
last. Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief,
which
alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far;
and if, after the extinction of our race, another should arise with
faculties and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must
be
the one which they would ultimately come to.
Links:
------
[1] https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.55.issue-1
[2] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[3] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plastic_Principle
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