BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list
I am not persuaded by your argument. Objective Idealism is not the
same as neutralism and I specifically rejected it. It is not the same
as Idealism. My understanding of the term of 'objective idealism' is
that it includes matter and mind as correlates of existential
reality. Neither are primordial but co-evolve. This is not neutralism
for neither are independent of each other. It is not materialism since
Matter is not primordial. It is not idealism since Mind is not
primordial. It is objective idealism, which to my understanding of
the many, many references that Peirce makes to the two [Mind and
Matter] means that the two don't have any reality or existence in
themselves except as integral correlates and producers of the world.
Please note - that I did not say that Peirce said "that Peirce does
not see objective idealism as a FORM of idealism' [my emphasis].
Peirce specifically rejected the 'psychical law alone as primordial,
which is idealism'. 6.24.
Objective idealism also rejects 'the psychical law ALONE as
primordial'. That's why it is OBJECTIVE idealism, which includes the
objective world of matter with the mental processes of Mind.
And it rejects neutralism, where both are primordial and separate. I
am surprised why you think that I believe in neutralism, for my view
that both matter and mind co-evolve is NOT neutralism.
I consider that you are ignoring the meaning of the term: objective
idealism - which is not a synonym of 'idealism'.
What is 'first'? Firstness is first - and he's outlined this often
enough as well. After all - if the 'unsettled is the primal state'
6.348, then this primal state is neither Matter nor Mind. The
unsettled - is Firstness. Unsettled does not mean 3ns - which is,
after all, a process of the organization of habits which are an
action of 'settling'.
I also strongly disagree that 3ns, or Mind, is primordial. That is
pure idealism - and Peirce was very specific. He did NOT say
'idealism' but OBJECTIVE idealism.
Edwina
On Fri 02/08/19 1:30 AM , Gary Richmond [email protected]
sent:
Edwina, list,
You wrote:
ET: I agree with you about Terry Deacon's 'superficial' use [and
understanding] of Peirce.
GR: I think that it's possible that Deacon just hadn't yet read
enough Peirce. But there are places in which he puts Peirce's thought
to good use. However, as I earlier wrote, I won't discuss this matter
until I have Incomplete Nature (and my notes in my copy of it) in
front of me.
ET: I disagree with you about your considering that 'objective
idealism' is equivalent to 'idealism, where 'the psychical law' is
primordial. And my view of Peirce is that his 'objective idealism'
means that both the physical and the psychical are 'basic' - which is
NOT the same as 'primordial' but that the one cannot exist without the
other.
GR: I completely disagree with you that Peirce does not see
'objective idealism' as a form of 'idealism'. After all, in the
passages I quoted, and even before mentioning 'objective idealism',
he gives as one of his three alternatives, this: "(c) the physical
law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial,
which is idealism." I really don't see how that could be any clearer.
You may disagree with it, but this is how Peirce saw it. (All emphasis
added.)
ET: To say that 'matter is effete mind' does NOT mean that Mind is
primordial' - which would be pure idealism. To me, it means that the
psychical only exists 'as' matter' and that matter only exists as an
articulation of Mind. Again - that does not suggest that either is
primordial.
GR: That may be your opinion, and you are free to hold it, but it
was not Peirce's (again, see the snippet just above).
ET: As Peirce noted 'the primal state' is 'the unsettled' [6.348]
and certainly, such a description can't be leveled at either Mind or
Matter.
GR: I read this passage different. Here's the entire paragraph:
CP 6.348 Modern thought has been extravagantly Ockhamistic, owing to
the accidental circumstance that, at the revival of learning, the
obscurantists, the fogeys, were adherents of Duns, of whom the
politician Ockham was the typical opponent. But this had come about
because, in those days of precise, if shallow, thinking, the
Scotistic doctrine had emerged triumphant from all the scholastic
disputations, of which the reformers of learning had but the dimmest
idea. Get rid, thoughtful Reader, of the Ockhamistic prejudice of
political partizenship that in thought, in being, and in development
the indefinite is due to a degeneration from a primary state of
perfect definiteness. The truth is rather on the side of the
scholastic realists that the unsettled is the primal state, and that
definiteness and determinateness, the two poles of settledness, are,
in the large, approximations, developmentally, epistemologically, and
metaphysically.
GR: This is Peirce's analysis of a moment in the history of logic
where by "accidental circumstance" Duns Scotus' views were ,
unfortunately, held by "the obscurantists, the fogeys," who were
opposed "in those days of precise, if shallow, thinking" by the
politicians, the Ockhamists. But a correct understanding is that
Scotus' scholastic realism required fallibility, indefiniteness (or
vagueness), what Peirce would consider the reality of 1ns (for him,
eventually, as Lane explicates in his book, even the reality of
possibles). In short, scholastic realism, clearly grasped, stood for
nothing 'definite' or 'determined', nothing so rigid and, as it were,
'complete' as that which the politicians thought constituted 'precise
thinking'.
GR: This is a very different matter than Peirce's incontrovertible
statement that your view (i.e., that both matter and mind arise
together--monism or neutralism) is to be rejected because it places
"the inward and outward aspects of substance on a par [rendering]
both primordial." You may disagree with it, but that was Peirce's
view.
ET: And as I've frequently noted - Peirce's outline of the
development of the cosmos [1.412] also refers to the primordial as
'indeterminacy'. "Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that
there would have come something, by the principle of Firsntess,
which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would
have been a second flash....then there would have come other
successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the
tendcy to take them ever strengthening themselves, "....
ET: I think that the above is a clear outline of the co-development
of Mind and Matter - and neither is primordial. And certainly,
neither is independent of the other but - co-dependent. // /To me -
this is what 'objective idealism' means.
GR: You always and, as you wrote, 'frequently' point to this passage
[1.412], and never to Peirce's later one (it is not in the CP but can
be found in EP:2) which appears in the last lecture of the 1898
lecture series, as his definitive position as to the origin of
things. But in that 1898 analysis in the lecture, it is not 1ns, but
continuity, 3ns, which is primordial: the primordial "womb of
indeterminacy" is not 1ns, but rather 3ns; that is, Mind. 1ns
'flashes' on the "blackboard" of continuity, 3ns.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 5:21 PM Edwina Taborsky < [email protected]
[1]> wrote:
Gary,list
I agree with you about Terry Deacon's 'superficial' use [and
understanding] of Peirce.
I disagree with you about your considering that 'objective idealism'
is equivalent to 'idealism, where 'the psychical law' is primordial.
And my view of Peirce is that his 'objective idealism' means that
both the physical and the psychical are 'basic' - which is NOT the
same as 'primordial' but that the one cannot exist without the other.
To say that 'matter is effete mind' does NOT mean that Mind is
primordial' - which would be pure idealism. To me, it means that the
psychical only exists 'as' matter' and that matter only exists as an
articulation of Mind. Again - that does not suggest that either is
primordial.
As Peirce noted 'the primal state' is 'the unsettled' [6.348] and
certainly, such a description can't be leveled at either Mind or
Matter.
And as I've frequently noted - Peirce's outline of the development
of the cosmos [1.412] also refers to the primordial as
'indeterminacy'. "Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that
there would have come something, by the principle of Firsntess,
which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would
have been a second flash....then there would have come other
successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the
tendcy to take them ever strengthening themselves, "....
I think that the above is a clear outline of the co-development of
Mind and Matter - and neither is primordial. And certainly, neither
is independent of the other but - co-dependent.
To me - this is what 'objective idealism' means.
Edwina
Edwina, list,
Edwina wrote: "My only quibble with the title is 'How Mind Emerged
from Matter'. My own view is that neither was primary; both emerged
and function together."
I also would quibble--perhaps more than quibble--with Deacon's
subtitle. But, and following Peirce's view--objective idealism--I see
mind as primordial.
Seeing matter as primordial Peirce terms 'materialism', a view which
he rejects as "repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since
it requires us to suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel."
He also rejects the third option which you support: that the two
arose together, which was then, apparently, referred to as 'monism'
but which Peirce prefers to call 'neutralism'. He 'condemns'
monism-neutralism on the basis of "Ockham's razor": "By placing the
inward and outward aspects of substance on a par, it seems to render
both primordial."
For Peirce the universe does not commence as a peculiar kind of 2ns
with the laws of mind and matter 'arising' together and co-equal.
CP 6.24-25 (1890) The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so
prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of
substance, will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are
driven to some form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the
question arises whether physical laws on the one hand and the
psychical law on the other are to be taken --
(a) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I
would name neutralism; or,
(b) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone
as primordial, which is materialism; or,
(c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone
as primordial, which is idealism.
The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to
scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose
that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a
hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason -- an ultimate,
inexplicable regularity; while the only possible justification of any
theory is that it should make things clear and reasonable.
Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as
Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be
supposed than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of
substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial.
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective
idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws. But before this can be accepted it must show itself
capable of explaining the tridimensionality of space, the laws of
motion, and the general characteristics of the universe, with
mathematical clearness and precision; for no less should be demanded
of every philosophy. (Boldface added to emphasize that Peirce is
discussing laws throughout.)
('Objective idealism' was recently discussed in another thread
here.)
As brilliant a thinker as Deacon is, he appears to some, including
me, to be a kind of "partial Peirceian," to some I've spoken with,
even a "thief of Peirce," an expression Walker Percy used to describe
his own use of Peirce: that is, using what is useful to ones own
argument and ignoring or discarding what is not. I tend to think of
him as much more the former than the latter, for his understanding of
Peircean semeiotics seems to me partial (although he uses some of
Peircean thinking well in Incomplete Nature, although not very much
of his semeiotic). But even if his understanding of Peirce seems
partial and 'incomplete', he appears to me to make a good faith
attempt to be true to his ownunderstanding.
This partial understanding was apparent even in consideration of his
first book, The Symbolic Species, and I recall discussions with
several Peirceans at an ICCS conference at the UAH in Huntsville,
Alabama, a number of years ago who found his thinking both
stimulating in some regards, but also somewhat superficial in
consideration of some well-established Peircean principles.
I will have more to say on Incomplete Nature (and its unfortunate
subtitle) including his novel use of 'constraint'. But I'm
unexpecedly away from my downtown desk and do not have my copy of
Incomplete Nature with me uptown where I am about to be entertaining
out of town guests.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 7:50 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Exactly- Peircean semiosis, with its three modal categories and
their subsets [1-1, 2-2; 2-1; 3-3; 3-2; 3-1]; and the semiosic
process of DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI, functions as a Complex Adaptive System
[CAS].
This is exactly as described, a self-organizing system with
anticipation, adaptation and both stability and novelty. My only
quibble with the title is 'How Mind Emerged from Matter'. My own view
is that neither was primary; both emerged and function together. After
all - you can't have matter without Mind, i.e., without an
organizational pattern - even of the basic atom; and certainly, I
reject any concept of Mind as an a priori reality and/or as existing
without being articulated as Matter.
Edwina
On Thu 01/08/19 12:40 AM , Gary Richmond [email protected]
sent:
List,
In the online 'Semiotics Research Group', Cary Campbell posted this
video of a lecture by Terrence Deacon at the University of Tartu.
The video of Terrence Deacon's (University of California, Berkeley)
"The bridge from information theory to semiosis", 15.07.2019 available
to see on UTTV at https://www.uttv.ee/naita?id=28688
Several years ago Gary Fuhrman and I considered discussing on
Peirce-L Deacon's difficult but, in our opinion, critically important
book, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter.
We finally decided that it would probably prove too challenging to
discuss it in an online forum (considering, for example, its length,
and the difficulties posed by some of Deacon's neologisms, terms
necessary to characterize several concepts he introduces in the book
necessary to set forth his argument). So while the book is deeply
informed by Peircean semeiotics (as was his earlier book, The
Symbolic Species), we dropped the idea of an online discussion,
concluding that it would probably be of interest only to a very few
here, such as those grounded in certain facets of information and
systems theory in its relation to biosemiotics.
The video offers, among other things, an excellent introduction to
Incomplete Nature. Here is an excerpt from a review of it in The New
York Review of Books:
Terrence W. Deacon approaches these questions [such as the origin
of life] with the apparatus of dynamic systems theory, which
describes the operations of complex systems that are autonomous,
self-maintaining, stable over time, and resistant to the tendency
toward disorder called entropy. The model of such systems, at a
primitive level, is the biological cell, which makes up further more
complex dynamic systems such as organs and whole organisms. The cell
maintains its integrity over time by means of an enclosing membrane
that is selectively permeable, letting in only such molecules as will
serve its self-preserving needs: performing basic metabolism and
expelling waste products. It is a self-organizing unit (unlike a
humanly constructed machine) that admits of teleological
description—it has goals toward which its activities tend—and
that contains the essential ingredients of life. One of its central
capacities is counteracting the effects of the second law of
thermodynamics: it creates order and resists chaos.
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/06/07/can-anything-emerge-nothing/
[2]
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/06/07/can-anything-emerge-nothing/
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
