Jon Alan, List We are at this point at the heart of our differences. That a sign cannot have a transmitter or interpreter is of great banality. Just consider the tides, the many pareidolia [1] <#_ftn1> for the former and for the latter think about the possible effects of global warming that no one has yet perceived. As for the signs produced in the space of the possibles by a human their interpretation can only be a "*vague view of the mind".* A view of the mind is completely unusable because of its indeterminacy and cannot have practical consequences without being updated. Such an "unreal" sign cannot determine anything real since it is not determined. How could he determine a final interpreter as a change of habit if anyone's habits are not affected by his incarnation in the real world, and therefore by the prior perception of an updated sign? If you avoid diving into the real world you can at will, in the universe of possibilities, *which is not subject to the principle of contradiction, *put the final interpretant at the beginning of semiosis, define the elements according to your own conceptions, while relying on quotations from Peirce that do not have, according to me, the clarity that you attribute to them. You will never encounter the edges of reality and the logics you can apply to them will brew wind in the directions that suit you. I can say about them that Peirce may have thought that his readers would be perceptive enough not to fall into this confusion between a possible and his incarnation.
"It follows that a member of this universe *[Firstness*] need not be subject to any law*, not even to the principle of contradiction*. I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason*. For that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially vague*.(C.S.Peirce, EP2 p.479)" So, the confusion must be lifted in order to avoid, in particular, that literalism can exploit it and oppose at every moment universes whose relationship is not exclusion but of embodiment. Indeed, it is the relationship between predefined forms, especially abstract mathematical objects, and the objects of knowledge they invest ... "While it is therefore true that the in-form of a doctrine can only be attributed to it by retrospective examination, it is conceivable that the examination of the procedures for detecting by the various forms of mathematization is an epistemological task inseparable from the history of science." (G. Canguilhem, *La Mathématisation des Doctrines Informes, *Preface, Hermann, 2003, ISBN 2-7056-1346-3) The representamen should therefore be rehabilitated in order to confine it to the universe of possibilities and the term sign should be reserved to the incarnate form. This is the reason why in my formalization process, I called these possible signs "protosigns". Protosigns are the a priori forms of all possible signs and the distinction must be made carefully with the "actual" signs that are these incarnate signs. The question will be: "Are we talking about the forms a priori in the universe of possibilities or of these same forms inscribed in the real world"? The form can only be represented by becoming a sensitive form in the real world and be perceived to be communicated. This shows how literalism can function as an obstacle to a truly scientific approach, disconnecting Peirce's semiotics from its pragmatism through conceptualist arguments and offering alternatives devoid of practical applications. Best regards, ------------------------------ [1] <#_ftnref1> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareidolia Le lun. 15 juin 2020 à 02:31, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> a écrit : > Auke, List: > > That is my concise summary of my understanding of Peirce's opinion as > expressed in his writings. I provided some supporting quotes in this same > thread a few days ago, as follows (Robert, please forgive the repetition). > > RM: A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it > must be perceived > > > JAS: This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement > that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., > is what it *would* determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP > 2:409, 1907). Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a > sign, as long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant > by virtue of having an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar > Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a > final interpretant, "the effect the Sign *would *produce upon any mind > upon which circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS > 110, 1909). > > > In fact, several years earlier Peirce already seems to recognize that an > *actual > *interpretant is not necessary, instead repeatedly calling it merely > "possible." > > CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the > Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the *possible *Third > Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the > *possible > *Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic > relation to the same Object, and for some *possible *Interpretant. (CP , > EP 2:290, 1903, bold added) > > > Later he explicitly affirms that "there must be a sign without an utterer > and a sign without an interpreter" (EP 2:404, 1907). Kinds of "signs > without utterers" include "symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, > groups of experiences serving as premisses, etc." "Signs without > interpreters" include pictures woven by a Jacquard loom that catch fire and > are "consumed before anyone can see them," "conditions and results" of > experiments with model boats that are "automatically recorded" but "nobody > takes the trouble to study," and "the books of a bank" when a balance sheet > is not drawn up from them. An example of my own is that ripples on > the surface of a remote lake at night are a sign of the direction of the > wind, despite there being no one there to observe them. > > Consequently, "neither an utterer, nor even, perhaps, an interpreter is > essential to a sign" (ibid). Peirce proceeds to "inquire whether there be > not some ingredient of the utterer and some ingredient of the interpreter > which not only are so essential, but are even more characteristic of signs > than the utterer and the interpreter themselves." He takes several pages > to identify the essential ingredient of the utterer as the *object *(EP > 2:404-409) and just two paragraphs to identify the essential ingredient of > the interpreter as the *interpretant *(EP 2:409-410). Every sign has a > conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and thus a possible > (immediate) interpretant, even if it never has an actual (dynamical) > interpretant because there does not happen to be an interpreter present to > be determined by it. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 3:59 AM Auke van Breemen <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon Alen, >> >> Is this your opinion or Peirce's? >> >> Moreover, my point continues to be that it is not necessary for something >> to be *actually *perceived in order to qualify as a sign. It is >> sufficient that (1) it *may *determine a dynamical interpretant under >> various circumstances by virtue of having an *immediate *interpretant, >> and (2) it *would *determine a dynamical interpretant under ideal >> circumstances by virtue of having a *final *interpretant. >> >> I am particular interested in where to find the source. >> >> best, >> >> Auke >> >
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