"Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
wrote:
Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List,
Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on consciousness.
The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses.
Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic.
Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice?
If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope of phenomenological inquiry.
Here is my question: is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might shape our experience?
--Jeff
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 12:46:29 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:
Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.”
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Gary F., List
You wrote:
"what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears.".
I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares relations, is structurally coupled).
Best,
Helmut
27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:
Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of something existing independently of your perception of it.
But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this appearing?
I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197):
CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what he shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason will receive special attention. [end CSP]
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 27-Aug-21 10:37
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Jon A., List:
I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in the referenced slide.
CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:7, 1904)
I can see how this might bring to mind "the unknowable object in itself" for someone who is otherwise unfamiliar with Peirce's writings, but it surprises me that it is coming from someone who has studied them carefully. For example ...
CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. (CP 5.452, EP 2:353-354, 1905)
Besides, in R 337, Peirce is talking about observation rather than knowledge. His point is not that any external object is unknowable in itself, but that phaneroscopy studies only that which is or could be present to the mind, and thus "throughout its entirety open to assured observation." What we know about external objects is the result of inference rather than direct observation, beginning with quasi-abductive perceptual judgments as "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 8:49 AM Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
oh goody,
after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.
jon
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