Edwina, list, You wrote:
ET: I agree with you about Terry Deacon's 'superficial' use [and understanding] of Peirce. GR: I think that it's possible that Deacon just hadn't yet read enough Peirce. But there are places in which he puts Peirce's thought to good use. However, as I earlier wrote, I won't discuss this matter until I have* Incomplete Nature* (and my notes in my copy of it) in front of me. ET: I disagree with you about your considering that 'objective idealism' is equivalent to 'idealism, where 'the psychical law' is primordial. And my view of Peirce is that his 'objective idealism' means that both the physical and the psychical are 'basic' - which is NOT the same as 'primordial' but that the one cannot exist without the other. GR: I completely disagree with you that Peirce does not see 'objective idealism' as a form of 'idealism'. After all, in the passages I quoted, and even before mentioning 'objective idealism', he gives as one of his three alternatives, this: "(c) the physical law as derived and special, *the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism*." I really don't see how that could be any clearer. You may disagree with it, but this is how Peirce saw it. (All emphasis added.) ET: To say that 'matter is effete mind' does NOT mean that Mind is primordial' - which would be pure idealism. To me, it means that the psychical only exists 'as' matter' and that matter only exists as an articulation of Mind. Again - that does not suggest that either is primordial. GR: That may be your opinion, and you are free to hold it, but it was not Peirce's (again, see the snippet just above). ET: As Peirce noted 'the primal state' is 'the unsettled' [6.348] and certainly, such a description can't be leveled at either Mind or Matter. GR: I read this passage different. Here's the entire paragraph: CP 6.348 Modern thought has been extravagantly Ockhamistic, owing to the accidental circumstance that, at the revival of learning, the obscurantists, the fogeys, were adherents of Duns, of whom the politician Ockham was the typical opponent. But this had come about because, in those days of precise, if shallow, thinking, the Scotistic doctrine had emerged triumphant from all the scholastic disputations, of which the reformers of learning had but the dimmest idea. Get rid, thoughtful Reader, of the Ockhamistic prejudice of political partizenship that in thought, in being, and in development the indefinite is due to a degeneration from a primary state of perfect definiteness. The truth is rather on the side of the scholastic realists that the unsettled is the primal state, and that definiteness and determinateness, the two poles of settledness, are, in the large, approximations, developmentally, epistemologically, and metaphysically. GR: This is Peirce's analysis of a moment in the history of logic where by "accidental circumstance" Duns Scotus' views were , unfortunately, held by "the obscurantists, the fogeys," who were opposed "in those days of *precise, if shallow,* thinking" by the politicians, the Ockhamists. But a correct understanding is that Scotus' scholastic realism *required* fallibility, indefiniteness (or vagueness), what Peirce would consider the reality of 1ns (for him, eventually, as Lane explicates in his book, even the reality of possibles). In short, scholastic realism, clearly grasped, stood for nothing 'definite' or 'determined', nothing so rigid and, as it were, 'complete' as that which the politicians thought constituted 'precise thinking'. GR: This is a very different matter than Peirce's incontrovertible statement that your view (i.e., that both matter and mind arise together--monism or neutralism) is to be rejected because it places "the inward and outward aspects of substance on a par [rendering] both primordial." You may disagree with it, but that was Peirce's view. ET: And as I've frequently noted - Peirce's outline of the development of the cosmos [1.412] also refers to the primordial as 'indeterminacy'. "Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firsntess, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash....then there would have come other successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendcy to take them ever strengthening themselves, ".... ET: I think that the above is a clear outline of the co-development of Mind and Matter - and neither is primordial. And certainly, neither is independent of the other but - co-dependent. // /To me - this is what 'objective idealism' means. GR: You always and, as you wrote, 'frequently' point to this passage [1.412], and never to Peirce's later one (it is not in the CP but can be found in EP:2) which appears in the last lecture of the 1898 lecture series, as his definitive position as to the origin of things. But in that 1898 analysis in the lecture, it is not 1ns, but continuity, 3ns, which is primordial: the primordial "womb of indeterminacy" is not 1ns, but rather 3ns; that is, Mind. 1ns 'flashes' on the "blackboard" of continuity, 3ns. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 5:21 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary,list > > I agree with you about Terry Deacon's 'superficial' use [and > understanding] of Peirce. > > I disagree with you about your considering that 'objective idealism' is > equivalent to 'idealism, where 'the psychical law' is primordial. And my > view of Peirce is that his 'objective idealism' means that both the > physical and the psychical are 'basic' - which is NOT the same as > 'primordial' but that the one cannot exist without the other. > > To say that 'matter is effete mind' does NOT mean that Mind is primordial' > - which would be pure idealism. To me, it means that the psychical only > exists 'as' matter' and that matter only exists as an articulation of Mind. > Again - that does not suggest that either is primordial. > > As Peirce noted 'the primal state' is 'the unsettled' [6.348] and > certainly, such a description can't be leveled at either Mind or Matter. > > And as I've frequently noted - Peirce's outline of the development of the > cosmos [1.412] also refers to the primordial as 'indeterminacy'. "Out of > the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come > something, by the principle of Firsntess, which we may call a flash. Then > by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash....then > there would have come other successions ever more and more closely > connected, the habits and the tendcy to take them ever strengthening > themselves, ".... > > I think that the above is a clear outline of the co-development of Mind > and Matter - and neither is primordial. And certainly, neither is > independent of the other but - co-dependent. > > To me - this is what 'objective idealism' means. > > Edwina > > > > > Edwina, list, > > Edwina wrote: "My only quibble with the title is 'How Mind Emerged from > Matter'. My own view is that neither was primary; both emerged and > function together." > > I also would quibble--perhaps more than quibble--with Deacon's subtitle. > But, and following Peirce's view--objective idealism--I see mind as > primordial. > > Seeing matter as primordial Peirce terms 'materialism', a view which he > rejects as "repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it > requires us to suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel." > > He also rejects the third option which you support: that the two arose > together, which was then, apparently, referred to as 'monism' but which > Peirce prefers to call 'neutralism'. He 'condemns' monism-neutralism on the > basis of "Ockham's razor": "By placing the inward and outward aspects of > substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial." > > For Peirce the universe does not commence as a peculiar kind of 2ns with the > laws of mind and matter 'arising' together and co-equal. > > CP 6.24-25 (1890) The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so > prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, > will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some > form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises > whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the other > are to be taken -- > > (a) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I would name > neutralism; or, > > (b) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone as > primordial, which is materialism; or, > > (c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as > primordial, which is idealism. > > The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific > logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a certain > kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis absolutely > irreducible to reason -- an ultimate, inexplicable regularity; while the > only possible justification of any theory is that it should make things > clear and reasonable. > > Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as > Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed > than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a > par, it seems to render both primordial. > > The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, > that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. But > before this can be accepted it must show itself capable of explaining the > tridimensionality of space, the laws of motion, and the general > characteristics of the universe, with mathematical clearness and precision; > for no less should be demanded of every philosophy. (Boldface added to > emphasize that Peirce is discussing laws throughout.) > > ('Objective idealism' was recently discussed in another thread here.) > > As brilliant a thinker as Deacon is, he appears to some, including me, to > be a kind of "partial Peirceian," to some I've spoken with, even a "thief > of Peirce," an expression Walker Percy used to describe his own use of > Peirce: that is, using what is useful to ones own argument and ignoring or > discarding what is not. I tend to think of him as much more the former than > the latter, for his understanding of Peircean semeiotics seems to me > partial (although he uses some of Peircean thinking well in Incomplete > Nature, although not very much of his semeiotic). But even if his > understanding of Peirce seems partial and 'incomplete', he appears to me to > make a good faith attempt to be true to his ownunderstanding. > > This partial understanding was apparent even in consideration of his first > book, The Symbolic Species, and I recall discussions with several > Peirceans at an ICCS conference at the UAH in Huntsville, Alabama, a number > of years ago who found his thinking both stimulating in some regards, but > also somewhat superficial in consideration of some well-established > Peircean principles. > > I will have more to say on Incomplete Nature (and its unfortunate > subtitle) including his novel use of 'constraint'. But I'm unexpecedly away > from my downtown desk and do not have my copy of Incomplete Nature with > me uptown where I am about to be entertaining out of town guests. > > Best, > > Gary > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 7:50 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Exactly- Peircean semiosis, with its three modal categories and their >> subsets [1-1, 2-2; 2-1; 3-3; 3-2; 3-1]; and the semiosic process of >> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI, functions as a Complex Adaptive System [CAS]. >> >> This is exactly as described, a self-organizing system with anticipation, >> adaptation and both stability and novelty. My only quibble with the title >> is 'How Mind Emerged from Matter'. My own view is that neither was primary; >> both emerged and function together. After all - you can't have matter >> without Mind, i.e., without an organizational pattern - even of the basic >> atom; and certainly, I reject any concept of Mind as an a priori reality >> and/or as existing without being articulated as Matter. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> On Thu 01/08/19 12:40 AM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: >> >> List, >> >> In the online 'Semiotics Research Group', Cary Campbell posted this video >> of a lecture by Terrence Deacon at the University of Tartu. >> >> The video of Terrence Deacon's (University of California, Berkeley) "The >> bridge from information theory to semiosis", 15.07.2019 available to see on >> UTTV at https://www.uttv.ee/naita?id=28688 >> <https://www.uttv.ee/naita?id=28688&fbclid=IwAR3gAqtFXExboW-r9Eosbt9HknhBp1cjME4NhEPE3XyqcgYal_o4x4xBRa0> >> >> >> Several years ago Gary Fuhrman and I considered discussing on Peirce-L >> Deacon's difficult but, in our opinion, critically important book, Incomplete >> Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. >> [image: Blocked image] >> We finally decided that it would probably prove too challenging to >> discuss it in an online forum (considering, for example, its length, and >> the difficulties posed by some of Deacon's neologisms, terms necessary to >> characterize several concepts he introduces in the book necessary to set >> forth his argument). So while the book is deeply informed by Peircean >> semeiotics (as was his earlier book, The Symbolic Species), we dropped >> the idea of an online discussion, concluding that it would probably be of >> interest only to a very few here, such as those grounded in certain facets >> of information and systems theory in its relation to biosemiotics. >> >> The video offers, among other things, an excellent introduction to Incomplete >> Nature. Here is an excerpt from a review of it in The New York Review of >> Books: >> >> Terrence W. Deacon approaches these questions [such as the origin of >> life] with the apparatus of dynamic systems theory, which describes the >> operations of complex systems that are autonomous, self-maintaining, stable >> over time, and resistant to the tendency toward disorder called entropy. >> The model of such systems, at a primitive level, is the biological cell, >> which makes up further more complex dynamic systems such as organs and >> whole organisms. The cell maintains its integrity over time by means of an >> enclosing membrane that is selectively permeable, letting in only such >> molecules as will serve its self-preserving needs: performing basic >> metabolism and expelling waste products. It is a self-organizing unit >> (unlike a humanly constructed machine) that admits of teleological >> description—it has goals toward which its activities tend—and that contains >> the essential ingredients of life. One of its central capacities is >> counteracting the effects of the second law of thermodynamics: it creates >> order and resists chaos. >> https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/06/07/can-anything-emerge-nothing/ >> >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> >> >> >> >
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