"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Jeff, list
I'm going to quibble with you that Peirce and Monod have entirely different views - on metaphysics or otherwise. I consider them compatible.
I've used Monod in my own work in semiosis and for a reason - I felt he supported Peirce's agapistic view of the development of not merely biological evolution but also the development of thought and knowledge. . I no longer have a copy of Monod's work in my library - but - my recollection and quotes from old papers is that Monod most certainly was not what one might term a 'neo-Darwinist', ie, anancastic or mechanical necessity that is without thought - with 'thought' understood as the operation of Mind. That was exactly his point - that 'thought' was an integral part of evolution. And as Peirce said, these actions are based on 'what is reasonable'. This means that interactions - as Monod suggests - are not mechanical or haphazard but chosen for their positive functionality
I strongly disagree that Peirce's evolutionary theory is teleological; there is no predetermined agenda or identity; all that we find is Mind-as-Matter, moving into ever more complex and varied morphologies. This is indeed 'purposive' "the purpose being the development of an idea' 6.315 - but - this idea is not akin to an ideal [ie, as is a Platonic Form] but is an open-to-variation-and-adaptation-and-interaction morphology. ie, the 'rationalization of the universe' 1.590 and 'reasonable 5.433. And above all, the maintenance of 'Mind-as-Matter'. This is compatible with Monod's rejection of teleology and to permit both chance and transformation. .."nature is objective and not projective' [1971;3] and self-regulating.
Edwina
On Sun 24/05/20 3:55 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Robert, Jon, List,
It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of metaphysical hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution proceeds, in some sense, from random variations. From this common starting point, the positions differ on a number of points, including the following:
Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed of potency for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the dough of creation. By the time living organisms evolve in the history of the cosmos, the seed has been sprouting as the laws of physics, inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry have evolved. One considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over those of Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves.
On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of formulating hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical validity while in the grips of a metaphysical theory. Instead, common sense tells us that the normative requirements for the conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct that is self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological in orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of inquiry involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed, criticized, and reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings of Camus and Sartre, seems to agree with these common-sense ideas concerning the purpose-driven character of the conduct of inquiry.
Having said that, Monod seems to go further. Drawing on the kinds of assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold that the deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be consciously selected by each individual in a radically free act of choice. Otherwise, the purposes and principles are not authentic.
Drawing on a critical common sense perspective, Peirce disagrees with these radical (i.e., existential and humanist) assertions about the origins of meaning for human life. The wisdom behind our logical and moral principles has been evolving for many centuries. What is more, this wisdom is possessed by the larger human community and not by any one individual.
The contrast between Peirce's and Monod's positions in ethics can help us see some of the reasons for thinking that a normative theory logic rests on principles drawn from a theory of ethics. For my part, I think that Peirce is on a more fruitful track when it comes to the question of what should be taken as the data for a normative theory of logic. The data should be arguments that the larger community holds to be valid--especially those that have stood the test of time. It would be a mistake, I think, to take as our data a set of arguments that some select individual takes to be valid--even if the evaluation of those arguments is taken to be "authentic" because the underlying purposes and principles are based on a radically free act of choice by that individual.
As such, I think there are good methodological reasons for rejecting the sorts of data that existentialists like Sartre and Monod seem to offer for the sake of developing a philosophical theory of ethics or a theory of logic as semiotics.
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 6:45:57 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)Robert, Helmut, List:RM: In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's statements as an argument of authority.HR: Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he?This comment and question both indicate a misunderstanding of my intent. I am not suggesting that there must be final causes in nature because Peirce says so, which would indeed be a fallacious appeal to authority--as would suggesting that there cannot be final causes in nature merely because Democritus and Monod say so. I am simply pointing out that Peirce explicitly (and repeatedly) affirms that there are final causes in nature, such that denying the reality of final causes is straightforwardly disagreeing with Peirce. I trust that no one disputes this.HR: "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it?No, why suggest that? Again, a final cause is not necessarily the purpose of an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation. The reality of final causes would not, by itself, entail the reality of God; and atheism does not, by itself, entail the rejection of final causation.RM: Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according to without a final cause there would be no evolution, arguing that evolution itself is the realization of an end, which will no longer be challenged by the science of its time (in 1902, I presume) which would have provided evidence of it. The old notion (Democrite I suppose) would be an old-fashioned one who can be mocked.There is nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and that Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition a major scientific support ...HR: One may also assume, that evolution is continuous adaption without an end.One may assume that, but for Peirce such "continuous adaptation" would not be a synonym for biological evolution. After all, by itself random variation is insufficient; natural selection also must come into play, and it is not the brute necessity of the "necessitarianism" that Peirce routinely dismissed as untenable. Instead, fitness for a particular environment is the telos of biological evolution--its ideal end or final cause, a "would-be" that is never perfectly realized, because if it were, then the process would cease. This philosophical observation is perfectly consistent with not only the science of Peirce's time, but also the science of today.HR: And when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived to operate without having been the purpose of any mind", had he forgotten then, that he had claimed that the universe has a mind?No, because he did not say that a final cause may be conceived to operate without any mind at all, he said that it may be conceived to operate without having been the purpose of any mind. Again, intentional agency is not required for final causation, and Peirce's concept of mind (and thought) is much broader than that. "It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906).HR: The big chill too, like the big bang, is not scientifically proven.No theory is "scientifically proven" in the sense of being absolutely definitive and infallible. Peirce's cosmological hypothesis is that the entire universe is constantly evolving (3ns) at the present from being utterly indeterminate (1ns) in the infinite past to being utterly determinate (2ns) in the infinite future. These are not actual states, they are ideal states that are approached but never reached, like the asymptotes of a hyperbola.HR: Organisms who have brains apply a third kind of causation, volitional or example causation: They remember or anticipate something they want to get.This is still final causation, but it is the specific kind that manifests as an agent having a purpose. In my view, influenced by what Menno Hulswit has written on the subject, formal causation corresponds to 1ns, efficient causation to 2ns, and final causation to 3ns. This is evident in the division of signs according to the relation with the dynamical object--the latter is the formal cause of an iconic sign, the efficient cause of an indexical sign, and the final cause of a symbolic sign. We can also see it in the three interpretants--the efficient cause of the dynamical (effective) interpretant is the sign token itself, while its formal cause is the immediate (explicit) interpretant and its final cause is the final (destinate) interpretant.Consequently, every sign always (logically) has an immediate interpretant (as a may-be) and a final interpretant (as a would-be), but a token is only involved in the continuous (temporal) process of semeiosis when the dynamical object determines it to determine a dynamical (actual) interpretant. This degenerate triadic relation, which is reducible to its constituent dyadic relations, is governed by the genuine and irreducible triadic relation between the dynamical object, the sign itself, and the final interpretant. Semeiosis without such final causation (3ns) is not genuine semeiosis at all, but rather degenerate semeiosis as strictly efficient-causal action (2ns) due to "inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1.293, 1891). This is also insufficient for evolution because it lacks the aspect of generalization, as Peirce explains.CSP: Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable. (CP 5.433, EP 2:343, 1905)Those generals that "the existent comes more and more to embody" by means of the "process of evolution" are both destined and reasonable. But what did Peirce "just now" describe as "destined" a few paragraphs earlier?CSP: Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of conduct, the nature of which ... does not depend upon any accidental circumstances, and in that sense may be said to be destined; so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of us virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of "real," the state of things which will be believed in that ultimate opinion is real. (CP 5.430, EP 2:342)Something is "destined" in the relevant sense if its nature "does not depend upon any accidental circumstances." The paradigmatic examples are self-controlled "habits of conduct," which are beliefs as the final interpretants of propositions, and the "ultimate opinion" after infinite inquiry by an infinite community, whose dynamical object is reality as a whole and whose final interpretant is the truth. This is the telos of all semeiosis, its ideal end or final cause, the aim of every sincere inquirer even though "the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation."RM: I am very grateful to you for producing a comparative analysis and I look forward to it with great interest.There are some hints of it here and in my other post this evening, but more is still to come. Thanks for your interest and patience.Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran LaymanOn Sat, May 23, 2020 at 2:55 PM robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> wrote:Jon Alan , List
In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's statements as an argument of authority. Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according to without a final cause there would be no evolution, arguing that evolution itself is the realization of an end, which will no longer be challenged by the science of its time (in 1902, I presume) which would have provided evidence of it. The old notion (Democrite I suppose) would be an old-fashioned one who can be mocked.
There is nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and that Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition a major scientific support; and I guess it wouldn't be sacrilege if someone sent the compliment back to CSP, 117 years later. Moreover, his proclaimed fallible allowed us to yet would oblige us to do so ...
CP 1.211 is still an opinion that concerns only, it seems to me, the supporters of the final cause.
I am very grateful to you for producing a comparative analysis and I look forward to it with great interest.
Best regards
Robert
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