Gary R., List: I have no desire to engage in yet another round of debates about CP 6.24-25. I fully agree with your excellent summary below, as well as your subsequent posts. Peirce's position is quite plainly stated in the text itself--not dualism, neutralism, or materialism, but idealism; specifically, objective idealism, which holds "the psychical law alone as primordial" and "that matter is effete mind."
Your comments about Deacon reflect remarks that I came across recently in a 2012 paper <https://www.pucsp.br/pragmatismo/dowloads/lectures_papers/mattew-moore-paper.pdf> by Matthew E. Moore--"We who are already convinced of Peirce’s greatness tend to forget how impenetrable he can look to the rest of the human race. The conceptual overhead of Peirce’s philosophy is almost prohibitively high ..." I suspect that this contributes to at least some of the recurring disputes here on the List--each of us has absorbed different amounts and different portions of that vast "conceptual overhead"--and I have found it to be a formidable obstacle to overcome whenever I want to explain Peirce to a non-Peircean. The "curse of knowledge <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curse_of_knowledge>" comes into play; I tend to forget that others are utterly unfamiliar with certain ideas and principles that I have come to take for granted. Moore went on to suggest that "we will need at least something answering to his categories and his theory of signs if we are to get much philosophical mileage out of Peirce," and the purpose of that particular paper is to question whether "the continuum" also needs to be included, as Peirce seemed to believe. What else (if anything) qualifies as bare minimum for understanding and appreciating Peirce's thought overall? What resources (if any) have you and others found especially helpful for enabling the uninitiated to get up to speed? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 3:46 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, list, > > Edwina wrote: "My only quibble with the title is 'How Mind Emerged from > Matter'. My own view is that neither was primary; both emerged and > function together." > > I also would quibble--perhaps more than quibble--with Deacon's subtitle. > But, and following Peirce's view--objective idealism--I see mind as > primordial. > > Seeing matter as primordial Peirce terms 'materialism', a view which he > rejects as "repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it > requires us to suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel." > > He also rejects the third option which you support: that the two arose > together, which was then, apparently, referred to as 'monism' but which > Peirce prefers to call 'neutralism'. He 'condemns' monism-neutralism on the > basis of "Ockham's razor": "By placing the inward and outward aspects of > substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial." > > For Peirce the universe does not commence as a peculiar kind of 2ns with *the > laws* of mind and matter 'arising' together and co-equal. > > CP 6.24-25 (1890) The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so > prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, > will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some > form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises > whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the other > are to be taken -- > > (a) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I would name > neutralism; or, > > (b) the psychical *law *as derived and special, the physical law alone as > primordial, which is materialism; or, > > (c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as > primordial, which is idealism. > > The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific > logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a certain > kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis absolutely > irreducible to reason -- an ultimate, inexplicable regularity; while the > only possible justification of any theory is that it should make things > clear and reasonable. > > Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as > Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed > than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a > par, it seems to render both primordial. > > The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, > that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. But > before this can be accepted it must show itself capable of explaining the > tridimensionality of space, the laws of motion, and the general > characteristics of the universe, with mathematical clearness and precision; > for no less should be demanded of every philosophy. (Boldface added to > emphasize that Peirce is discussing *laws* throughout.) > > ('Objective idealism' was recently discussed in another thread here.) > > As brilliant a thinker as Deacon is, he appears to some, including me, to > be a kind of "partial Peirceian," to some I've spoken with, even a "thief > of Peirce," an expression Walker Percy used to describe his own use of > Peirce: that is, using what is useful to ones own argument and ignoring or > discarding what is not. I tend to think of him as much more the former than > the latter, for his understanding of Peircean semeiotics seems to me > partial (although he uses some of Peircean thinking well in *Incomplete > Nature*, although not very much of his semeiotic). But even if his > understanding of Peirce seems partial and 'incomplete', he appears to me to > make a good faith attempt to be true to his ownunderstanding. > > This partial understanding was apparent even in consideration of his first > book, *The Symbolic Species*, and I recall discussions with several > Peirceans at an ICCS conference at the UAH in Huntsville, Alabama, a number > of years ago who found his thinking both stimulating in some regards, but > also somewhat superficial in consideration of some well-established > Peircean principles. > > I will have more to say on *Incomplete Nature* (and its unfortunate > subtitle) including his novel use of 'constraint'. But I'm unexpecedly away > from my downtown desk and do not have my copy of* Incomplete Nature *with > me uptown where I am about to be entertaining out of town guests. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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