List, Re: synechism, I should add that Peirce elsewhere wrote:
It is that synthesis of tychism and of pragmatism for which I long ago proposed the name, Synechism (1906, CP 4.584). 'Tychism' and 'Pragmatism' in a synthesis named 'Synechism? What could that mean? Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 2:27 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > JAS: > > - The fundamental constitution of being as a continuum reflects > *synechism*. > - The ongoing sequences of events involving spontaneity, reactions, > and (non-absolute) habits reflect *tychism*. > - The overall evolution of states from "unpersonalized feeling" to > "dead matter" (as theoretical limits) reflects *idealism*. > > Perhaps I'm comparing apples and oranges here, but synechism, tychism, and > idealism seems a strange trio and certainly, or at least, most probably not > a categorial trichotomy at all. > > For one thing, while synechism is surely categorially 3ns, both tychism > and idealism are, at least in my thinking, associated with 1ns. So from the > trichotomic (trikonic) standpoint, there are two 1ns and no 2ns. But > perhaps your inclusion of idealism here hasn't anything to do with > categoriality. > > Moreover, in "Evolutionary Love" Peirce gives this trichotomy as "three > modes of evolution": > > tychism (1ns) "evolution by fortuitous variation" > |> agapism (3ns) "evolution by creative love" > anacism (2ns) "evolution by mechanical necessity" (EP1:362) > > (Incidentally, Peirce says that both anacasm and tychasm are degenerate > forms of agapasm.) > > Now certainly agapism (agapastic evolution "by creative love") cannot be > exactly equated with synechism ("the tendency to regard everything as > continuous," EP2:1) , but it seems clear enough that they are both primary > examples of 3ns. > > A possible trikon employing synechism might be: > > chance (1ns) > |> synechism (3ns) > brute reaction (2ns) > > . . . the characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist > upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to secure to thirdness its > really commanding function, I [find it indispensable] that it is a third, > and that Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other > elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have > anything upon which to operate. Accordingly, I like to call my theory > Synechism, > because it rests on the study of continuity (RLT 261; CP 6.202; in > Commens Dictionary) > > > So, again, while you may have something quite different in mind relating > synechism, tychism, and idealism, I'm not at all clear exactly what that is. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > On Fri, Aug 9, 2019 at 12:18 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> List: >> >> This is just a brief (and now slightly modified) addendum to my >> cosmological summary. It occurred to me that each account can be >> associated with a key component of Peirce's overall metaphysics. >> >> - The fundamental constitution of being as a continuum reflects >> *synechism*. >> - The ongoing sequences of events involving spontaneity, reactions, >> and (non-absolute) habits reflect *tychism*. >> - The overall evolution of states from "unpersonalized feeling" to >> "dead matter" (as theoretical limits) reflects *idealism*. >> >> The order even matches how Peirce evidently prioritized these three >> doctrines. >> >> CSP: Permit me further to say that I object to having my metaphysical >> system as a whole called Tychism. For although tychism does enter into it, >> it only enters as subsidiary to that which is really, as I regard it, the >> characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon >> continuity ... Accordingly, I like to call my theory Synechism ... (CP >> 6.202; 1898) >> >> CSP: I have begun by showing that *tychism *must give birth to an >> evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind >> are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism >> which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP >> 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892) >> >> CSP: In view of the principle of continuity, the supreme guide in >> framing philosophical hypotheses, we must, under this theory, regard matter >> as mind whose habits have become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming >> them and losing them ... (CP 6.101; 1902) >> >> >> For Peirce, tychism is "subsidiary to" synechism and "must give birth to" >> idealism, which is also required by synechism. We can then add his >> (extreme scholastic) realism to complete the picture. >> >> CSP: I have thus developed as well as I could in a little space the >> *synechistic >> *philosophy, as applied to mind. I think that I have succeeded in making >> it clear that this doctrine gives room for explanations of many facts which >> without it are absolutely and hopelessly inexplicable; and further that it >> carries along with it the following doctrines: first, a logical realism of >> the most pronounced type; second, objective idealism; third, tychism, with >> its consequent thorough-going evolutionism. (CP 6.163, EP 1:333; 1892) >> >> >> Synechism, Tychism, Idealism, Realism--no wonder Peirce's metaphysical >> views tend to cause a STIR. :-) >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 7:13 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> ET: Therefore - there is no 'a priori' or separate MIND. >>> >>> ET: I have disagreed with such a separate linearity. >>> >>> ET: ... mind and matter - are not separated from each other. >>> >>> ET: That is Peirce does not separate mind and matter. >>> >>> >>> You keep attacking this straw man, over and over; *no one is suggesting >>> that mind and matter are separate.* The whole point of Peirce's >>> synechism is that while "*mind *and *matter *are of disparate natures >>> ... this disparateness is a mere matter of degree" (R 936:3); i.e., they >>> are not "entirely distinct" (CP 7.570). The whole point of Peirce's >>> Schelling-fashioned objective idealism is that "*matter *is a peculiar >>> sort of *mind*" (R 936:3)--specifically, "effete mind" (*ibid *and CP >>> 6.25, EP 1:293) or "specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP >>> 1:312) or "mind hide-bound with habits" (CP 6.158, EP 1:331). What I have >>> maintained--and as Gary R. pointed out, what the overwhelming majority of >>> the secondary literature affirms, as far as we both know--is that Peirce's >>> *objective >>> *idealism is a particular form of *metaphysical *idealism; "the >>> physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" >>> (CP 6.24, EP 1:292). >>> >>> ET: And this has been my point all along - that you cannot separate >>> objective idealism from epistemological realism; i.e., mind is articulated >>> as matter; matter is instantiated via mind. >>> >>> >>> That is *not *what "epistemological realism" means. I already quoted >>> Guardiano's brief definition--"the real is mind, whether it is known or >>> not" (p. 191 n. 14)--and he elaborates on it a bit later. >>> >>> NG: Epistemic objectivity can mean many things to a philosopher, and >>> whatever its details on which Peirce elaborates in other writings, one >>> thing is certain--that he does not hold to an epistemological idealism, >>> whereby the real is taken to be determined by the mind of the individual >>> knowing subject ... Peirce is a realist as defined by his Century >>> Dictionary definition of "Realist": "A philosopher who believes in the real >>> existence of the external world as independent of all thought about it, or, >>> at least, of the thought of any individual or any number of individuals." >>> Yet and simultaneously, he holds to the doctrine of idealism as also >>> defined by his dictionary definition: "The metaphysical doctrine that the >>> real is of the nature of thought; the doctrine that all reality is in its >>> nature psychical." (pp. 192-193) >>> >>> >>> In other words, *epistemological *realism is essentially what Lane >>> called Peirce's *basic* realism--"A central thesis of this book is that >>> Peirce held there to be real things and thus that he believed in a real >>> world, a world that is the way it is regardless of whether you, or I, or >>> anyone else believes that it is that way" (p. 2). This is not in any way >>> inconsistent with Peirce's *metaphysical *idealism. >>> >>> ET: As I understand you, JAS, you do set up a linear path, beginning >>> with an omniscient God, followed by a primordial Mind which you define as >>> pure Thirdness, on its own - - which is then followed by 1ns and 2ns. >>> >>> >>> I did not say one word about God in my last post, and I also did not >>> "set up a linear path." Instead, I outlined a complex combination of >>> cosmological accounts drawn from Guardiano's later paper that must be taken >>> together, rather than treated in isolation. Here, let me summarize the >>> whole thing for you once more. >>> >>> 1. The *constitution of being* is an inexhaustible continuum, which >>> underlies indefinite possibilities, some of which are actualized (vector >>> of >>> *representation*, 3ns→1ns→2ns). >>> 2. The *sequence of events* in each case of such actualization is >>> spontaneity, then reaction, then habit-taking (vector of *order*, >>> 1ns→2ns→3ns). >>> 3. The *evolution of states* is chaos in the infinite past, ongoing >>> sequences of events at any assignable date, and complete regularity in >>> the >>> infinite future (vector of *process*, 1ns→3ns→2ns). >>> >>> 3ns is *logically *primordial relative to both 1ns and 2ns (#1), while >>> 1ns is *both *logically and temporally primordial relative to 2ns (all >>> three). 3ns is temporally last in #2, but the habit-taking tendency *itself >>> *is original. 3ns is temporally between 1ns and 2ns in #3, but those >>> are ideal limits. >>> >>> ET: My reading of Peirce in 6.24, is that, in his outline of [c] - with >>> "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as >>> primordial, which is idealism' - my view is that this refers to pure >>> idealism. >>> >>> >>> On the contrary, it refers to *any and every form* of (metaphysical) >>> idealism. The different versions vary when it comes to the details, but >>> not this fundamental definition. There is no warrant in the text for the >>> claim that "this refers to pure idealism"; in fact, as far as I can tell, >>> Peirce *never once* used that term in *any *of his writings. >>> >>> ET: Not subjective and not objective - but to the pure 'Platonic' style >>> which separates mind and matter. >>> >>> >>> Peirce provided a different name in the same passage for the >>> metaphysical doctrine that "separates mind and matter"--*dualism*, >>> which treats them "as two radically different kinds of substance." He also >>> provided a different name in the same passage for the metaphysical doctrine >>> that mind and matter are "on a par" and "both primordial"--*neutralism*. >>> He *never once* called either of these views *idealism*, objective or >>> otherwise. >>> >>> ET: Again - I have a quibble with this - to say that Mind, as the >>> organizing principle of the universe, has logical priority- makes sense >>> only because Mind is logical - but, I think that ALL three modes have >>> 'priority'. >>> >>> >>> That is *not *what "logical priority" means; and in any case, Peirce's >>> term is *primordial*, which in this context means "basic and >>> fundamental." Mind is primordial *relative to *matter; i.e., mind is *more >>> *basic and fundamental than matter. Again, "*matter *is a peculiar >>> sort of *mind*"--specifically, "effete mind" or "specialized and >>> partially deadened mind" or "mind hide-bound with habits." >>> >>> ET: Now - I know, JAS, that you will continue to disagree with my >>> interpretation of Peirce - but - that's just the way it is. It's NOT a >>> 'misreading' or wrong, as you inform me'; it's my interpretation and has, I >>> think, as I've pointed out in previous posts, enough backing from Peirce's >>> texts, to substantiate as a 'reasonable interpretation'. >>> >>> >>> Any legitimate "reading" or "reasonable interpretation" of someone >>> else's writings must be grounded in the text itself. There is absolutely >>> no basis in *any *of the passages that we have been discussing for the >>> assertion that Peirce *rejected *metaphysical idealism as the doctrine >>> that "the physical law [is] derived and special, the psychical law alone >>> [is] primordial"; on the contrary, he *explicitly endorsed *that view. >>> >>> ET: Now - whether others accept it or not - is up to others. >>> >>> >>> Indeed; as always, those reading along can evaluate our respective cases >>> and draw their own conclusions. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 3:00 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> JAS, list >>>> >>>> 1] As NG writes - NG: It is useful to think of the "idealism" half of >>>> Peirce’s philosophy of objective idealism as pointing to a theory of >>>> metaphysics, and the "objective" half, pointing to a theory of epistemology >>>> ... We can say that objective idealism includes epistemological realism and >>>> idealist metaphysics. (pp. 192-193) >>>> >>>> And this has been my point all along - that you cannot separate >>>> objective idealism from epistemological realism; i.e., mind is articulated >>>> as matter; matter is instantiated via mind. Therefore - there is no 'a >>>> priori' or separate MIND. >>>> >>>> 2] As I understand you, JAS, you do set up a linear path, beginning >>>> with an omniscient God, followed by a primordial Mind which you define as >>>> pure Thirdness, on its own - - which is then followed by 1ns and 2ns. I >>>> have disagreed with such a separate linearity. My view is that all three >>>> categorical modes operate together, within the semiosic process. >>>> >>>> 3] John Sowa provided an addendum to his post, outlining multiple >>>> versions of idealism; that is - there are not 'just the two' - subjective >>>> and objective idealism. My reading of Peirce in 6.24, is that, in his >>>> outline of [c] - with "the physical law as derived and special; , the >>>> psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism' - my view is that >>>> this refers to pure idealism. Not subjective and not objective - but to the >>>> pure 'Platonic' style which separates mind and matter. Peirce then rejects >>>> this - and offers his own outline of objective idealism, where the two ; >>>> mind and matter - are not separated from each other. >>>> >>>> As you, JAS, quote: "Nevertheless, he likewise goes on to describe >>>> objective idealism as the doctrine "that every instance of matter is also >>>> an instance of mind/feeling" (p. 78). And that is exactly what I've been >>>> saying! >>>> >>>> However - I disagree with this comment [not sure to whom it belongs]. >>>> " in other words, there is a sense in which mind encompasses both 1ns >>>> (feeling) and 3ns (thought), while matter primarily corresponds to 2ns >>>> (action)." >>>> >>>> Mind encompasses all three modes; matter couldn't exist without the >>>> laws organizing its matter. As Peirce writes; "All mind is directly >>>> or indirectly connected with all matter...all mind more of less partakes of >>>> the nature of matter' 6.268 >>>> >>>> And 'if habit be a primary property of mind, it must be equally so of >>>> matter, as a kind of mind" 6.269 >>>> >>>> That is Peirce does not separate mind and matter. >>>> >>>> 4] And, as I outlined Peirce's cosmogeny -[see 1.412 and 6.348] with an >>>> original - AFTER the Nothing - phase of pure feeling or 1ns. ..which then >>>> produced individual instances of matter [which would entropically >>>> dissipate] except that 3ns developed habits-of-association and formation to >>>> maintain this matter/mind actuality. >>>> >>>> 5]JAS wrote: " I suggest that this accords with the "topological" >>>> conception of continuity, in which a true continuum as a whole (3ns) has >>>> only indefinite parts (1ns) unless and until some are "marked off" as >>>> singularities (2ns). Specifically, the entire universe is just such a >>>> continuum (mind) governed by psychical law, whose indefinite parts >>>> (feelings) still exhibit considerable freedom, but whose actual parts >>>> (matter) are constrained by "inveterate habits becoming physical law." >>>> >>>> ET - I have no problem with the above. I've been saying the same thing >>>> - that the universe is rational and logical, and is articulated as >>>> organized matter - along with the freedom of chance. All three modes are >>>> necessary. >>>> >>>> 6] NG writes: ", mind is primordial, not because it is first in a time >>>> series, but because it has (phenomeno-)logical priority. (p. 196)" >>>> >>>> Again - I have a quibble with this - to say that Mind, as the >>>> organizing principle of the universe, has logical priority- makes >>>> sense only because Mind is logical - but, I think that ALL three modes have >>>> 'priority'. In other words - a universe without 1ns would be unable to >>>> adapt and evolve and change; it would be reduced to 'dead matter'. A >>>> universe without 2ns wouldn't exist since particulate matter wouldn't >>>> exist. And a universe without 3ns would be without organizing laws and >>>> would dissipate, entropically, into Nothing. >>>> >>>> So- how can one conclude which one has priority? All three modes are >>>> required- and can we privilege any one of them??? >>>> >>>> 7] Therefore - I disagree with: >>>> >>>> NG: " mind must be primordial to matter, since it is a necessary >>>> condition of such facts. (p. 198)" >>>> >>>> I think that the above contradicts the assertion "that every instance >>>> of matter is also an instance of mind/feeling" (p. 78). >>>> >>>> ------------------------------- >>>> >>>> 8] Now - I know, JAS, that you will continue to disagree with my >>>> interpretation of Peirce - but - that's just the way it is. It's NOT a >>>> 'misreading' or wrong, as you inform me'; it's my interpretation and has, I >>>> think, as I've pointed out in previous posts, enough backing from Peirce's >>>> texts, to substantiate as a 'reasonable interpretation'. Now - whether >>>> others accept it or not - is up to others. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>
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