Robert, List: RM: Such an "unreal" sign cannot determine anything real since it is not determined. How could he determine a final interpreter as a change of habit if anyone's habits are not affected by his incarnation in the real world, and therefore by the prior perception of an updated sign?
This reflects once again our disagreement about the meaning of "determines" within the process of semeiosis. In my view, it only means "efficiently causes" when a dynamical object determines an indexical sign and when a sign token determines a dynamical interpretant (actuality). It means "formally causes" when a dynamical object determines an iconic sign and when a sign type determines an immediate interpretant (possibility). It means "finally causes" when a dynamical object determines a symbolic sign and when a final interpretant (conditional necessity) determines a dynamical interpretant. A sign that never *actually* determines a dynamical interpretant can still be real and have a final interpretant because it *would *produce that effect under ideal circumstances, just as a diamond that never *actually *gets rubbed with corundum nevertheless is really hard because it *would *resist scratching under those circumstances (CP 5.457, EP 2:356-357, 1905). RM: The representamen should therefore be rehabilitated in order to confine it to the universe of possibilities and the term sign should be reserved to the incarnate form. No, this would not be consistent at all with Peirce's terminology. For a time he defines a "sign" as "a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273, 1903) and "a Representamen of which some Interpretant is a cognition of a mind" (CP 2.242, EP 2:291, 1903), such that "representamen" is a *generalization *of "sign." However, two years later he describes "sign" as "a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition" and acknowledges that he "formerly preferred the word representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193, 1905) because "representamen" and "sign" are now effectively synonymous. Instead, it is a sign *type* as "a definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537, 1906) that belongs to "the universe of possibilities," although Peirce admittedly assigns it to the universe of necessitants; and it is a sign *token *as "a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time" (ibid) that is "the incarnate form." RM: The form can only be represented by becoming a sensitive form in the real world and be perceived to be communicated. I agree that a sign *type *must be embodied in a sign *token* in order for the sign itself to *act *by determining a dynamical interpretant. This is the sense in which "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303, 1904). It is also the sense in which "a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22, 1906). RM: This shows how literalism can function as an obstacle to a truly scientific approach, disconnecting Peirce's semiotics from its pragmatism through conceptualist arguments and offering alternatives devoid of practical applications. On the contrary, it shows how deviating from Peirce's carefully chosen terminology and his corresponding conceptual framework can result in misunderstanding and misapplication of his ideas; most notably, the rejection of final causation, which he explicitly affirms.. Moreover, my arguments are robustly realist rather than conceptualist (or nominalist), recognizing that reality includes some possibilities (may-bes) and conditional necessities (would-bes) rather than being confined to actualities. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 4:19 AM robert marty <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon Alan, List > > We are at this point at the heart of our differences. That a sign cannot > have a transmitter or interpreter is of great banality. Just consider the > tides, the many pareidolia [1] > <#m_3023044804399113558_m_7008256178111926644_m_4028518753449587719_m_5974681334274207485_m_-2178071239835973149_m_5240091734395543262_m_-5246159053361251967__ftn1> > for > the former and for the latter think about the possible effects of global > warming that no one has yet perceived. As for the signs produced in the > space of the possibles by a human their interpretation can only be a "*vague > view of the mind".* A view of the mind is completely unusable because of > its indeterminacy and cannot have practical consequences without being > updated. Such an "unreal" sign cannot determine anything real since it is > not determined. How could he determine a final interpreter as a change of > habit if anyone's habits are not affected by his incarnation in the real > world, and therefore by the prior perception of an updated sign? If you > avoid diving into the real world you can at will, in the universe of > possibilities, *which is not subject to the principle of contradiction, *put > the final interpretant at the beginning of semiosis, define the elements > according to your own conceptions, while relying on quotations from Peirce > that do not have, according to me, the clarity that you attribute to them. > You will never encounter the edges of reality and the logics you can apply > to them will brew wind in the directions that suit you. I can say about > them that Peirce may have thought that his readers would be perceptive > enough not to fall into this confusion between a possible and his > incarnation. > > > > "It follows that a member of this universe *[Firstness*] need not be > subject to any law*, not even to the principle of contradiction*. I > denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles, although the > latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the > contrary as a general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of > perfect actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for no other > reason*. For that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction > is essentially vague*.(C.S.Peirce, EP2 p.479)" > > > > So, the confusion must be lifted in order to avoid, in particular, that > literalism can exploit it and oppose at every moment universes whose > relationship is not exclusion but of embodiment. Indeed, it is the > relationship between predefined forms, especially abstract mathematical > objects, and the objects of knowledge they invest ... > > > > "While it is therefore true that the in-form of a doctrine can only be > attributed to it by retrospective examination, it is conceivable that the > examination of the procedures for detecting by the various forms of > mathematization is an epistemological task inseparable from the history of > science." (G. Canguilhem, *La Mathématisation des Doctrines Informes, > *Preface, > Hermann, 2003, ISBN 2-7056-1346-3) > > > > The representamen should therefore be rehabilitated in order to confine it > to the universe of possibilities and the term sign should be reserved to > the incarnate form. This is the reason why in my formalization process, I > called these possible signs "protosigns". Protosigns are the a priori forms > of all possible signs and the distinction must be made carefully with the > "actual" signs that are these incarnate signs. The question will be: "Are > we talking about the forms a priori in the universe of possibilities or of > these same forms inscribed in the real world"? The form can only be > represented by becoming a sensitive form in the real world and be perceived > to be communicated. This shows how literalism can function as an obstacle > to a truly scientific approach, disconnecting Peirce's semiotics from its > pragmatism through conceptualist arguments and offering alternatives devoid > of practical applications. > > > > Best regards, > > ------------------------------ > > [1] > <#m_3023044804399113558_m_7008256178111926644_m_4028518753449587719_m_5974681334274207485_m_-2178071239835973149_m_5240091734395543262_m_-5246159053361251967__ftnref1> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareidolia > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareidolia> >
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