Jerry,

For which context? I do not recognize the one you provide.

best,

Auke

> Op 11 juni 2020 om 6:12 schreef Jerry Rhee <[email protected]>:
> 
>     Hi Auke, JAS, list,
>      
>     Could you help me work this out?
>      
>     AvB:  If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we 
> may say that he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did 
> err when he discarded A.
>      
>     ‘man is a sign’ (1868)
>     ‘the general answer to the question what is man? is that he is a symbol.’ 
> (CP 7.585)
>      
>     So there, (pointing), you have A and not-A,     because C A B. 
>      
>     What would be a reason to say we did err, were we to discard A,
>     since a two (sign) cannot be a three (symbol) at the same time?
>      
>     I mean what “either side” are we talking about?
>     Are we saying that we should only accept that man is a three because it 
> is the more considered view because later, and that man can no longer be a 
> two?
>      
>     JAS:  As I have said before, I believe that the proper approach--in 
> accordance with the hermeneutic principle of charity--is to assume that 
> Peirce's writings never contradict each other, unless and until this turns 
> out to be untenable. 
>     At that point, I agree that a case can sometimes be made for either side; 
> but my default assumption is that his later writings reflect his more 
> considered views, and hence should be given slightly more weight accordingly.
>      
>     Thanks for your time,
>     Jerry R
> 
>     On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 9:22 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < 
> [email protected] mailto:[email protected] > wrote:
> 
>         > >         Bernard, List:
> > 
> > 
> >             > > >             BM:  I was not trying to illustrate the 
> > project JAS is pursuing.
> > > 
> > >         > > 
> >         Thanks for clarifying this, I did not think that was your intent.
> > 
> > 
> >             > > >             BM:  Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a 
> > Sign, a complex one. But it needs to be perceived in order to act as such, 
> > I agree strongly with Robert on this.
> > > 
> > >         > > 
> >         I agree that a sign must be perceived in order to act as 
> > such--i.e., it must be embodied in an actual token that determines an 
> > actual (dynamical) interpretant--but that is not what Robert stated.  Here 
> > is the relevant part of our exchange again.
> > 
> > 
> >             > > >             RM:  A sign is always a real thing that 
> > represents because to be sign it must be perceived
> > > 
> > > 
> > >         > > 
> >             > > >             JAS:  Something need not be perceived in 
> > order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is capable of determining a 
> > dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an immediate interpretant ... 
> > and a final interpretant ...
> > > 
> > >         > > 
> >         My point was that a sign need not be perceived in order to be a 
> > sign.
> > 
> > 
> >             > > >             BM:  If it is possible to speak seriously 
> > about signs without referring explicitly to their technical definitions, 
> > what does it mean to practice "applied semiotics"?
> > > 
> > >         > > 
> >         This is an excellent question for those who routinely complain 
> > about the supposedly excessive emphasis on semeiotic theory in List 
> > discussions.  We cannot properly apply Peirce's ideas to today's problems 
> > unless we first establish what those ideas were, which requires paying 
> > careful attention to his technical definitions of the relevant terms.
> > 
> > 
> >             > > >             BM:  If signs need an observer, who is this 
> > observer if not a sign himself?
> > > 
> > >         > > 
> >         Indeed, as I have noted previously, Peirce often uses "quasi-mind" 
> > in lieu of "mind" when referring to both the utterer and the interpreter of 
> > a sign; and he says that "every sign even if external to all minds must be 
> > a determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a 
> > determinable sign" (SS 195, 1906).
> > 
> >         Regards,
> > 
> >         Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> >         Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> > Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> >         -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> > 
> >         On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand < 
> > [email protected] mailto:[email protected] > wrote:
> > 
> >             > > >             Le 10/06/2020 à 18:08, John F. Sowa a écrit :
> > >             >
> > >             > Bernard Morand summarized the meaningful content of this 
> > > debate in one sentence plus one image:
> > >             >
> > >             > BM> In place of the old, often recurring debates on this 
> > > subject I propose to muse over a painting from René Magritte entitled "Le 
> > > sens
> > >             > des réalités"
> > >             >
> > >             > That image, which shows a large boulder suspended in the 
> > > middle of the clouds, is an excellent illustration of the way JAS 
> > > assembles
> > >             > "fireworks of quotations" (RM's phrase) to state a 
> > > hypothesis (AKA guess) and defend as if it were gospel truth.
> > >             >
> > >             John, List
> > > 
> > >             I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is persuing.
> > > 
> > >             I wanted to ask by means of the painting: what does "Real" 
> > > mean ? With the consequence: What is "Real" in the nature of signs?
> > > 
> > >             This latter question seems to me to be at the core of the 
> > > Peirce's way of thinking.
> > > 
> > >             Going back to the Magritte's painting, I think impossible 
> > > that the boulder may be "suspended in the middle of the clouds" as John 
> > > see it.
> > > 
> > >             Because it would be a manifest violation of the law of 
> > > universal gravitation. The boulder is falling down to the earth that we 
> > > see distinctly on the lower part of the image, may be it is some kind of 
> > > meteorite.
> > > 
> > >             So we have from the beginning an image of the Reality: that 
> > > which will hurt you -and perhaps kill you-  if you stay under the boulder.
> > > 
> > >             But we can imagine some other senses of realities apart this 
> > > one that has been derived from the necessity of law.
> > > 
> > >             The boulder is really an event, here and there on the painted 
> > > scene, -it is an intrusion- and as such it causes an effect of surprise 
> > > for the audience (this effect is also initiated by Magritte himself to 
> > > make the spectator think about the scene). This intrusive event is also a 
> > > sense of realities: to be able of observation.
> > > 
> > >             Finally one latter sense of reality may consist in the 
> > > consideration of the painting as recalling to our memories the extinction 
> > > of the dinosaurs. A possibility already envisaged by scientists.
> > > 
> > >             Sure, all of this comment of the Magritte painting is highly 
> > > problematic. Many more stories could be presented in illustration of the 
> > > painting, probably as much as people commenting it.
> > > 
> > >             Sure, there is in this example nothing which proves that 
> > > Peirce's semiotic is a truth. As a matter of fact common sense has 
> > > already recognized that "an example is not a proof".
> > > 
> > >             Nevertheless one can see that his semiotic elementary 
> > > distinctions -immediate and dynamic object, immediate dynamic normal 
> > > interpretant, sign- are there, behind. I just choose to escape technical 
> > > terms in this mail.
> > > 
> > >             Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. 
> > > But it needs to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly 
> > > with Robert on this.
> > > 
> > >             I finish with two questions of which I have quite no answer:
> > > 
> > >             1) If it is possible to speak seriously about signs without 
> > > referring explicitely to their technical definitions, what does it mean 
> > > to pratice "applied semiotics"?
> > > 
> > >             2) If signs need an observer, who is this observer if not a 
> > > sign himself?
> > > 
> > >             Regards
> > > 
> > >         > > 
> >     >     _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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