Jon Alan Schmidt concluded: We have to distinguish the quality *in itself* as a real possibility (1ns) from both its inherence in something that exists (2ns) and our physical sensation of it (also 2ns), as well as our perceptual judgments about it (3ns) and any subsequent reasoning about it (also 3ns).
From my point of view this is pretty basic trichotomic stuff. The quality, 'hard', can possibly (1ns) appear in many disparate things (2ns) such as diamonds, hammers, and rocks, while my physical sensation (2ns), the result of, say, having a rock thrown at and hitting my head may result is such perceptual judgments (3ns) as "ouch!" at the experience of pain, and such "subsequent reasoning about it" such as, "what direction did that rock come from?" and "who the heck threw that rock at me?" Best, Gary "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 9:29 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > John, Auke, List: > > I agree that the conclusions of semeiotic are "eminently fallible," as > Peirce himself described them. That is why we are not locked into > treating *his *speculative grammar as rigid dogma but are free to make > adjustments that we deem appropriate in accordance with the results of our > own investigations. We simply need to be clear about those deviations and > acknowledge that they *are *deviations, which is what I have tried to > do. By the way, according to Peirce, the conclusions of *every *science > are fallible--including mathematics and formal/mathematical logic. > > CSP: *Theoretically*, I grant you, there is no possibility of error in > necessary reasoning. But to speak thus "theoretically," is to use language > in a Pickwickian sense. In practice and in fact, mathematics is not exempt > from that liability to error that affects everything that man does. > Strictly speaking, it is not certain that twice two is four. (CP 5.577, EP > 2:44, 1898) > > > I disagree that my analytical approach is "detached from reality" merely > because it is "strictly formal." I recognize that it relies on > abstraction, but that is true of any purportedly factual proposition that > anyone ever composes. The object of every proposition is "the all of > reality," while its interpretant is "an abstract constituent part of > reality" and "a prescissively abstract state of things" (CP 5.549, EP > 2:378, 1906). Its parts are its predicate and its subjects, likewise > "creations of thought"--prescissive and hypostatic abstractions, > respectively--derived from our experience as it is "forced upon us in the > form of a flow of images," which in itself "has no parts, least of all > predicates" (NEM 3:917, 1904). Again, the minimum of *real *semeiosis is > a *continuous *argument. > > I also disagree that qualities "can be looked at as nerve firings or > agitations," because the latter are quite clearly *reactions* instead. > We have to distinguish the quality *in itself* as a real possibility > (1ns) from both its inherence in something that exists (2ns) and our > physical sensation of it (also 2ns), as well as our perceptual judgments > about it (3ns) and any subsequent reasoning about it (also 3ns). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 11:15 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> John, Edwina, list, >> >> looking at the subject line: >> >> I did introduce the nonagons in my reply to Jon Alan because I think that >> besides discussing theory with the help of examples, in order to stay >> grounded, it is needed to look from what perspective and with what interest >> we discuss the terminology and the measure in which what we state is >> compatible with Peirce's text. A main devide being an object orientation or >> a process interpretation of semiotics, both have their value. But there >> also are more subtle ones. >> >> Let me take my discussion with Jon Alan as an example. He is not wrong in >> my opinion, but has a very broad scope, in the sense that he is not >> interested in the meaning issue (semantical dimension) and the >> effectiviness issue (pragmatical dimension). It can be illustrated by an >> example. >> >> JAS to GF: I agree, but as I stated, "My purpose is to analyze the >> process of semeiosis *in general*"; i.e., the aspects of semeiosis that >> are operative in *every *context. >> >> While a student I read, in a psycholingistics journal, some recordings of >> and discussions about schizophrenics conversating. It was impossible to >> make sense of the conversation, but they adhered to the speaking >> conventions and constructed their sentences as correctly as in 'normal' >> conversations. It seemed to me that they conversed without a common goal >> and a goal that, individually, might shift for each new sentence they met >> with. Jon Alan, so it seems to me, restricts himself to that kind of >> 'anything goes as long as it adhers to the most basic rules' kind of >> approach. It is detached from reality, strictly formal and devoid of >> interaction. But not 'wrong' in its domain.And indeed, it make sense to >> only distinguish three interpretants. >> >> Jon Alan's denial of qualisigns, and personal choice to talk about tones >> instead, is of theoretical interest because it sheds light on the point at >> which we may differentiate between a totally context free semiotics and a >> "the proces of semiosis" covering semiotics (process implying a goal and >> context). Qualities, that can be looked at as nerve firings or agitations, >> that run unintellectual in a continuous stream through our sheets. >> Collections (pure icon) of firings (sinsigns) may have a familiar pattern >> (legisign). If one leaves out the qualisigns, one is context free. One >> could wonder whether semiotically speaking a characteristic of >> schizophrenics is, that their ability to sort out the collections of >> qualities got meddled, only the context free rules count. >> >> Comming back to the orientations in semiotic analyzis: object ( a kind of >> secondness, Claudio and I would suggest your graph work, but in different >> ways), process (a kind of thirdness orientation, Gary F, Edwina and I), >> distinction. Jon Alan can be understood to work looking at the sign only >> (firstness orientation). Note that each approach is needed, and of course, >> each approach is represented by a lot of other persons in a variety of >> shades. >> >> It is almost tempting to try to collectively make a nonagon with >> semiotics in the center by asking listers to score their primary focus. And >> to provide their reasons. In an extended version it could be asked to score >> others, and provide reasons. I would class Claudio and John bot in the >> object range in the symbol field, in the shade iconic symbol. But Claudio >> more at the iconic side and John more at the symbolic side. Why, one could >> ask? >> >> I keep it at this, a rhematic adress of the reader that the above alinea >> is intended to have. >> >> The main problem of peircean semiotics is that it didn't grow into a >> research program in the sense of Lakatos. That is because the different >> proponents of the different viewpoints didn't succeed in finding common >> ground. >> >> Auke >> >> Op 2 mei 2020 om 16:37 schreef "John F. Sowa" <[email protected]>: >> >> Edwina, Gary F, Jon AS, >> >> ET> My question about 'pure theorizing' so to speak, also arises from the >> quote below: >> >> "Now the whole process of development among the community of students of >> those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of the truths >> which must hold good of all signs used by a scientific intelligence is >> an observational science, like any other positive science, notwithstanding >> its strong contrast to all the special sciences which arises from its >> aiming to find out what must be and not merely what is in the actual >> world. (CP 2.227, c. 1897; my emphasis] >> >> Yes. Every science, including semeiotic, must begin with observational >> data. That is why I have insisted on examples. Without data, it's >> impossible to discover, test, evaluate, or even discuss any scientific >> claims. >> >> ET> After all - since mankind's emergence- we have had multiple theories >> about our reality - most of which have a logical basis, are reasonably >> coherent and yet - have no capacity other than their own insistence and our >> acceptance - to move out of a pure Argument and into the real world of >> Secondness and explain what is going on in this real world. >> >> Yes. For Peirce, semeiotic is a fallible science. It *aims* to find out >> what must be. But as we can see from physics -- the most advanced of all >> the special sciences -- every theory that has been proposed is eventually >> shown to be limited to the kinds of observations on which is has been >> tested. >> >> ET> many different research disciplines are exploring this real world - >> and their vocabulary differs - even though they are talking about the same >> processes! Therefore - I think that the Peircean world should not reject >> the research of other disciplines merely because the terms are different. >> The analysis is dealing with the very same processes - and it can be shown >> that the logical and pragmatic infrastructure of the Peircean framework is >> similar to that of these other disciplines. >> >> In his 1903 classification, Peirce made room for those sciences. He >> admitted that he had not done much work in many of them, but he did not say >> that their work or terminology was unworthy of being considered a science. >> GF>I simply find myself unable to come up with an individual experience >> that could be referred to as a “sign token” and has no context. Every >> example of a sign that I can remember or imagine experiencing has some kind >> of context which limits the kind of interpretant(s) it can generate. >> >> Yes. Science begins with data and is tested on data. The best theories >> are true of a wider context than the examples from which they were >> derived. But it's not possible to make claims beyond the range that has >> been tested. >> >> GF>: First, in the real world there is no disembodied mind and no >> disembodied semiosis. Hence there is no context-free semiosis. >> >> Yes. >> >> John >> >>
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