Helmut, Jeff, List: HR: I am wondering about the difference between Telos and Purpose ...
*Telos *is simply the Greek word for "end," and when I use it, I am often just trying to avoid confusion with that which comes last in a temporal sequence. I mentioned *telos *twice in my previous post in this thread, and both times I appended "ideal end or final cause" because I think that these are roughly synonymous with it. Every purpose is a *telos *or ideal end or final cause, but not every *telos *or ideal end or final cause is a purpose. In our everyday language, a purpose is usually the intention of an agent, but a *telos *or ideal end or final cause need not be. Accordingly, stating that Peirce's evolutionary theory is *teleological *is merely saying that he *affirms *the reality of final causes, as he explicitly does in the quotes that I already provided, as well as elsewhere in his writings. Likewise, stating that one's own evolutionary theory is *not *teleological is merely saying that one *denies *the reality of final causes. However, claiming that *Peirce's *evolutionary theory is *not *teleological is a blatant misrepresentation since it is directly contradicted by his own words. JD: The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing metaphysical claims into the discussion of the normative theory of semiotics. I strongly agree. While the scope of semeiosis is by no means limited to human thinking and communication, our study of it must be properly grounded in those familiar manifestations of it. Otherwise we risk the mistake of reversing the specific relationship that Peirce consistently affirms between metaphysics and the normative science of logic as semeiotic--"Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896). We properly come to understand the nature of reality in accordance with how we have first come to understand the nature of reasoning, not the other way around. After all, "the entire universe--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth'--that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1905). In addition, "the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... an argument ... a great work of art, a great poem" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903). Moreover, "There is a science of semeiotics ... and one of its theorems ... is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). And since "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293, 1891), even dyadic physical (i.e., dynamical) processes are degenerate forms of triadic mental (i.e., semeiosic) processes. In other words, the study of the universe is the study of a *single *sign that involves an immense *plurality *of signs. There is nothing inconsistent or contradictory about this--such is the nature of *every *symbolic sign, which involves indexical signs and iconic signs; and such is the nature of *every* argument, which involves propositions and terms. In fact, I maintain that the minimum of *real* semeiosis is a continuous argument, which we can (and often do) *artificially* parse into discrete propositions and terms only in retrospect, for the purpose of analysis. "It is more than doubtful whether what we can state as an argument or inference represents any part of the thinking except in the logical relation of the truth of the premiss to the truth of the conclusion" (CP 2.27, 1902). JD: Does Peirce formulate explanations that are teleological in character when he explains the evolution of law? Yes, I think he does. Does Peirce appeal to teleological explanations in explaining self-controlled processes of reasoning. Yes. Again, I strongly agree. In fact, "The character which distinguishes [anancasm] from agapasm is its purposelessness" (CP 6.312, EP 1:367, 1893) because "[t]he agapastic development of thought should, if it exists, be distinguished by its purposive character, this purpose being the development of an idea" (CP 6.315, EP 1:369). Hence the rejection of teleology, ideal ends, final causes, and even purposes in evolution is a rejection of agapasm as Peirce clearly defines it. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 2:45 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List, > > The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good > methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing > metaphysical claims into the discussion of the normative theory of > semiotics. > > Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are hard to > make out based on what he says in *Chance and Necessity.* He does a lot > of hand waving and gesturing towards various sorts of positions as he > tries to locate his view within the larger conceptual landscape. I find it > difficult to bridge the many gaps in what he says about the larger > philosophical questions in metaphysics, logic and ethics because he is > covering so much ground so quickly. > > Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is > interested in looking more closely his monograph: > https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf > > Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward: "The > universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at last > knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of > which he emerged only by chance." (180) > > It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, > Peirce entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each > as implausible. > > Teleological explanations and causes involve pretty broad conceptions > that have a long history. As a person who regularly teaches Plato and > Aristotle, I tend to start there in my discussion of the nest of questions > that typically surface in discussions of these large ideas. Setting aside > all of the details that would be needed to make sense of how Peirce's > metaphysical > hypotheses fit into the larger historical story, my sense is that one > central question that Monod seems largely to be ignoring is the > following: what kind of explanation can be given for the laws of physics, > chemistry and biology? Why do the laws that appear to govern these natural > systems take the shape that they do at this point in the evolution of the > cosmos? Peirce's answer, of course, is that the laws of nature are > themselves evolving. > > Is the evolution of these natural laws adequately explained by saying > they came about as a matter of chance? No. Is the evolution of these laws > adequately explained by saying that they are the result of mechanical and > necessary processes? No. Is the evolution of these natural laws > adequately explained by saying they came about in virtue of a combination > of the operation of chance and natural necessity? No, not according to > Peirce. I agree with him on these questions. > > As far as I can tell, Monod is not asserting the third kind of > explanation. Rather, he does not offer much if any explanation of the > evolution of the laws of nature themselves. Rather, he thinks it is > enough to explain the evolution of the populations of the individuals that > comprise the systems that are governed by such laws. He attempts to explain > the evolution of physical, chemical and biological systems by appealing to > a combination of chance and natural necessity. > > How might we classify Monod's explanatory strategy? Here are five types > of positions that Peirce considers: > > Possible relations between law and chance in explaining the cosmos. > > A holds that every feature of all facts conforms to some law. A 's being > the persons who admit the least arbitrariness. Most everything is governed > by law. Nothing happens by chance. Does A also hold that every feature of > every law is governed by some further law of > > B holds that the law fully determines every fact, but thinks that some > relations of facts are accidental. > > C holds that uniformity within its jurisdiction is perfect, but confines > its application to certain elements of phenomena. > > D holds that uniformities are never absolutely exact, so that the > variety of the universe is forever increasing. At the same time we hold > that even these departures from law are subject to a certain law of > probability, and that in the present state of the universe they are far too > small to be detected by our observations. > > E's being those who admit the most arbitrariness (most everything happens > by chance. Nothing is governed by law. (Variety and Uniformity, CP 6.90) > > The position that Peirce is developing fits the mold of D. The position > that Monod is developing seems to fit somewhere between B and C. > > Does Peirce formulate explanations that are teleological in character when > he explains the evolution of law? Yes, I think he does. Does Peirce appeal > to teleological explanations in explaining self-controlled processes of > reasoning. Yes. Do I agree with Peirce on these matters? Broadly speaking, > yes. I tend to think that his hypotheses concerning the evolution of the > laws of nature and the systems that are governed by these laws are more > plausible than those that fit the models of A-C and F. > > Hope that helps. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Sunday, May 24, 2020 10:34 AM > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* [email protected]; Jeffrey Brian Downard > *Subject:* Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and > Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...) > > Edwina, Jon, Robert, Jeff, List, > > I am wondering about the difference between Telos and Purpose: Is it so, > that Telos is a Purpose, but not one of the individual´s mind, but of a > mind of a system on another classificational level, or, speaking with > Salthe, at another subsumption level? Then the individual is acting > according to this telos or purpose of the mind of e.g. its culture, > species, genus, life as a whole, or universe as a whole, and the telos is > inherited. A super-telos of evolution is individuation, meaning, that > instructions for acting shall not only come from such super-systems´ minds > , but from the individual´s mind, meaning, that telos is more and more > substituted by purpose, and evolution provides the means therefore, like > brain, thinking-in-symbols-capacity, language-capacity, etc.? > > Best, > > Helmut >
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