Helmut, List: Every genuine triadic relation *involves *three dyadic relations but is never *reducible* to them. There is no "sign-sign" relation in Peirce's speculative grammar, any more than there is an "object-object" relation or an "interpretant-interpretant" relation. Claiming otherwise would indicate confusion regarding the three trichotomies in the 1903 taxonomy--the first (qualisign/sinsign/legisign) is not for sign's *relation *with itself, but for the nature of the sign *in itself*.
CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law ... (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903) On the other hand, the second and third trichotomies are indeed for relations--object-sign (icon/index/symbol) and sign-interpretant (rheme/dicent/argument), respectively. In fact, the three correlates have exactly the same three dyadic relations with each other that one would expect--object-sign, sign-interpretant, and object-interpretant. The reason why the last of these never comes up in Peirce's writings about semeiotic is because it is the *same *as the object-sign relation, at least when the interpretant is another sign. CSP: Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its *interpretant *sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its *object*, as that in which itself stands to C. (NEM 4:20-21, 1902) CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A *Sign *is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) CSP: A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object. (CP 8.332, 1904) There are hints here of Liszka's alternative to reductionism, especially in the second quote where the chain of signs determining interpretants that serve as signs of further interpretants is implied to be endless, or at least continuous rather than *really *having the discrete steps into which analysis parses it. Peirce later proposed that the object-interpretant relation is approximated instead by the sign-interpretant relation, encompassing cases when the interpretant is a feeling or exertion rather than another sign (CP 4.536, 1906). CSP: ... the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. (EP 2:391, 1906) CSP: ... the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22, 1906) He eventually summarized this as the sign *mediating *between the object and interpretant. CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907) That is why the sign is the *first *correlate of the triadic relation--it is what *does *the mediating between the object and interpretant, the representing *of *the object as the second correlate *to *the interpretant as the third correlate. Moreover, for Peirce the interpretant *itself *is the meaning of the sign, rather than the object-interpretant relation. CSP: But, in the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine ... I call an *interpretant *of A. (EP 2:304, 1904) Expanding to six correlates, I suggest that the *immediate *interpretant is a type's range of *possible *meanings (for a term, its definition) within a particular system of signs, the *dynamical *interpretant is a token's *actual *meaning in a particular instance, and the *final *interpretant is the sign's *necessary *meaning under ideal conditions--namely, a habit of conduct. CSP: But that the *total *meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept consists in affirming that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind, the subject of the predication would (or would not) behave in a certain way,--that is, that it either would, or would not, be true that under given experiential circumstances (or under a given proportion of them, taken *as they would occur* in experience) certain facts would exist,--*that *proposition I take to be the kernel of pragmatism. More simply stated, the whole meaning of an intellectual predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen, once in so often, in the course of experience, under certain kinds of existential circumstances. (EP 2:402, 1907) Finally, I disagree that analysis can distinguish "as many [correlates] as you will." Robert's "podium" diagram clearly shows that in accordance with Peirce's three categories, there can only be six--sign (1), immediate object (1/2), dynamical object (2), immediate interpretant (1/2/3), dynamical interpretant (2/3), and final interpretant (3). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 12, 2020 at 2:21 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, All, > I vaguely remember about irreducibility and reducibility something like, > that a triad is compositionally (or another adverb with "c") not reducible > to dyads, but projectively is, usually, the triad being ABC, to AB, BC, and > AC. Now, in the case of sign it is different: The (projective or whatever) > reducibility goes SS, SO, SI. What is missing here, would be OI, at least > in Peircean theory, while in Ogden/Richard´s theory a relation between > object and interptretant does exist. I think it is called "meaning", > obviously being some ontological thing, while with Peirce a meaning without > a sign´s partaking can not exist. I hope I have not gotten it totally wrong > now. > Anyway, I feel that a sign relation is a triadic relation, but a quite > special kind of such. Its special way of being able to be projectively > reduced to dyads opens ways of relations based on projection (or whatever) > consisting of more than three: Six, to start with, but really as many as > you will, as every secondness (DO, DI) may analytically be splitted into > two more, and every thirdness (FI) into three more. > Is that probably so? > Best, > Helmut > *Gesendet:* Sonntag, 12. April 2020 um 15:36 Uhr > *Von:* "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]> > *An:* "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>, "robert marty" < > [email protected]>, [email protected] > *Betreff:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Categories and Speculative Grammar > Jon, All ... > > Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > - Every proposition is *collective* and *copulative*; as I stated in a > recent post > > < https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-03/msg00028.html >, > > its dynamical object is "the entire universe" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, > 1906), > > which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903), > > while its immediate object is "the logical universe of discourse" > > (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903). > > Thanks for calling attention to this point. I'm occupied with another train > of thought at the moment so I'll just stop to flag it for a later > discussion. > Incidentally, or synchronistically, lack of care in distinguishing > different > objects of the same signs, in particular, immediate and ultimate objects > and > their corresponding universes or object domains, has been the source of > many > misunderstandings in scattered discussions on Facebook of late. > > Another issue arising here has to do with the difference between the > "dimension of a relation" and the "number of correlates". Signs may > have any number of correlates in the object domain without requiring > the dimension of the relevant sign relation to be greater than three. > This is one of the consequences of "triadic relation irreducibility". > > Regards, > > Jon >
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