Jeff, list
I'm going to quibble with you that Peirce and Monod have entirely
different views - on metaphysics or otherwise. I consider them
compatible.
I've used Monod in my own work in semiosis and for a reason - I felt
he supported Peirce's agapistic view of the development of not merely
biological evolution but also the development of thought and
knowledge. . I no longer have a copy of Monod's work in my library -
but - my recollection and quotes from old papers is that Monod most
certainly was not what one might term a 'neo-Darwinist', ie,
anancastic or mechanical necessity that is without thought - with
'thought' understood as the operation of Mind. That was exactly his
point - that 'thought' was an integral part of evolution. And as
Peirce said, these actions are based on 'what is reasonable'. This
means that interactions - as Monod suggests - are not mechanical or
haphazard but chosen for their positive functionality
I strongly disagree that Peirce's evolutionary theory is
teleological; there is no predetermined agenda or identity; all that
we find is Mind-as-Matter, moving into ever more complex and varied
morphologies. This is indeed 'purposive' "the purpose being the
development of an idea' 6.315 - but - this idea is not akin to an
ideal [ie, as is a Platonic Form] but is an
open-to-variation-and-adaptation-and-interaction morphology. ie, the
'rationalization of the universe' 1.590 and 'reasonable 5.433. And
above all, the maintenance of 'Mind-as-Matter'. This is compatible
with Monod's rejection of teleology and to permit both chance and
transformation. .."nature is objective and not projective' [1971;3]
and self-regulating.
Edwina
On Sun 24/05/20 3:55 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
[email protected] sent:
Robert, Jon, List,
It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of
metaphysical hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution
proceeds, in some sense, from random variations. From this common
starting point, the positions differ on a number of points, including
the following:
Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed
of potency for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the
dough of creation. By the time living organisms evolve in the history
of the cosmos, the seed has been sprouting as the laws of physics,
inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry have evolved. One
considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over those of
Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the
ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves.
On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of
formulating hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical
validity while in the grips of a metaphysical theory. Instead,
common sense tells us that the normative requirements for the conduct
of inquiry involve the idea of conduct that is self-controlled. If
such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would not be
self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological
in orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of
inquiry involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed,
criticized, and reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings
of Camus and Sartre, seems to agree with these common-sense ideas
concerning the purpose-driven character of the conduct of inquiry.
Having said that, Monod seems to go further. Drawing on the kinds
of assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold
that the deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be
consciously selected by each individual in a radically free act of
choice. Otherwise, the purposes and principles are not authentic.
Drawing on a critical common sense perspective, Peirce disagrees
with these radical (i.e., existential and humanist) assertions about
the origins of meaning for human life. The wisdom behind our logical
and moral principles has been evolving for many centuries. What is
more, this wisdom is possessed by the larger human community and not
by any one individual.
The contrast between Peirce's and Monod's positions in ethics can
help us see some of the reasons for thinking that a normative theory
logic rests on principles drawn from a theory of ethics. For my part,
I think that Peirce is on a more fruitful track when it comes to the
question of what should be taken as the data for a normative theory
of logic. The data should be arguments that the larger community
holds to be valid--especially those that have stood the test of time.
It would be a mistake, I think, to take as our data a set of
arguments that some select individual takes to be valid--even if the
evaluation of those arguments is taken to be "authentic" because the
underlying purposes and principles are based on a radically free act
of choice by that individual.
As such, I think there are good methodological reasons for rejecting
the sorts of data that existentialists like Sartre and Monod seem to
offer for the sake of developing a philosophical theory of ethics or
a theory of logic as semiotics.
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 6:45:57 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate
Opinion (was To put an end ...) Robert, Helmut, List:
RM: In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you
use CSP's statements as an argument of authority.
HR: Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he?
This comment and question both indicate a misunderstanding of my
intent. I am not suggesting that there must be final causes in
nature because Peirce says so, which would indeed be a fallacious
appeal to authority--as would suggesting that there cannot be final
causes in nature merely because Democritus and Monod say so. I am
simply pointing out that Peirce explicitly (and repeatedly) affirms
that there are final causes in nature, such that denying the reality
of final causes is straightforwardly disagreeing with Peirce. I
trust that no one disputes this.
HR: "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working
out of a definite end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it?
No, why suggest that? Again, a final cause is not necessarily the
purpose of an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation.
The reality of final causes would not, by itself, entail the reality
of God; and atheism does not, by itself, entail the rejection of
final causation.
RM: Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according
to without a final cause there would be no evolution, arguing that
evolution itself is the realization of an end, which will no longer
be challenged by the science of its time (in 1902, I presume) which
would have provided evidence of it. The old notion (Democrite I
suppose) would be an old-fashioned one who can be mocked. There is
nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and that
Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition
a major scientific support ...
HR: One may also assume, that evolution is continuous adaption
without an end.
One may assume that, but for Peirce such "continuous adaptation"
would not be a synonym for biological evolution. After all, by
itself random variation is insufficient; natural selection also must
come into play, and it is not the brute necessity of the
"necessitarianism" that Peirce routinely dismissed as untenable.
Instead, fitness for a particular environment is the telos of
biological evolution--its ideal end or final cause, a "would-be" that
is never perfectly realized, because if it were, then the process
would cease. This philosophical observation is perfectly consistent
with not only the science of Peirce's time, but also the science of
today.
HR: And when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived to
operate without having been the purpose of any mind", had he
forgotten then, that he had claimed that the universe has a mind?
No, because he did not say that a final cause may be conceived to
operate without any mind at all, he said that it may be conceived to
operate without having been the purpose of any mind. Again,
intentional agency is not required for final causation, and Peirce's
concept of mind (and thought) is much broader than that. "It appears
in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that
the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551,
1906).
HR: The big chill too, like the big bang, is not scientifically
proven.
No theory is "scientifically proven" in the sense of being
absolutely definitive and infallible. Peirce's cosmological
hypothesis is that the entire universe is constantly evolving (3ns)
at the present from being utterly indeterminate (1ns) in the infinite
past to being utterly determinate (2ns) in the infinite future. These
are not actual states, they are ideal states that are approached but
never reached, like the asymptotes of a hyperbola.
HR: Organisms who have brains apply a third kind of causation,
volitional or example causation: They remember or anticipate
something they want to get.
This is still final causation, but it is the specific kind that
manifests as an agent having a purpose. In my view, influenced by
what Menno Hulswit has written on the subject, formal causation
corresponds to 1ns, efficient causation to 2ns, and final causation
to 3ns. This is evident in the division of signs according to the
relation with the dynamical object--the latter is the formal cause of
an iconic sign, the efficient cause of an indexical sign, and the
final cause of a symbolic sign. We can also see it in the three
interpretants--the efficient cause of the dynamical (effective)
interpretant is the sign token itself, while its formal cause is the
immediate (explicit) interpretant and its final cause is the final
(destinate) interpretant.
Consequently, every sign always (logically) has an immediate
interpretant (as a may-be) and a final interpretant (as a would-be),
but a token is only involved in the continuous (temporal) process of
semeiosis when the dynamical object determines it to determine a
dynamical (actual) interpretant. This degenerate triadic relation,
which is reducible to its constituent dyadic relations, is governed
by the genuine and irreducible triadic relation between the dynamical
object, the sign itself, and the final interpretant. Semeiosis
without such final causation (3ns) is not genuine semeiosis at all,
but rather degenerate semeiosis as strictly efficient-causal action
(2ns) due to "inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP
1.293, 1891). This is also insufficient for evolution because it
lacks the aspect of generalization, as Peirce explains.
CSP: Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not make the summum
bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process
of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those
generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we
strive to express in calling them reasonable. (CP 5.433, EP 2:343,
1905)
Those generals that "the existent comes more and more to embody" by
means of the "process of evolution" are both destined and reasonable.
But what did Peirce "just now" describe as "destined" a few paragraphs
earlier?
CSP: Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends
toward fixing certain habits of conduct, the nature of which ... does
not depend upon any accidental circumstances, and in that sense may be
said to be destined; so, thought, controlled by a rational
experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions,
equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end,
however the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the
postponement of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of
us virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the truth
of which he seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted
definition of "real," the state of things which will be believed in
that ultimate opinion is real. (CP 5.430, EP 2:342)
Something is "destined" in the relevant sense if its nature "does
not depend upon any accidental circumstances." The paradigmatic
examples are self-controlled "habits of conduct," which are beliefs
as the final interpretants of propositions, and the "ultimate
opinion" after infinite inquiry by an infinite community, whose
dynamical object is reality as a whole and whose final interpretant
is the truth. This is the telos of all semeiosis, its ideal end or
final cause, the aim of every sincere inquirer even though "the
perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the postponement
of the ultimate fixation."
RM: I am very grateful to you for producing a comparative
analysis and I look forward to it with great interest.
There are some hints of it here and in my other post this evening,
but more is still to come. Thanks for your interest and patience.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]
On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 2:55 PM robert marty wrote:
Jon Alan , List
In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use
CSP's statements as an argument of authority. Indeed, the quotation
CP 1.204 states a proposal according to without a final cause there
would be no evolution, arguing that evolution itself is the
realization of an end, which will no longer be challenged by the
science of its time (in 1902, I presume) which would have provided
evidence of it. The old notion (Democrite I suppose) would be an
old-fashioned one who can be mocked.
There is nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is
right and that Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do),
with in addition a major scientific support; and I guess it wouldn't
be sacrilege if someone sent the compliment back to CSP, 117 years
later. Moreover, his proclaimed fallible allowed us to yet would
oblige us to do so ...
CP 1.211 is still an opinion that concerns only, it seems to me,
the supporters of the final cause.
I am very grateful to you for producing a comparative analysis and
I look forward to it with great interest.
Best regards
Robert
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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