Robert, List:
My current understanding of Peirce's semeiotic is grounded mainly in his
post-1903 writings. For one thing, he eventually abandons "representamen,"
having decided that "there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193,
1905). For another, he ultimately identifies not just three, but six
correlates--the sign itself (1), the immediate object (1/2), the dynamical
object (2), the immediate interpretant (1/2/3), the dynamical interpretant
(2/3), and the final interpretant (3). The "podium" diagram helpfully
shows how the immediate object (1/2) and immediate interpretant
(1/2/3) are *internal
*to the sign (1), while the other three correlates are *external *to it.
It also reflects how the dynamical interpretant (2/3) never fully captures
the dynamical object (2) in its entirety--the latter "is something of which
our knowledge can never be complete; so that there is always a difference
between the experienced thing and our idea of it" (CP 7.281, c. 1895).
Moreover, the relations of determination--in a third different sense,
besides the two addressed on page 12 of the paper--among five of the six
semeiotic correlates correspond to the two cylinders in the diagram. The
dynamical object (2) determines the immediate object (1/2), while the final
interpretant (3) determines the dynamical interpretant (2/3), which
determines the immediate interpretant (1/2/3).
CSP: Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the
Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the
Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant ... (EP
2:481, 1908)
The sign itself (1) appears to be an exception--according to Peirce, it is
determined by the immediate object and determines the final interpretant.
As for the translation of "destinate" and "explicit" into "final" and
"immediate," respectively, I have explained my reasons for that in the
past. Briefly, the immediate interpretant is "explicit" in the sense of
being "revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself" (CP 4.536,
1906), because it is "represented or signified in the Sign" (CP 8.434, EP
2:482, 1908); and Peirce often associated that which is "destined" with
that which is "final," even doing so specifically with respect to habits of
conduct and the ideal outcome of inquiry as the final opinion.
CSP: Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing
certain habits of conduct, the nature of which … does not depend upon any
accidental circumstances, and in that sense, may be said to be *destined*;
so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the
fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be
the same in the end … (CP 5.430, EP 2:342, 1905)
CSP: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so
far as there is any "truth") to its being the predestined result to which
sufficient inquiry *would *ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907)
However, my own speculative grammar now deviates from Peirce's by no longer
positing a linear order of all ten trichotomies to produce 66 classes of
signs. As James Liszka convincingly argues
<https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/semi/2019/228/article-p153.xml>,
this approach is "premised on a reductionist framework of semiosis that is
contrary to the irreducible triadic character of signs that Peirce
otherwise espouses," and "the remedy ... is to re-emphasize the processual
and functional view of semiosis, rather than to focus on particular classes
of signs." I tentatively propose the following alternative accordingly.
- The dynamical object is an actuality and the final interpretant is a
conditional necessity, both pertaining to the sign itself.
- The immediate object and immediate interpretant are possibilities
pertaining to a *type* of a sign, which belongs to a particular system
of signs with which the interpreter must already be acquainted (CP 8.179,
EP 2:494, 1909).
- The dynamical interpretant is an actuality pertaining to an individual
*token* of a type of a sign, which may be accompanied by different *tones
*such as voice inflections or punctuation marks that result in different
perlocutionary effects (CP 4.537, 1906).
- According to its relation with its dynamical object, a sign is *iconic*,
*indexical*, or *symbolic*; these are matters of degree, not distinct
divisions, and "the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic,
indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as equally as possible" (CP
4.448, 1903).
- According to its relation with its final interpretant--i.e., the
nature of its influence (EP 2:490, 1908)--a sign is a seme, a pheme, or a
delome; these are generalizations respectively of term, proposition, and
argument (CP 4.538, 1906), but I will stick with the latter for the sake of
familiarity.
- According to its relation with its dynamical interpretant--i.e., its
manner of appeal (EP 2:490, 1908) or illocutionary force--a token with its
tones is *suggestive *when presented, *imperative *when urged, or
*indicative
*when submitted (CP 8.338, 1904).
- According to the mode of being of its dynamical object, a term is
either *abstractive* when denoting a quality or other *ens rationis*, or
*concretive* when denoting a thing (EP 2:480, 1908); e.g., spots in
existential graphs are abstractives, while lines of identity are
concretives.
- According to the mode of presentation of its immediate object, an
abstractive term is *descriptive*, relying on an interpreter's past
collateral experience (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909), while a concretive term
is *designative*, relying on an interpreter's present collateral
observation (EP 2:404-409, 1907).
- Every proposition is *collective* and *copulative*; as I stated in a
recent post
<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-03/msg00028.html>, its
dynamical object is "the entire universe" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906),
which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209,
1903), while its immediate object is "the logical universe of discourse"
(CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903).
- An argument *in itself* is a continuous inferential process (CP 2.27,
1902), while an argumentation *represents *an argument as a series of
discrete propositions (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908) married by a logical
leading principle (CP 3.168, 1880).
- The final interpretant is a habit of feeling (association) for a term,
a habit of conduct (belief) for a proposition, and a habit-change
(persuasion) for an argument.
I am still working on building my case for all this and would welcome
constructive feedback to help me understand which aspects especially need
further support.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Fri, Apr 10, 2020 at 5:39 PM robert marty <[email protected]>
wrote:
Dear colleagues hello,
I submit for your review this preprint which is awaiting publication :
https://academia.edu/resource/work/41574474
Here is his abstract :
"This article organizes Peirce's universal categories and their
degenerate forms from their presupposition relationships. These
relationships are formally clarified on the basis of Frege's definition of
presupposition. They are visualized in a "podium" diagram. With these
forms, we then follow step by step the well-known and very often cited
third Peirce Lowell Conference of 1903 (third draft) in which he sets out
his entire method of analysis based on these categories. The very strong
congruence that is established between the podium and the text validates
the importance, even the necessity, of taking into account these
presuppositions in order to correctly understand
Peirce's phenomenology"
I would be very happy to read your comments.
Best regards
Robert Marty
