John, list,
John concluded: I believe that Edwina's point
is consistent with Peirce, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Potter,
and others.
Please offer some--*any*--textual support for this loose, really flaccid
statement, this broad, altogether meaningless generalization. Without such
support your post amounts to little more than unsubstantiated opinion: mere
opinion.
I know these four thinkers well, and would draw very different broad
generalizations from their work (although I think the entire exercise of
such generalizing is foolish), and wouldn't even think of doing it if I
didn't think your post, and especially its conclusion, were so completely
wrong and misleading.
"Edwina's point" is clearly *not at all* consistent, but rather *completely
inconsistent* with Peirce's as is clear from the texts I earlier quoted.
That is for anyone possessing an open and unbiased mind. This statement of
yours is, however, more or less correct:
JFS: Edwina's statement is close to Whitehead's _Process and Reality_.
Whitehead's actual entities, his basic elements of existence,
combine aspects of both mind and matter.
However, your claiming that "Edwina's point is consistent with Peirce" borders
on the absurd, indeed, on the ridiculous. Peirce's position is that:
". . .the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as
primordial, which is idealism."
"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism,
that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws."
Disagree with Peirce as much as you want, but you must admit that Edwina's
'point' is anything but that, that is, her position is tantamount to one of
the three ("neutralism") which Peirce rejected. Edwina in fact seemingly
absolutely rejects Peirce's view.
Whitehead's views of God and religion have almost nothing at all to do with
Peirce's and are quite idiosyncratic by anyone's standards. So, for
example, in *Process and Reality* he says things like:
"It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that
the World is permanent and God is fluent.
"It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World
is one and God many.
"It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actual
eminently, as that, in comparison with God, the World is actual eminently.
"It is as true to say that the World is immanent
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanent> in God, as that God is immanent in
the World.
"It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World
transcends God.
"It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates
God
These are statements which Peirce would never say. There is no place for
religion in Whitehead's metaphysics; and while there is a place for 'God',
it is altogether idiosyncratic.
Father Potter's views on religion are *far* closer to Peirce's than to
Whitehead's-- given the latter's intense criticism of Christianity--as to
be at almost opposite ends of the religions/theological spectrum. I'll have
more to say on this when I can refer to Potter's essays in *Charles S.
Peirce: On Norms and Ideals*, and other works.
Hartshorne's views on religion were complex, and while he was most
certainly deeply influenced by Whitehead's process philosophy, he was also
influenced by Peirce, James, Royce, and Bergson. There's more to be said
here too.
JFS wrote: Finally, the question of whether matter or mind came first is
meaningless. Time is only defined in a material universe.
Without matter, there is no before or after.
It was clearly *not *meaningless to Peirce. The question is of primal
origins: cosmogenesis. The 1898 lectures (and even Edwina's oft referenced
passage at 6.348) consider what *migh*t have 'preceded' the so-called 'Big
Bang' (although Peirce reserves the language of Time for a later stage of
the universe's unfolding, even as doing so is virtually impossible: e.g.,
'before' the Big Bang as a contemporary person might say).
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 11:13 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote:
> Gary and Edwina,
>
> GR
> > following Peirce's view--objective idealism--I see mind as primordial.
> > Seeing matter as primordial Peirce terms 'materialism', a view which
> > he rejects as "repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense
>
> ET
> > To say that 'matter is effete mind' does NOT mean that Mind is
> > primordial' - which would be pure idealism. To me, it means that
> > the psychical only exists 'as' matter' and that matter only exists
> > as an articulation of Mind. Again - that does not suggest that
> > either is primordial.
>
> Edwina's statement is close to Whitehead's _Process and Reality_.
> Whitehead's actual entities, his basic elements of existence,
> combine aspects of both mind and matter.
>
> Hartshorne was the primary editor of CP vol. 6, but he adopted
> Whitehead's process philosophy as a basis for his own Process
> Theology. I don't know much about Hartshorne's theology, but
> I note that Vincent Potter (1995) agreed with the criticisms of
> Peirce's metaphysics by Hartshorne (1995).
>
> As a Jesuit priest who wrote extensively about Peirce, Potter was
> well qualified to judge Hartshorne's comments with quite a bit of
> sympathy for Peirce. Yet he sympathized with Hartshorne criticisms
> of Peirce's version.
>
> Finally, the question of whether matter or mind came first is
> meaningless. Time is only defined in a material universe.
> Without matter, there is no before or after.
>
> In summary, all the above theories are consistent with the
> equation of Theos and Logos. I believe that Edwina's point
> is consistent with Peirce, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Potter,
> and others.
>
> John
>
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